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This dissertation explores the question of whether myth 
represents a kind of knowledge and a way of knowing useful 
to children at particular stages of development. The question 
is approached through an examination of theories about the 
potential significance of myth as an element in and shaper 
of modern consciousness. Myth as a way of interpreting 
reality is contrasted with the scientific rationalism of our 
age and is defined as a way of assigning meaning through 
narratives and symbols that create a unified concept of na­
ture and human life. 
The study found that the importance of myth in the learn­
ing process is different at different stages of development. 
At all stages, attention to myth in education supports the 
values of imagination, meaning, and community; but in child­
hood the main contribution is to developing the imagination 
and in adolescence, to establishing meaning. 
To explore the value of myth for culture and education, 
an examination is made of works of several writers who sug­
gest that myth continues to be important to people who no 
longer live in primitive or closed religious societies. Con­
cerns central to this study, such as myth in an age of science, 
myth as an expression of universal characteristics of the 
psyche, the role of myth in developing the imagination, the 
effect of myth on our understanding of the individual in 
relation to community, and the importance of myth to cultural 
symbols, are examined from the writings of Carl Jung, Joseph 
Campbell, and Northrop Frye. 
Studies are examined that support the idea that children 
of our century and culture have a significant relation to and 
need for myth that directly influences their educational de­
velopment. Recent studies are reviewed that point to the 
correspondence between Piaget's early findings about the mythi 
elements in child thought and Bettelheim's theories about the 
child's close connection with fairy tales. An examination of 
these writings concludes that there is strong evidence that 
traditional stories reflect the child's conception of reality 
and emotional needs more accurately than do realistic stories. 
These findings are applied to Egan's theory of curriculum that 
defines the first stage of education development as the "mythi 
stage," as well as to concerns about educating the imagination 
Investigation into the educational needs of adolescents 
focuses on the importance of philosophic ideas for this age 
and interprets this interest as a need to construct a myth 
that organizes knowledge and establishes personal meaning. 
Erikson's writings about the importance of ideology to the 
adolescent task of identity formation and Piaget's observa­
tions about the philosophic abilities and needs of adolescent 
thinkers provide the basis for the argument that myth in its 
ideological function is of primary importance to youth. Edu­
cational theory and strategies are suggested that focus on 
the student's need to think philosophically about cultural 
and personal myths. 
The perspective of myth introduces community as an im­
portant value in culture and in education. The analysis of 
education and community from this perspective poses some 
fundamental value conflicts over issues such as individualism, 
materialism, and progress. This study uses Oliver's perspec­
tive on community as a traditional form that meets human needs 
better than utilitarian, corporate organization models. The 
argument is made that myth and community are mutually depen­
dent and that education that focuses on the need for myth 
must be supportive of the student's need to understand and 
identify sources of community. 
Suggestions are made about areas for futher study, in 
particular the implications of this study for approaches to 
children's reading, to science curricula and to moral educa­
tion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this study is the pedagogical function of 
myth, involving such questions as: Is there a form or content 
in myths that teaches in a way appropriate to children? Do 
myths represent a way of knowing and certain values that are 
missed when attention is focused on reason and empirical in­
vestigation? Do myths give a different way of viewing reality 
that is both useful and valid? My approach to these questions 
has been to examine some of the major writings about the 
meaning of myth from a contemporary perspective and to inves­
tigate theories supportive of the hypothesis that myth repre­
sents knowledge and a way of knowing useful to school-aged 
children. 
It may also be important to state what I am not includ­
ing in this study. This is not an investigation into how to 
incorporate the great myths of the world in a humanities 
curriculum. Little is said here about the use of Greek, 
Norse or Indian mythology at different levels or the value 
of studying those or other particular myths. One will look 
in vain for names like Zeus, Athena, Balder, Homer, Bullfinch. 
But neither is this study concerned with the examination of 
modern myths, those themes or ideologies that represent the 
stories and visions by which secular cultures in our day 
interpret their goals and values, although the signficance 
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of both modern and ancient myths is discussed at various 
points. Rather the focus is. on the function of myth in human 
development and the significance of a "mythic perspective" 
on educational issues. 
Jacques Ellul (1975) observes that the attention being 
given to myth in our time appears to be something of an 
anachronism. The movement of western civilization over the 
past several centuries has been away from myth and towards 
science, technology and rationalism as the dominant modes of 
thought. In fact, in the 19th century intellectual world 
myths seemed to belong to the past, Ellul observes. But the 
work of depth psychology gave new meaning to myths as the 
expressions of deep and complex human tendencies, first in 
a negative sense by Freud and then in a positive role by 
Jung. Our attitude toward myth is changing: 
By a strange reversal, what now seems childish 
is not the imaginary myth but the rationalistic 
philosophy which called it in question through a 
failure to understand it. Cicero is seen to be 
more simplistic than Homer. (Ellul, 1975, p. 89) 
In discovering that myths are more than the interesting 
but inaccurate way that prescientific peoples explained 
natural phenomena, anthoropologists, psychologists, theolo­
gians and literary critics, in particular, have developed 
new theories about the place of myth in human consciousness 
and its role in human society. I do not find much evidence 
that these theories have made an impact on educational ideas 
and they may not so long as the social and political climate 
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continue to insist that the schools' main function is to 
prepare students to meet the needs of an industrial society. 
The underlying conflict between the mythic mode of thought 
and the current modes in Western culture is one of the con­
siderations of this study. 
Defining Myth 
In this investigation, I have had to struggle constantly 
with the problem of setting limits on the term "myth," of 
maintaining some reasonably consistent definition. The 
problem has not been with the common misuse of "myth" to 
refer to mistaken and discarded ideas. That popular use of 
"myth" comes from the 19th-century attitude, which still pre­
vails, that mythic perceptions are erroneous ones. However, 
it is easy enough to make a distinction between the use of 
"myth" to refer to a misconception and the use of the term 
to refer to those philosophic stories and themes that hu­
mans always have and continue to create. The problem with 
definition is the question of whether, or to what extent, 
modern ideologies and cultural themes are the extension of 
myth or are a related but different conceptual form. In 
working with the idea of myth I have found that its value to 
us lies as much in its ancient symbolism as in its schematic 
qualities, and thus modern forms that do not draw on that 
body of symbolism in any significant way may be only partially 
mythic. Consequently, I have sought a definition that is 
specific enough in giving attention to the body of mytho­
logical stories but also broad enough to suggest an ongoing 
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process. The following definition provides that kind of 
balance but is not quite complete: 
Myth is to be defined as a complex of stories— 
some no doubt fact, and some fantasy—which, for 
various reasons, human beings regard as demonstra­
tions of the inner meaning of the universe and of 
human life. Myth is quite different from philosophy 
in the sense of abstract concepts—consisting of 
vivid, sensually intelligible narratives, images, 
rites, ceremonies and symbols. (Anderson & Groff, 
1972, p. 42, quoted from Alan Watts, Myth and 
Ritual in Christianity) 
Anderson and Groff (1972) add to that definition the idea 
that a myth is a story that operates on the assxamption that 
there is order, meaning, design, and a life force behind 
nature by which the myth creates a "holistic, all-encompasing 
picture of nature and of man" (p. 43). Thus the essence of 
myth is, they suggest, that it "endows nature with life and 
purpose" (p. 54). We can say, then, that a myth is a way 
of assigning meaning and order to the universe and human 
life through narratives and symbols that create a holistic 
picture of nature and man. 
This way of defining myth is no problem when we are con­
sidering the ancient myths or those that people not influ­
enced by modern thought continue to live by. But what does 
it mean for people in the West whose vision of wholeness, 
if they ever had one, is seriously challenged by a natura­
listic conception of the physical world and a deterministic 
conception of human nature? Once the animism is gone, how 
does one again "endow nature with life and purpose"? Once 
one has seen the world as absurd and has looked into the 
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void, how can s/he talk about order and meaning in the uni­
verse? It is understandable that many will argue that to 
talk about myth again in our age is to talk about regression 
or engage in hopeless fantasy. 
There are, I suggest, two different ways that the person 
today is connected with myth: one is the ties we continue 
to have with the original form of myth and the other is the 
continuation of myth-making in forms altered by the social 
and intellectual changes of the last centuries. 
There are several ways that people today are linked with 
myths more closely than is usually recognized. Our dreams 
participate in the themes and symbols common to all of the 
great myths, as Jung has demonstrated (see Chapter I). At 
a subconscious level the dream-myth world is one with which 
we are deeply involved. Also the world of childhood is more 
closely akin, both cognitively and emotionally, to myth than 
has usually been acknowledged. To be a child, or to work 
with children, I will argue below, is to be related to myth. 
The adult's relationship to myth is primarily through reli­
gion and art, for the aesthetic and the religious are both 
expressions of the inner world that works with mythic images 
and patterns to create meaning and order. Also, myth influ­
ences our culture through metaphors we have derived from the 
stories. Thus Prometheus represents the struggles of the 
humanist and the liberator against orthodoxy;Sisyphus, the 
Existentialist's concept of the dilemma of being human; and 
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Oedipus, the psychological complexity and tragic dimension 
of human sexuality. 
However, in modern, secular societies the need to have 
common themes and goals that give a common purpose to the 
social order is being met more by modern ideologies than by 
myths. It appears that ideology is the form that the mythic 
impulse for order and meaning takes in cultures that have 
broken from their identity with a particular religion or myth. 
To a large extent, ideologies are the transmuting of mythic 
themes into a more philosophical and self-conscious mode that 
can accomodate economic and political ideas, as well as sci­
entific knowledge and rational discourse. In the same way 
that ideologies are more suited to the forms of thought and 
the growth of knowledge in our age they are also limited 
to expressing those modes of thought and thus lack the psycho­
logical and spiritual depth of myths. In that ideology and 
myth share the same function of giving an ordered and meaning­
ful interpretation of history and events for a society, 
ideology is considered in this study as a part of myth. But 
it is also distinguished from myth, lacking the strong narra­
tive, the large repertoire of universal symbols and patterns 
(archetypes), and the close tie between the human and natural 
world—all of which give to myth its distinctive form and 
function. Ideology, then, I shall treat as a quasi-myth. 
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The Mythic Perspective 
A basic premise of this study is that in addition to 
providing useful forms of knowledge for children, myths 
represent a kind of perspective on reality that should inform 
our theories about education. There are two aspects of a 
mythic perspective. One dimension is what the myths of the 
world tell us, in their amazingly consistent themes and images, 
about human nature and the kind of meaning humans make of 
their relationships with each other and with nature. To 
mention a few insights, myths tell us of the need to project 
an ideational world beyond the actual world, e.g., that we 
live between a lost paradise and a yet unattained Nirvana or 
Holy City that makes of "the time being" not just today but 
a pilgrimage, trial or endurance. In continually establishing 
connections between the patterns of human life and those in 
the natural world they express the importance to the human 
psyche (and perhaps to the survival of life) of living in 
an interrelated way with nature and the universe. Basic to 
myth is the importance of the spiritual world, either in the 
sense of a relationship of the divine to the human or in 
cultivation of spirituality as an inward state. According 
to myth, the order of the world is moral and thus instruction 
in what is good and what is evil and learning the balance 
between opposing forces is of critical importance. Myths 
often reveal the tragic dimensions of human nature, the 
destructive conflicts between passion and reason, the fatal 
flaws within the best of persons. 
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The other aspect of a mythic perspective lies in the 
recognition of the role of the mythic themes and symbols 
that are present to all people regardless of whether they 
have heard mythic stories. Here I refer to Jung's findings 
about the consistency with which certain mythic ideas and 
symbols recur in dreams and art. Whether one accepts Jung's 
theory that the mythic content is inherited or the conclu­
sion of others that myths arise spontaneously due to common 
psychological experiences of being human, there is the phe­
nomenon of certain mythic ideas and images that appear across 
cultures. What is represented by the artifacts of myth found 
in children, in dreams, in art and in religion is, I suggest, 
universal and representative of a depth in the human psyche 
that is not addressed by either rational inquiry nor the 
ideas of modern philosophy. 
The mythic perspective, I suggest, exists in all persons 
but often in a diminished form because in our culture we 
have little access to the modes of its expression, e.g., 
stories, symbols, rituals, dance, traditional communities. 
To be concerned about myth in the development of children, 
as well as in the life of the culture, is to take a position 
regarding values and trends in Western thought. For instance, 
it is to oppose the momentum technology has gained because 
of the impact it is making on the social and natural environ­
ments, changing our way of viewing people and the earth. In­
stead of the intricate web of interrelatedness that myth 
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portrays, we have in technology a set of possibilities for 
manipulating conditions to the material benefit of the in­
dustrial nations. It is to be as concerned for the culti­
vation of the imagination and a sense of moral responsibility 
as much as for the achievement of intellectual skills and 
mastery of a given body of knowledge. It is to be more con­
cerned with teaching cooperation and building community than 
with developing competitive instincts and satisfying the 
personal goals of individuals. Finally, it is to suggest 
that the mind is to be regarded and trained for intuitive 
and symbolic modes of knowing and expression, as well as for 
rational and analytic modes. 
How these values and ideas related to myth fit into the 
education of the child, more specifically how they relate to 
the child's development and the curriculum we use, is the 
concern of this study. 
The Plan of Study 
The order of the chapters is the order of the inquiry 
which developed a step at a time. My initial investigation 
was into writings of this century about myth. The work in 
anthropology had to be excluded because it is vast and is a 
whole conversation in itself. I chose Jung as the beginning 
point because his work has been responsible, more than any­
thing else, for the modern perspective on myth and because 
almost every writer on the subject has been influenced by 
his theory of the mythological heritage carried in the 
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collective unconscious. I then turned to Joseph Campbell 
because he is one of the great students of the world's myths. 
Campbell has also developed theories about how the modern 
person relates to myth and has written on the need to continue 
to know and construct myths in our age. Finally, I made a 
study of Northrop Frye's theory about the significance of 
myth in educating the imagination, a theory based on his 
extensive study of how myth is the structural form of litera­
ture. 
When I began my investigation into how myth relates to 
the development and learning styles of school-aged children, 
I discovered two important sources: the educational theory 
of Kieran Egan (1979) and the early writings of Piaget, both 
outlining in detail the mythic characteristics of the young 
child's thinking. These writings provided a picture of the 
child's cognitive needs that corresponded to the description 
of the child's emotional needs in Bettelheim's The Uses of 
Enchantment. These perspectives reinforced the growing re­
cognition by people in the area of children's literature and 
reading interests of the strong appeal of fantasy, tale, and 
myth. 
All of these sources, however, argued that the mythic 
world ceases to be important once the child outgrows certain 
modes of thinking and resolves the kinds of emotional con­
flicts portrayed in fairy tales. By age ten or 12, the child 
is through with the mythic mode and ready to deal with the 
real world through logic, reason, scientific investigation. 
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My argument, however, is that the mythic mode does not van­
ish but takes on a different function, i.e., giving order 
and meaning to the universe and establishing one's relation­
ship to that schema. 
In earlier work with Erikson's writings I had been im­
pressed by the importance he placed on ideology in the develop 
ment of identity in adolescence. From my study of myth I 
now recognized that ideology serves one of the functions of 
myth in our age, that of providing a meaningful structure or 
as Erikson says, "establishing the larger framework." Indeed, 
the way in which Egan describes the adolescent's need for 
philosophy suggests that it is the need to construct a myth 
rather than any abstract philosophical system that he is 
dealing with in his analysis. Thus my study of the educa­
tional needs of the adolescent focused on the importance at 
that age of constructing a myth designed to organize knowledge 
and establish personal meaning. 
From my examination of these and other faces of myth as 
it relates to education, I concluded that myth offers a 
different perspective on reality, a different way of knowing 
and of deciding what is important knowledge. Maxine Greene 
(1978) alluded to that difference when she wrote (with some 
dismay) about young people prefering mysticism or sensuality, 
"magic, ancient myth, orphic wisdom, or astrology" (p. 8), 
as an escape from discursive thinking, on the one hand, and 
the depersonalization of technology on the other. Exploring 
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what a mythic perspective, as opposed to a rationalistic or 
technologically oriented perspective, might be for education, 
I found that three ideas were prominent: the importance of 
the imagination, the importance of personal meaning, and the 
importance of community. The study of myth and the child 
led to some insights about the importance of developing the 
imagination and the function of myth is accomplishing that. 
At the adolescent level, the main contribution of myth was 
found to be in focusing on ways of learning that help estab­
lish personal meaning. This left me with the concern for 
community, a theme which had repeatedly presented itself 
from the beginning of the investigation of myth and a theme 
which is very important to me and which, in part, had led 
me to the study of myth and education in the beginning. The 
final step of the inquiry, then, was to explore how we under­
stand education and community from the perspective that 
myth offers. 
The analysis of education and community is based on a 
critique of values and problems in modern culture that, per­
haps, will not be as readily accepted as the conclusions 
about the child's and the adolescent's need for myth in their 
education. Community, like myth, is a very old form that 
represents some of the trade-offs our culture has made in 
order to accommodate new knowledge, the benefits of the 
industrial age, and the rise of the individual. In focusing 
on community, as well as on myth, I am suggesting that we 
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need to seek a new balance, where possible, between some of 
our old and our new values and modes of thinking. 
Overview 
Chapter I is an exploration of modern theories about 
myth, with particular attention to the ways myth continues 
to be significant in contemporary thought and what function 
it serves vis-a-vis scientific and rational modes of thought. 
Chapter II examines several studies of the thought and 
interests of the child that describe and interpret characteris­
tics related to myth. Piaget's early research on the primitive 
characteristics of child thought is examined and its impli­
cations for education are explored in theories of curriculum 
development, psychological needs, and interest patterns. 
Chapter III focuses on the role of myth in the adolescent's 
task of identity formation, with Erikson's writings about 
youth, identity, and ideology forming the basis of the study. 
Attention is given to the implications of the adolescent 
need for myth or ideology for curriculum development. 
Chapter IV is an examination of one of the primary values 
derived from a mythic perspective for education, the value of 
community. Distinguishing the perspective of myth from that 
of rationalism and technicism, I examine the implications of 
that perspective for an understanding of education and com­
munity. 
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CHAPTER I 
MYTH AND MODERN CONSCIOUSNESS 
In order to explore what value myth has for culture to­
day, and thus for education, I have examined works of 20th-
century writers who have suggested that myth continues to 
be important to people who no longer live in primitive or 
closed religious societies. From this area of scholarship 
I have chosen three writers whose theories seem to provide 
a fairly solid and broad base from which to establish a 
viewpoint useful to curriculum theory: Carl Jung, Joseph 
Campbell, and Northrop Frye. If space and time permitted, 
the inclusions of Mircea Eliade's perspective from religion 
and Claude Levy-Strauss' perspective from anthropology (to 
name only two of many possibilities) would give a more com­
plete picture. However, from the three examined we have 
access to many of the major ideas in the area and also a 
perspective from which further studies might develop. 
Concerns central to this study, such as myth in an age of 
science, the role of myth in the development of the imagina­
tion, the effect of myth on our understanding of the individ­
ual in relation to community, and the kind of consciousness 
that myth characterizes, are addressed here in different ways 
by each writer. Instead of arranging the material topically, 
I have chosen to treat the viewpoints separately because 
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their ideas are best represented within the framework of 
their main concerns and theories. Because each is a prolific 
writer, I can only give a partial perspective and have sought 
to emphasize those ideas about myth, modern consciousness, 
imagination, and community that offer the theoretical per­
spective needed for a theory about myth and education. 
First in this study is Carl Jung who has, more than any­
one else, created a new interest in myths and dreams as posi­
tive forces in the psyche. From a depth psychology perspective 
he approaches myths as expressions of the inward life, of 
psychic depths and structures closely linked to dreams and 
artistic symbols. For Jung, myths are of particular signifi­
cance as the bearers of our moral and spiritual traditions, 
as well as the protectors of these from what he considers the 
dangerous one-sidedness of our scientific, rational and indi­
vidualistic culture. 
Next I will discuss Joseph Campbell who, from a literary 
and historical perspective, examines mythologies both for what 
they as a body say about the meaning of myths and for what 
they reveal about the role of myth in human society and 
individual consciousness. Resolving the myth-science con­
flict, finding the universals in the myths of the world, and 
finding ways to express and create myths beyond the dogmas 
of religion are some of his concerns. 
Northrop Frye developed his theories about myths from 
his work in literary criticism. In particular, his studies 
of Blake led him to examine mythology as the source of literary 
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structures and the keystone of literary criticism. From his 
study he concludes not only that myths were originally essen­
tial in the development of literary forms but also that they 
continue to be vital in the education of the imagination and 
the projection of ideals in a time when realism tends to limit 
our social imagination. 
All of these writers address the issue of what scientific 
and rational thinking have done to the modern consciousness 
and thus the ambiguity and hostility that characterize much 
of the Western attitude toward myths. They all imply that one 
of the most critical problems of modern life, alienation, 
stems from the break with the mythological heritage and the 
community-oriented perspective it held. It is not to deny 
the gains in terms of individual freedom and the growth of 
knowledge that came from that break, but to try to discover 
new ways to relate to the mythological heritage that they 
are concerned when they write about the value of myth in our 
time. 
Carl Jung 
As scientific understanding has grown, so our world 
has become dehumanized. Man feels himself isolated 
in the cosmos, because he is no longer involved in 
nature and has lost his emotional 'unconscious iden­
tity' with natural phenomena. These have slowly 
lost their symbolic implications. Thunder is no 
longer the voice of an angry god, nor is lightening 
his avenging missle. No river contains a spirit, 
no tree is the life principle of a man, no snake 
the embodiment of wisdom, no mountain cave the 
home of a great demon. No voices now speak to man 
from stones, plants, and animals, nor does he speak 
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to them believing they can hear. His contact with 
nature has gone, and with it has gone the profound 
emotional energy that his symbolic connection sup­
plied. (Jung, 1968, p. 85) 
What do myths mean to us as inhabitants of the "modern 
Aristotelian city/Of darning and the eight-fifteen" (Auden)? 
This question includes both the concern for whether the mode 
of thought represented in mythic thinking is made useless 
by the scientific rationalism of our age. Without mythologies, 
Jung (1968) suggests, life is without a broader meaning than 
meeting of basic needs and the acquiring of goods. Our Western 
civilization is suffering the loss of its beliefs and mythic 
consciousness to a degree we scarcely understand and with 
consequences beyond our present considerations. Our pursuit 
of the scientific and our belief in rationalism have resulted 
in a disorientation and dehumanization: 
Modern man does not understand how much his 'rationa­
lism' (which has destroyed his capacity to respond to 
numinous symbols and ideas) has put him at the mercy 
of the psychic 'underworld.' He has freed himself 
from superstitution (or so he believes) but in the 
process he has lost his spiritual values to a posi­
tively dangerous degree. His moral and spiritual 
tradition has disintegrated, and he is now paying 
the price for this break-up in world-wide disorien­
tation and dissociation. (Jung, 1968, p. 84) 
It is this belief that myths express our moral and spirit­
ual traditions and are an expression of our search for mean­
ing, the positive integration of self and world, that charac­
terizes Jung's approach to the study of myths. The understanding 
of myths begins, for him, with the study of the psyche. 
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Central Psychological Concepts 
In writing about the layers of human consciousness, Jung 
defines three levels of the psyche and their contents which 
are summarized as follows: 
(a) conscious—that which seems to come to us through 
sense-perceptions and is known to us through think­
ing or reflection, 
(b) personal unconscious—those things that are lost 
from consciousness because they lose their intensity 
or are repressed, as well as sense impressions not 
strong enough to enter consciousness, and 
(c) collective unconscious—the images and patterns laid 
down from earliest times that form a stratum common 
to all people and reflecting the primitive interpre­
tation of phenomena. (Progoff, 1953, pp. 66-68) 
It is with the first and third of these that Jung is most in­
terested, and the concept of the "collective unconscious" is 
perhaps his most definitive and provocative contribution to 
psychology. Progoff (1953) observes that Jung rejects Freud's 
concept of the unconscious as those drives that are suppressed 
because they are destructive and unacceptable and posits, 
rather, a rich and profitable realm of the psyche, the con­
tents of which may be beneficial to the individual who can 
be in touch with them through dream, myth, and art. Indeed, 
the full maturing and realization of creative potential is 
dependent on an integration of the conscious with the uncon­
scious . 
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Jung (1963) finds evidence of an unconscious that is 
more than personal or cultural experience and history in the 
universal motifs that appear in dreams, myths, and art. It 
is the phenomenon of universality that leads him to posit a 
collective unconscious, a stratum of the psyche that is com­
mon to all people. The deeper one goes into the psyche the 
closer one gets to the universals and to the biological/ 
animal dimension of man, and the more one finds unity and 
less differentiation. Thus he suggests that the universals 
are much like inherited instincts that reach backwards to 
man's most primitive life. The origin of these patterns is 
the imprinting on the psyche of regular physical events (such 
as the body's need for a system of functions for adapting), 
an imprinting that is fantastic or distorted because the 
primitive mind did not make the distinction between subject 
and object we make now. Progoff (1953) suggests that "col­
lective" is a word to contrast with "personal"; the develop­
ment of individuality requires an emergence from the collective. 
The collective is also prior to and more fundamental than 
the individual. Myths are, Jung thinks, the primordial images 
and motifs projected from that collective unconscious. 
The universals are expressed symbolically in archetypal 
images that arise from the collective unconscious. Jaffe 
(1971) points out that Jung first wrote about the archetypes 
as "primordial images," "deposits," or "inherited pathways," 
but later decided that they were not laid down or accumulated 
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through history but original, "the timeless constants of human 
nature" (p. 17). The archetypes are themselves the forms 
or the potentialities in the psyche, or in Progoff's (1953) 
words, "the symbols that represent psychic processes, generic 
to the human species" (p. 58). However, they are manifest 
only in contents that are tied to historical experiences and 
thus they appear in many forms in the lives of individuals 
and in myths. The evidence for the archetypes Jung finds in 
the patterns of symbol formation in myths and in dreams of 
people of all cultures; thus his definition of archetypes: 
forms or images of a collective nature which occur 
practically all over the earth as constitutents of 
myths and at the same time as autochthonous, in­
dividual products of unconscious origin. (Progoff, 
1953, p. 69) 
Anti-mythic Dimensions of Modern Thought 
Looking at civilized man of this age^ Jung (1963) sees 
the development of consciousness as an evolutionary product 
that has gone to a dangerous extreme, the correction of which 
is inevitable. There are both promising and threatening signs 
of the reassertion of the suppressed subconscious energies, 
but the necessity of restoring a balance between the conscious 
and unconscious dimension of the psyche is unquestioned. It 
is this concern for regaining a balance, for correcting a 
modern tendency, that is the background for Jung's warnings 
about the dangers of stressing individuality and keeping the 
unconscious and collective in the background. Progoff (1953) 
comments on Jung's concern over this imbalance: 
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a main contention regarding the 'diagnosis' of the 
condition of modern man is that consciousness has 
been overstressed to the point where an unbalanced 
situation has developed in the psyche. (p. 78) 
He quotes Jung on the danger in the modern attitude that "en­
tirely forgets that it carries the whole living past in the 
lower stories of the skyscraper of rational consciousness" 
(p. 78). The conscious will threatens to take over to the 
point of losing contact with the archetypes and thus insuring 
its own collapse. 
In the essay, "The Psychology of the Child Archetype," 
Jung (1963) writes that the increase of freedom and rationality 
is at the risk of man loosing touch with "the laws and roots 
of his being." The conscious mind is by nature one-sided, 
its effort being "to concentrate on relatively few contents 
and to raise them to the highest pitch of clarity" (p. 81). 
This capacity to train the will to attain what in his con­
sciousness and rationality man desires is deemed progressive, 
but it is also potentially destructive: 
This assertion of the will means, on the one hand, 
the possibility of human freedom, but on the other 
it is a source of endless transgressions against 
one's instincts, like the animal, is characterized 
by fear of novelty and adherence to tradition. To 
our way of thinking he is painfully backward, where­
as we exalt progress. But our progressiveness, though 
it may result in a great many delightful wish-fulfill­
ments, piles up an equally gigantic Promethean debt 
which has to be paid off from time to time in the 
form of hideous catastrophes. . . . Our differentiated 
consciousness is in continual danger of being uprooted; 
hence it needs compensation through the still existing 
state of childhood. (Jung, 1963, p. 82) 
In this article Jung (1963) points out that such "com­
pensation" appears to reflect a timid and conversative mode, 
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but in fact is both a protective and moral stance that seeks 
to keep the psyche rooted and thus whole: 
But inasmuch as man has, in high degree, the capaci­
ty for cutting himself off from his own roots, he 
may also be swept uncritically to catastrophe by 
his dangerous one-sidedness. The retarding ideal 
is always more primitive, more natural (in the 
good sense as in the bad), and more 'moral' in that 
it keeps faith with law and tradition. The progres­
sive ideal is always more abstract, more unnatural, 
and less 'moral' in that it demands disloyalty to 
tradition. . . . The more differentiated conscious­
ness becomes, the greater the danger of severance 
from the root-condition. (p. 82) 
Jung thus gives us a radically different perspective 
on the meaning of community to the individual from that of 
Freud. The cultural heritage is not just an inevitable part 
of the psychological make-up but, essentially, a positive 
life-giving, fruitful source for the individual, a bearer 
of the images, patterns and rootedness that are necessary 
for depth. History and civilization are the sources of power­
ful psychic energy that is essential for self-realization, 
creativity, integration, individual expression; not, as in 
Freud, the necessary but negative forces containing our baser 
drives. However, as we shall discuss below, his is not an 
unqualified endorsement of a culture, a status quo; in fact, 
he writes in an almost contradictory way of the importance 
of the individual as an active moral agent transcending the 
limits set by society. 
The Individual and the Collective; 
The Mythic Perspective 
Individuality is, in Jung's view, but one aspect of the 
self, a tip of the iceberg, which can be given too much 
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attention. In thus diminishing the importance of individual­
ity in the totality of the human psyche and in giving direc­
tion to human history Jung goes against the mainstream of 
Western thought. He claims that the individual person as 
one conscious of his/her individuality is a rather recent 
occurrence in human development and that the psyche is still 
largely a product of the "primitive" experience which does 
not differentiate between self and world. 
In discussing Jung's analysis of the individual's rela­
tion to society, Progoff (1953) observes that Jung departs 
from the usual psychological approach that understands society 
as a generalization of the individual by asserting that man's 
social dimension is inherent in his nature. Thus Jung opposes 
the liberal idea that society is made up of individuals in a 
social contract. Rather the psyche must have culture, a 
position that Jung comes to, Progoff thinks, from the greater 
influence of sociologists like Durkheim and Burckhardt than 
that of psychological writers and from his conclusion that 
the deeper levels of the unconscious are derived from man­
kind's great communal experiences, not from individual ex­
periences. Progoff concludes that Jung sees individuality as 
a derivitive of society and social experiences as the main 
source of content for the individual psyche. And since Jung 
understands the social as "essentially the unconscious, and 
more particularly the deeper layers of the Collective Uncon­
scious," (p. 163), Progoff thinks we can draw a parallel 
between consciousness emerging out of the unconscious and 
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the individual becoming differentiated from society. Jung 
(1976) makes this parallel in his essay "Relations Between 
the Ego and the Unconscious": 
We shall probably get nearest to the truth if we 
think of the conscious and personal psyche as rest­
ing upon the broad basis of an inherited and univer­
sal psychic disposition which is as such unconscious, 
and that our personal psyche bears the same relation 
to the collective psyche as the individual to society, 
(p. 93) 
On the other hand, Jung continues in the essay as if he 
were in the mainstream of Western liberalism in his assertions 
that personality and individuality must continually assert 
their independence from and superiority over society and over 
forms of collective thinking. The drive toward personality 
which has been a major dynamic in history since the flowering 
of Greek civilization is always threatened by invasion of 
the collective psyche: 
Collective thinking and feeling and collective ef­
fort are far less a strain than individual function­
ing and effort; hence there is always a great tempta­
tion to allow collective functioning to take the 
place of individual differentiation of the personali­
ty. (p. 98) 
And there is the greater danger, he suggests, that discovery 
of the collective through the analysis of the unconscious will 
bring not only an unhealthy fusion of the personal psyche 
with the collective but also an effort to enforce 
. . . the demands of his unconscious upon others, 
for identity with the collective psyche always brings 
with it a feeling of universal validity—'godlikeness' 
—which completely ignores all differences in the 
personal psyche of his fellows. (p. 99) 
Jung (1976) goes on in this essay to describe thd col­
lective or the social in its most destructive potential, 
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setting up the individual as the source of the moral. In par­
ticular, it is the large community or State that disregards 
the individual and perpetuates mediocrity: 
The element of differentiation is the individual. 
All the highest achievements of virtue, as well as 
the blackest villainies, are individual. The 
larger a community is, and the more the sum total 
of collective factors peculiar to every large com­
munity rests on conservative prejudices detrimental 
to individuality, the more will the individual be 
morally and spiritually crushed, and, as a result, 
the one source of moral and spiritual progress for 
society is choked up. Naturally the only thing that 
can thrive in such an atmosphere is sociality and 
whatever is collective in the individual. Every­
thing individual in him goes under, i.e., is doomed 
to repression. . . . It is a notorious fact that 
the morality of society as a whole is in inverse 
ratio to its size; for the greater the aggregation 
of individuals, the more the individual factors are 
blotted out, and with them morality, which rests 
entirely on the moral sense of the individual and 
the freedom necessary for this. Hence every man is, 
in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when 
he is in society than when acting alone; for he is 
carried by society and to that extent relieved of 
his individual responsibility. (p. 100) 
The different statements in which Jung locates morality 
in the action of the free individual making conscious choices, 
on the one hand, and in the tradition-bearing community up­
holding values and laws, on the other hand, are not harmonious. 
What we see, rather, is the tension in which Jung perceives 
the dimensions of the psyche, consciousness, and their corre­
spondents, individual and society. Consciousness, and thus 
personality, is a fragile state. In Man and His Symbols, 
Jung (1963) speaks of it as still in an "experimental state," 
"still a doubtful affair," (p. 8) that can be easily disrupted 
and overwhelmed. Society and the unconscious care little, 
if at all, for the individual and even find this differentia­
tion a threat; thus the need to support and sustain the emer­
gence of the personality. Yet to the extent that such self-
knowledge and differentiation are dependent on separation 
and denial of the rootedness in the collective unconscious, 
the movement toward the individual threatens both the full 
realization of the self and culture. 
If Jung, then, warns our age of the dangers, on the one 
hand, of the individual slipping back into the collective 
thought (an easier state) and thus loosing freedom to choose 
the good, and, on the other hand, of carrying our drive for 
freedom too far to an individuality that cuts us off from 
the depths within ourselves and in the past whose traditions 
carry our common symbols, he is leading us to acknowledge 
the poles of a dialectic—the individual and the collective— 
the dangers and powers of each we ignore to our peril. In­
dividuation is the synthesis toward which both self and, we 
can speculate, culture strive. It is a process of realizing 
the inter-connectedness of conscious and unconscious. Or as 
Progoff (1953) defines it, an inter-weaving relationship: 
The archetypes of the collective experience, which 
are the symbols of the society, must be expressed 
through individuals; on the other hand, individuals 
must rely on collective material for the basic 
content of their personalities. This inter-weaving 
relationship, coming together from opposite directions, 
is at the heart of the interpretation of the individ­
ual in society. (p. 176) 
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Myth and the Search for 
Wholeness and Depth 
Essential to that integration is' finding a new stage of 
interpretation for the archetypes in each age "in order to 
connect the life of the past that still exists in us with the 
life of the present, which treatens to slip from it" (Jung, 
1963, p. 76). Myth and dreams are central to making that 
reinterpretation and finding the connections. That "rooted-
ness" from which modern man is being cut off is more compre­
hensively represented for us in mythology, but it is also 
made known to the individual in dreams. 
The relationship of dream to myth is explained by the 
archetypes which are found in both, for the archetypes are 
the symbols and motifs that arise autochthonously from pat­
terns in the psyche. Jung's experience with the dreams and 
revelations of his patients led him to believe that the cor­
respondence of images and motifs was due to an inner source: 
. . . one could almost say that if all the world's 
traditions were cut off at a single blow, the whole 
mythology and the whole history of religion would 
start all over again with the next generation. 
(Jung, 1976, xiii) 
Jung (1976) writes that the collective unconscious "appears to 
consist of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which 
reason the myths of all nations are its real exponents." He 
goes on to assert that "the whole of mythology could be taken 
as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (p. 39). 
He concludes that we can study the unconscious either through 
examining mythology or the dreams and fantasies of individuals. 
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So long as consciousness is in control the possibilities 
of being in touch with the depth of the psyche and thus with 
a broader, richer vision of both self and world are greatly 
reduced. Modern man, by increasing powers of conscious 
thought and rationality, has made great gains but, Jung (1968) 
says, "at the price of enormous losses, whose extent we have 
scarcely begun to estimate" (p. 36). Mythologies originate 
in times and among peoples that had not developed concentra­
tion and intensity of consciousness, and fantasies/visions 
occur today for people when they are in a "state of reduced 
intensity of consciousness" so that "hitherto unconscious 
material streams, as though from opened side-sluices, into 
the field of consciousness" (Jung, 1963, p. 74). That myth 
and fairy tale correspond to our dreams and that all have a 
certain antagonism to reason but also a deep meaning for us 
is a phenomenon made plausible by Jung's analysis. What we 
gain by paying attention to expressions of the unconscious as 
well as of the conscious is, suggests Jaffe (1971), a move­
ment in the direction of "wholeness and a unitary picture of 
the world" (p. 25). 
Kerenyi and Jung (1963) produced several related articles 
which they published together as Essays on a Science of 
Mythology. In the opening essay, Kerenyi writes about the 
impact of science on myth and on our mode of thinking. By 
providing explanations to us, Kerenyi contends, science 
seemed to give us something better than immediate experience 
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itself. And it has given us a truth about our world, a free­
dom from falsehood we cannot do without. But in the process 
we have: 
. . . lost our immediate feeling for the great 
realities of the spirit—and to this world all 
true myths belong—lost it precisely because of 
our all-too-willing, helpful, and efficient sci­
ence. (pp. 1-2) 
What we need now is to be able to find a "feeling of intimacy 
between ourselves and scientific objects" (pp. 1-2) , a task 
which science must help us do. The use of science in the 
exploration of mythology and the unconscious is a means to 
that end. 
It is, then, in providing a way to discover a foundation, 
"a way back to primordial times," that myth serves man in the 
search for authenticity. The journey into myth is, Kerenyi 
(1963) writes, "a kind of immersion in ourselves that leads 
to the living germ of our wholeness." Such immersion enables 
us to see those images that come from the "ground" of our 
being, "the mid-point about which and from which our whole 
being organizes itself" (p. 9). From this perspective 
mythology tells us both what we were and what we still are. 
Mythic Archetypes and Developmental Stages 
Of particular interest to those concerned with education 
and child development is an application of Jungian analysis 
of myths to a description of archetypes that represent a 
development pattern from childhood to adulthood. This expli­
cation by Henderson, one of a group of co-authors with Jung 
of Man and His Symbols, in his essay in that book, "Ancient 
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Myths and Modern Man," suggests a rich area for study of mythic 
stories and motifs that relate to stages of child development. 
The hero myths represent, Henderson thinks, the universal 
pattern of the development of ego-consciousness, of evolu­
tionary stages that are repeated by each individual in the 
development of personality. Taking as a representative 
mythology that of the North American Indians, particularly 
the Winnebago, he discusses the archetypal figures that charac­
terize each stage. First in this sequel is Trickster, usually 
an animal like Brer Rabbit or Reynard the Fox, "a figure whose 
physical appetites dominate his behavior; he has the mentality 
of an infant" (p. 103). Starting at a point of pure gratifi­
cation of needs and mischievous exploits, he usually shows 
progress in the direction of physical maturity. 
The stage following Trickster is represented by Hare, 
or the Transformer, an animal form who offers something to 
human society (e.g., the Hare who gives the Winnebago their 
important Medicine Rite and is thus a savior as well). Thus, 
Henderson notes, Hare marks a progress beyond Trickster: "One 
can see that he is becoming a socialized being, correcting the 
instinctual and infantile urges found in the Trickster cycle" 
(p. 105). 
The third figure in the sequel is Red Horn, a human with 
superhuman powers who must prove himself through tests of 
strength and courage: "With Red Horn we have reached the world 
of man, though an archaic world, in which the aid of superhuman 
powers or tutelary gods is needed to ensure man's victory over 
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the evil forces that beset him" (p. 106). The growth of this 
archetypal figure is marked by the departure of the hero-god, 
who is assisted, leaving Red Horn and his companions to face 
the danger as that which comes from themselves and which they 
must deal with themselves. 
Finally, there are the Twins, representing the two sides 
of human nature, reflection and action (introvert and extrovert) 
who are powerful humans that overcome the monsters but are 
unable to stop when the danger is destroyed and thus threaten 
with destruction of their own. This hubris requires the 
death of the hero, bringing about an equilibrium in human 
nature again, or the liberation of the mature person (the 
conscious ego) from the necessary excesses of adolescent 
idealism and from the pull of the unconscious to return to 
the security of the childhood state. 
Essential for that transition and the maintenance of the 
mature consciousness, in Henderson's interpretation, is the 
existence of a social group to replace the parent archetype 
that must be destroyed in the initiation to adulthood. 
Henderson sees this process operating in the contemporary 
primitive societies in the initiation rites that take the 
child from parents into the clan: 
But in making this break with the childhood world, 
the original parent archetype will be injured, and 
the damage must be made good by a healing process 
of assimilation into the life of the group. . . . 
Thus the group fulfills the claims of the injured 
archetype and becomes a kind of second parent to 
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which the young are first symbolically sacrificed, 
only to re-emerge into a new life. (pp. 120-21) 
Henderson characterizes the journey of the developing 
self as going from the sense of completeness of the childhood 
state that is characterized by unconsciousness or lack of 
differentiation between self and other, good and evil, through 
the emerging forms of self-awareness or consciousness that 
destroy that unity to an adult sense of completeness "achieved 
through a union of the conscious with the unconscious con­
tents of the mind," the latter represented by symbols of 
transcendence. There is in this process, Henderson finds, 
a tension between the opposing forces of liberation and con­
tainment, our predicament of "needing freedom and security" 
(p. 156). 
Examining myths from this perspective could give direc­
tion to the selection of myths appropriate to particular ages. 
It appears that myths might be used for moral development 
stories in a curriculum using the Kohlberg approach to moral 
education. For instance, the comparison of Trickster stories 
with the next level Transformer stories could help generate 
the kinds of questions and dilemmas needed by children moving 
from pre-conventional to conventional moral reasoning. The 
value of mythic stories over real-life dilemmas might be 
that they more readily engage the child's imagination and 
also fit the kind of moral polarity that characterizes the 
child's thinking (an argument developed in Chapter II). In 
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addition, the myth goes straight to the heart of the moral 
struggle, without the many other concerns that so often dis­
tract a child's attention from the central moral dilemma that 
the real-life story is meant to portray. 
From this brief analysis of themes, we see that from a 
Jungian perspective, myth is one of the keys to our past and 
present, to the symbols that express the universal and thus, 
also, that which is most basic in our nature. Myth emerges 
from the shadow of historical relics to a place of importance 
in our study of man, his development and his psychic make-up. 
Through Jung's interpretation we are encouraged to find there 
a deeper understanding of the human as capable of transcending 
collective thought and morality but always rooted in the com­
munal and bearer of the values of both a people and all people. 
Joseph Campbell 
Man, apparently, cannot maintain himself in the 
universe without belief in some arrangement of the 
general inheritance of myth. In fact, the fullness 
of his life would even seem to stand in a direct 
ratio to the depth and range, not of his rational 
thought, but of his local mythology. . . . (W)hen-
ever men have looked for something solid on which 
to found their lives, they have chosen, not the 
facts in which the world abounds, but the myths 
of an immemorial imagination. (Campbell, 1960, p. 20) 
Joseph Campbell has not only collected myths from cul­
tures around the world, but he has also done the important 
literary work of finding corresponding themes, images, and 
patterns of the world's mythologies and the philosophical 
work of seeking the meaning behind the art of myth-making 
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and the impact of changes in civilization on forms of con­
sciousness. Thus he gives us not only a rich, detailed pic­
ture of the mythic mind but also a way of thinking about that 
heritage from our own point in history. 
The loss of our traditional myths and the demise of the 
inclination to mythic thinking is variously described by 
Campbell as both a poverty of Western culture and a necessary 
condition for going beyond inadequate myths toward the cre­
ation of deeper and richer ones. This is perhaps the unique­
ness of his perspective, for from the long and broad view 
gained by his study of myths from all ages and cultures he 
can see a necessity in the deterioration or transformation 
of myths that are no longer concordant with knowledge and 
experience and also the necessity of mythic symbols for human 
community and creative expression. Campbell refuses to see 
science as the destroyer of the mythic impulse and conscious­
ness , but rather posits it as the other half of the sphere 
of knowledge and thus ultimately complementing but not com­
peting with myth, dream, and religion. While man must pur­
sue knowledge in both spheres, it is, Campbell believes, from 
the probing of the human psyche that the greatest discoveries 
are to be made and energy and creative power released to 
allow a new civilization to flower. 
Nature and Function of Myth 
Campbell (1972) agrees with Jung that myths represent 
universal impulses and experiences derived from the structure 
of the psyche, or from the ancient and perpetual condition of 
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man's being in the world. The three central conditions that 
drive man toward myth are the recognition of mortality (and 
the need to transcend it), the realization of the endurance 
of the social order, and the need to understand the universe 
and how it relates to man's existence. Because all peoples 
deal with these conditions there are universals and a common 
unity in myths, but because their experiences differ (e.g., 
ways of death and forms of survival) there is differentiation. 
From his exhaustive study of myths (especially the many vol-
umned, The Masks of God) he draws together the themes and 
patterns that demonstrate both the unity and diversity of 
themes and images. 
There are, Campbell (1970) suggests, four functions of 
mythologies. These are: 
(a) mystical or metaphysical: "reconciliation of con­
sciousness to the precondition of its own existence," response 
to the mystery of life, 
(b) cosmological: to bring the image of the cosmos in 
accord with the scientific knowledge of the times, 
(c) sociological: "validating and maintaining some spe­
cific social order, authorizing its moral code", and 
(d) psychological: "shaping individuals to the aims and 
ideals of their various social groups" (pp. 139-140). 
In the course of time with the advances in knowledge and 
technology the cosmological and sociological dimensions of 
myth have changed, he concludes. This is because effective 
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myths must give a current view of the universe and reflect 
morally and intellectually valid concepts of society and 
nature. However/ the psychological problems, because they 
are rooted in the biology of the species, have been constant 
and have controlled the myths and rites to the extent that 
common strains run through all myths. The sequence of these 
psychological problems are (a) dependency that comes from 
the human being born too soon and needing protection for 12-14 
years, (b) the necessity of becoming an adult (suddenly in 
many cultures and over a very long period of time in our 
society) and taking on a social role, and (c) the preparation 
for bearing the aging back to nature. It is, Campbell con­
cludes , from the metaphysical and psychological dimensions of 
mythology that we derive significance for the renewing of 
our civilization and the recovery of valid symbols. Ancient 
myths and contemporary art can both serve us in that both 
speak to the same core of being and depth of human experience. 
For those who view myths through these lenses they are 
not reflections of a passing age but> Campbell (1969) writes, 
"a permanent spiritual legacy, symbolic of the very structure 
of the psyche" (p. 130). If we accept that mythological 
cosmologies do not reflect so much the world of facts but 
dreams and visions, can these former representations of the 
macrocosom now be restored as "a universal revelation of the 
microcosom" (p. 130)? If such microcosmic universals exist 
they must, Campbell thinks, relate in some mysterious way 
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to the macrocosom, and thus an universal order not limited 
to the human experience. In focusing now on the inwardness 
of the psyche he is not excluding from importance man's re­
lationship to the universe but suspending that task as one 
for which we are not ready, that we are as yet unable to ex­
plore. 
The sciences of comparative ethnology, philosophy, phil­
ology, history, folklore and art have showed us the rich source 
of our common heritage and pointed us in the direction of our 
unity, but it remains for poetry and the arts, Campbell (1949) 
suggests, to give birth to those symbols necessary for a 
creative mythology to emerge, a mythology for the planet as 
one community. VJe need a transmutation of the whole social 
order, Campbell contends, so that in all of secular life the 
image of the universal god-man may be brought to consciousness. 
Consciousness cannot itself invent or predict this transfor­
mation, for it occurs on another level. And the manifesta­
tion will be a variety of symbols, but we must learn to see 
beyond the diversity, "to recognize the lineaments of God 
in all of the wonderful modulations of the face of man" (p. 390). 
Modern Consciousness—The 
Decline of Mythic Thinking 
The loss of mythic consciousness, symbols and rituals 
has had a negative impact on our civilization. Since 1914, 
Campbell (1972) writes, there has been: 
. . .  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  d i s r e g a r d  a n d  e v e n  d i s d a i n  f o r  
those ritual forms that once brought forth, and up 
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to now have sustained, this infinitely rich and 
fruitfully developing civilization. 
In The Hero with a Thousand Faces he describes our culture as 
a waste land (frequently referring to Eliot's poem), whose 
inhabitants lack both outer doctrine and inner depth and thus 
feel the desperation of being lost in a labyrinth. The high 
instance of neuroticism in our culture may come from the lack 
of spiritual aid that myth and rite have always given, "the 
symbols that carry the human spirit forward, in counteraction 
to those other constant human fantasies that tend to tie it 
back" (p. 11). We are fixated in our infancy and lack the 
inclination, direction to carry us to adulthood. The gods 
are dead, the bondage to the past is shattered, we have 
emerged from ancient ignorance, but we are without symbols: 
(T)he democratic ideal of the self-determining in­
dividual, the invention of the power-driven machine 
and the development of the scientific method of 
research, have so transformed human life that the 
long-inherited, timeless universe of symbols has 
collapsed. . . . (T)he ancient human heritage of 
ritual, morality, and art is in full decay. 
(pp. 387-388) 
Without working symbols, Campbell (1972) argues elsewhere, 
"the individual cracks away, becomes dissociated and disoriented" 
(p. 88). 
However, he does not believe that a shoring-up of the 
old belief systems is either possible or desirable. In Myths 
to Live By, Campbell argues that the dominant mythology of 
the West, the biblical mythology embodied in the Hebrew and 
Christian religions, is totally inadequate both in its 
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cosmological and sociological functions. Like the North 
American plains Indians, we are forced to turn inward because 
our "public religious symbols (have) lost their claim to 
authority and passed away" (p. 90). Through history, astono-
my, biology and all the other intellectual explorations, the 
claims of Christianity and Judiasm, he asserts, have been 
disqualified. Campbell is strong and unremitting in his 
denunciation of biblical religion as a dogma; it has been 
a wrong-headed approach to man's spirituality, insisting on 
authority, dualism, and historical revelation rather than on 
spirituality, unity of all life, and psychology. However 
he would not have modern man disassociate himself from its 
rites and symbols but only from the dogma and verbal inter­
pretations that the priest and rabbi perpetuate. The drama 
of the ritual and the magic of the symbols, the affective 
dimension of each, is what can bring us in touch with the 
magic and depth of "what is always and forever" (p. 97). 
It is the dogmatism that divides (peoples from each other 
and the psyche from its depths) and the mystic experience 
that unites. 
In Campbell's (1972) view the importance of ritual and 
myth for the person in the modern world is in one respect the 
same as it has always been and in another respect distinctive 
to our time. To link the individual to the group and to the 
cosmos has always been a central function of myth and ritual: 
The characteristic effect of mythic themes and 
motifs translated into ritual, consequently, is 
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that they link the individual to transindividual 
purposes and forces. (p. 57) 
The ritual procedure takes one out of the self in conduct that 
is not personal but of the species, of society. This movement 
beyond self is necessary, he contends, not only for society's 
cohesion but also for the individual in developing an aware­
ness of his/her humanity. Campbell (1949) contends that 
group identification has, however, too often in the past re­
quired the loss of self, the subordination of personal exper­
ience to group role in our history (especially as peoples 
moved from a hunting to an agricultural society). In recent 
times, however, society has shifted from an emphasis on the 
group to a focus on the individual, thus reversing thd problem 
that existed in the stable periods when great mythologies 
emerged: "Then all meaning was in the group, . . . none in 
the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in the 
group. . . all is in the individual" (p. 388). Instead of 
community, the individual has become the center of our concern: 
In our present day—at least in the leading modern 
centers of cultural creativity—people have begun 
to take the existence of their supporting social 
orders for granted, and instead of aiming to de­
fend and maintain the integrity of the community 
have begun to place at the center of concern the 
development and protection of the individual— 
the individual, moreover, not as an organ of the 
state but as an end and entity in himself. 
(Campbell, 1972, p. 24) 
Emergence of the Individual 
Campbell's perspective on the emergence of modern con­
sciousness, especially the discovery and celebration of the 
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individual, is a complex one. He writes about our civiliza­
tion as one endangered by the culmination of one of its great 
discoveries: the importance of the individual and the focus 
on man instead of the cosmos. And yet, he finds in this lib­
eration of the individual from a fixed social role and the 
consequent humanism the potential for a new birth accompanied 
by mythic symbols that can give awareness of mankind's whole­
ness . 
The individual was first significant in the Greek myths, 
Campbell (1949) observes, and the titans of the late Middle 
Ages and Renaissance who defied the authoritarian God and 
state were indeed heroes who through science and art brought 
us to contemplate humanitas. He suggests that the heroes 
needed today are ones who will carry us further in that quest, 
not in a pursuit of individual liberation from society or 
from our ground in a common unity but in search of a new con­
sciousness of self as a part of the cosmos. 
The tension between the individual understood as the 
hero who embarks on his quest and charts an unknown way to 
the deeper experience and the individual as a being incomplete 
in himself, "locked in the narrowness of the self-centered ego" 
(1949, P» 19) is maintained in Campbell's writings. The re­
solution of what often seems a contradiction in his treat­
ment of "the individual" is achieved when it is understood 
that the goal of the individual quest, the inward journey, 
is a "transpersonal centeredness" (p. 20). In a dialectical 
pattern, the hero withdraws from society and its conventions 
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and makes the journey inward to clarify, eradicate and break 
through to experiences of the archetypal images, and returns 
to be reintegrated with the community, bringing spiritual 
energy, new or renewed symbols. The hero is one who battles 
past the personal and singular to the generally valid, bring­
ing insight and energy from the source through which society 
is reborn. 
Impact of Science 
In his essay, "The Impact of Science on Myth," Campbell 
(1972) discusses the fact that science has had at least a 
temporarily destructive impact on myths. But he finds no 
inherent contradiction between the two modes of knowing repre­
sented by each because they are quite distinct in their func­
tions. Our knowledge gained through science and rational 
thought has led us irrevocably beyond the Occidental world 
view of a three-storied universe, a personal and authoritarian 
God, a moral order based on fixed laws. Our particular mythic 
framework has been shattered, but science does not take over 
mythic functions, for myth is'always concerned with the un­
known and unknowable, while science is concerned with what 
can be known and does not attempt to give the truth of the 
great mysteries. Campbell separates the knowledge gained 
from facts (science) from knowledge gained through the imagi­
nation or mystical religious experiences or through dreams, 
for the latter is the knowledge of the psyche, a separate 
system containing its own order and universals, though one 
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not unrelated to the physical world. That there is some ulti­
mate unity in the design of the psyche and design of the cosmos 
he has little doubt, but it is a unity that as yet, and per­
haps ultimately, can only be experienced and symbolized as a 
mystery or the unknown. 
In his essay Campbell discusses several influential 
theories. Frazer and Freud both erred, in his judgment, in 
viewing mythological thinking as a negative manifestation of 
consciousness. Frazer believed science would put myth behind 
us because it is magical, non-rational (like religion). In 
directing his concern to myth's function in controlling the 
outward world Frazer ignored its relation to inward life. 
Freud saw both myth and religion as public dreams manifesting 
repressions, fears, and delusions. It is Jung who has showed 
us, Campbell asserts, the positive end that myth and religion 
serve, one not in competition with the findings and domain 
of science: 
They [Jnyths] are telling us in picture language of 
powers of the psyche to be recognized and integrated 
in our lives, powers that have been common to the 
human spirit forever, and which represent that wis­
dom of the species by which man has weathered the 
millenniums. Thus they have not been, and can never 
be, displaced by the findings of science, which 
related rather to the outside world than to the 
depths that we enter in sleep. (p. 14) 
The rejection of science and reason through some orthodoxy 
can only impoverish a culture's mythology because there can 
then be no interplay between the mind's discoveries and the 
symbols of the civilization. In the modern Western world, a 
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continuity of growth, an organic flowering, has been due to 
the "open-hearted and open-minded guest of a few brave men" 
(p. 57), thus bringing the new and not some "canonized" truth. 
Campbell closes this essay with a parable that suggests that 
our scientific and intellectual probing has brought us, tem­
porarily, negative results in terms of the loss of cohesion 
mentioned above, but that if we can absorb that danger we 
can go deeper to realize more profound benefits. Thus Campbell 
goes beyond the pessimism that usually accompanies discussions 
of the impact of science on myth or religion, rejecting 
neither but celebrating both, seeing the loss of mythic unity 
in the modern consciousness as a challenge, not a tragedy. 
Mythology and the Development of Creativity 
The first function of art isy Campbell (1970) writes in 
the essay, "Mythological Themes in Creative Literature", the 
same as the first function of myth, "to transport the mind in 
experience past the guardians—desire and fear—of the paradisal 
gate to the tree within of illuminated life" (p. 168). How­
ever the artist as hero who fashions living myths cannot simply 
descend into himself and reflect a private experience but 
must also be a scholar who can relate inward experience to 
the present world. Examples for Campbell of the artist as 
such a hero who can formulate works of the stature of myth are 
Joyce and Mann: 
It is an important characteristic of both James Joyce 
and Thomas Mann, that, in developing their epic works, 
they remained attentive equally to the facts and con­
texts of the outward, and the feeling systems of the 
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inward, hemispheres of the volume of experiences 
they were documenting. They were both immensely 
learned, furthermore, in the scholarship and sci­
ences of their day. And they were able, conse­
quently, to extend and enrich in balanced corre­
lation the outward and the inward ranges of their 
characters' spheres of experience, progressing in 
such a way from the purely personal to the larger, 
collective orders of outward experience and inward 
sense of import that in their culminating master-
works they achieved actually the status, the 
majesty, and validity, of contemporary myth. (p. 169) 
The inward journey is, then, the means to creative mytho­
logy in our day, according to Campbell (1969), but it has as both 
context and goal the deeper integration of the individual in 
the community that is accomplished through "some arrangement 
of the general inheritance of myth" (p. 20), an arrangement 
informed by the mythic consciousness and symbols from the 
past but fashioned to incorporate the knowledge of our age. 
While it is the poet and artist who will fashion the 
symbols of creative myths, the crisis we are experiencing of 
the decay of the old mythologies and the challenge of science 
must be a concern of education.. How, Campbell (1972) asks, 
is the conscientious teacher to respond who is as concerned 
with moral as well as intellectual growth when caught be­
tween the "supporting myths of our civilization" and "the 
1factualized' truths of his science" (p. 11)? The main ques­
tion now in teaching or bringing up children, Campbell asserts, 
is, "is there not some point of wisdom beyond the conflicts 
of illusion and truth by which lives can be put back together 
again?" (p. 12). The best answer, he suggests, will come from 
psychology and the study of myths, examining and comparing 
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until it becomes clear that they are not accounts of history 
but "universally cherished figures of the mythic imagination 
[that] must represent facts of the mind" (p. 12). Finding 
the unity beyond the divisions, of objective truth and sub­
jective experience and their manifestations in dreams, myths, 
and religion is probably not something that can be realized 
in the near future. But to take myth seriously, to attend 
to its structures and symbols, especially in childhood when 
modes of thought are developing and there is a closer corre­
spondence (the animism and fantasies of the child's imagina­
tion) , and to see it as a possible key to the mystery of 
the human psyche and the eventual reintegration of individual 
with the community, (both local and universal) , is something 
we can be doing. 
Northrop Frye 
Myth is the structural principle of literature 
that enters into and gives form to the verbal dis­
ciplines where concern is relevant. Man's views of 
the world he wants to live in, of the world he does 
not want to live in, of his situation and destiny 
and heritage, of the world he is trying to make 
and of the world that resists his efforts, forms 
in every age a huge mythological structure, and 
the subjects I have just listed form the main ele­
ments of it. (Frye, 1970, p. 18) 
The education of the imagination is Northrop Frye's cen­
tral pedagogical concern. For it is the imagination that 
makes it possible for persons to do more than adjust to the 
social mythology of their particular time and place. The 
imagination is developed from encounters with the arts, 
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especially literature, which provide those universal images 
(archetypes) and structures of thought and provide a vision 
of the world as we want it to be. Thus through the imagina­
tion, Frye (1964, 1970) contends, we see a more real, a more 
universal (though not abstract) and a better human society 
than the one the prevailing social mythology has created and 
would have us believe in. The education of the imagination 
is, then, social and moral development as much as aesthetic, 
and it is based on the theory that the structures of myth 
are the essential elements of the imagination. 
The focus of Frye's literary criticism is the relation­
ship of literature to mythology. Rejecting historical, bio­
graphical, sociological, and new criticism as too limited, 
Frye (1957) concludes that it is from within the body of 
literature as a whole that a theory must be found. The 
emergence of literature from primitive myths offers a key 
both to the origin of genres and to the abiding similarities 
in literary forms. He argues that literature reflects neither 
life as we experience it nor the poet nearly so much as it 
reflects the "artificial" or constructed world of literature. 
And the conventional literary patterns derive their form 
from the patterns of mythology. 
Frye establishes a theoretical framework for a curricu­
lum in literature that is based on the study of myths and of 
certain forms of literature (comedy, romance, tragedy and 
irony) that express aspects of the mythic vision appropriate 
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to that stage of development. His concern is not primarily 
better readers or more sophisticated literature students 
(i.e., those well-versed in the "best" works), but the lib­
eration of the imagination from an adjustment mythology, the 
capacity for a vision of a different and better social order. 
Having summarized the main ideas from Frye's work that 
I am here concerned with, I want to look now at how he under­
stands imagination and mythology, how literature is related 
to mythology, and what the social and educational import 
of his theory of literary criticism is. 
Imagination 
Frye (1963) defines imagination in the essay, "The Imag­
ination and the Imaginary" as one of two social contexts of 
the mind: imagination and sense. "Sense" is that attitude 
of the mind that man adopts in dealing with his environment, 
the world of nature, to distinguish what is, what exists and 
what is feasible; it is the basic starting point for the 
scientist and the psychiatrist (and closely akin to "reason" 
but less theoretical). The imagination or the creative is 
a different attitude that creates a vision of what might be, 
a model of what is desirable but non-existent, and it is 
employed most by the arts, love, and religion. The imagina­
tive power of the mind has created the city out of nature; 
through desire it continues to strive to realize the forms 
it has the potential for, to separate what is wanted from 
what is not. Imagination is not itself the unlimited vision 
but, Frye suggests, a perspective between the poles of sense, 
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which says what is possible, and vision which is uninhibited 
desire. Some peoples are more controlled by sense, others more 
by vision. He notes that the Hebrews in response to their 
oppression developed a soaring vision, in contrast to the Greeks 
who imposed firm limits on the aspirations of gods and men. 
The world of nature was thought for a long time to be 
identical with the mythologically structured universe, but 
particularly since the 17th century there has been a process 
of separating mythological concepts of space and time from 
the physical events. This process, Frye (1976) suggests, has 
given back to the imagination the mythic world it once created. 
Thus through the arts man can once again reformulate the mythic 
structure and so emancipate and regenerate culture (pp. 114-115). 
Again and again Frye returns to the concept of imagina­
tion as the power and instinct of the mind to create a world 
other than the one that is, to fashion from desire on the one 
hand and sense on the other, the world we want to live in. 
Thus the works of the imagination have the capacity to pro­
mote social progress but do not necessarily do so. In The 
Educated Imagination, (1964), he makes this limitation clear 
when he notes that writers may express out-dated or even re­
pressive political notions. The relevance of literature is 
based on its belonging to the world of imagination, a world 
constructed not out of the actual world but out of the human 
passions which are universal and archetypal and expressed 
through image and stories, not through philosophical debate. 
Most specifically, the imagination strives to create or 
50 
participate in a world where our lost identity is regained, 
where there is a vision of wholeness or oneness (e.g., the 
City, the Lost Paradise). These images of wholeness are 
predominantly images of community. 
Mythology and Literature 
If development of the powers of the imagination and free­
ing them from the restraints of a particular social mythology 
is central to Frye's pedagogic concern, the clarification 
of the function of myth in the history and interpretation of 
literature is central to his theory of criticism. Frye 
uses the word "mythology" to refer both to the bodies of 
specific myths developed early in the life of a people to 
explain the origin of the world, the activity of the gods, the 
place of man, and the phenomena of nature and to the ideologies 
by which people interpret their world today (such as "the 
American way of life," Marxism). 
In all of his writings Frye asserts that literary criti­
cism begins with an understanding of the relation of litera­
ture to myth. In The Educated Imagination (1964), he defines 
this relationship: 
(I)n the history of civilization literature fol­
lows after a mythology. A myth is a simple and prim­
itive effort of the imagination to identify the human 
with the nonhuman world, and its most typical result 
is a story about a god. Later on, mythology begins 
to merge into literature, and myth then becomes a 
structural principle of story-telling. (p. 48) 
Literature being derived from myth and myth from those common 
experiences that are shaped by the imagination leads to the 
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phenomenon of "all themes and characters and stories that you 
encounter in literature belonging to one big interlocking 
family" (p. 53). The most essential story, the framework of 
all literature, Frye concludes, is the story of "how man once 
lived in a golden age or a garden of Eden or the Hesperides, 
or a happy island kingdom in the Atlantic, how that world was 
lost, and how we some day may be able to get it back again" 
(p. 131). The mythic framework and themes are significant 
not only in providing historical perspective on the develop­
ment of literary forms but also in forming the imagination 
by restoring "the primitive perspective that mythology has" 
(Frye, 1963, p. 18), essentially the association of the human 
and natural worlds and a feeling of a lost paradise. 
The structure that myth provides for literature has two 
sources—the natural world and the inward world of dreams or 
the subconscious. It is through analogy, Frye (1964) writes, 
that parallels are made between human life and the world of 
nature: 
Myth seizes on the fundamental element of design of­
fered by nature—the cycle, as we have it daily in 
the sun and yearly in the seasons—and assimilates 
it to the human cycle of life, death, and (analogy 
again) rebirth. (p. 110) 
But the world as it is, is not as. man desires it and thus a 
dialectic is developed between the world as it is and as it 
is desired, a hell and a heaven. That second structure is 
the vision that comes from the desire for something better 
and it is essentially a product of the inward world. 
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The search for the origin of the genres or ''literary 
anthropology," which is a search for archetypes, takes us to 
the preliterary forms such as ritual, myth, and folktale, 
according to Frye (1963) , that inform and structure litera­
ture now, not just in its beginnings. Ritual is the origin 
of narrative, for in ritual we have the conscious effort to 
bring all human events into harmony with the natural cycle: 
All the important recurrences in nature, the day, 
the phases of the moon, the seasons and solstices 
of the year, the crises of existence from birth to 
death get ritual attached to them, and most of the 
higher religions are equipped with a definitive to­
tal body of rituals suggestive, if we may put it so, 
of the entire range of potentially significant actions 
in human life. (p. 18) 
From these cycles myth "constructs a central narrative around 
a figure who is partly the sun, partly vegetative fertility 
and partly a god or archetypal human being" (Frye, 1957, 
p. 171). The work of Jung and Frazer has caused literary 
critics to recognize the importance of this myth, but Frye 
(1957) finds that the application to literature has not been 
sufficiently comprehensive or systematic to show the signi­
ficance of the relationship. 
If the stuff of rituals is what narrative derives from, 
the origins of imagery lie in oracular material or epiphanies 
where a correspondence between human life and the natural 
world is made. The epiphany originates in the subconscious, 
the dream world, the source of imagniation: "The human cycle 
of waking and dreaming corresponds closely to the natural cy­
cle of light and darkness, and it is perhaps in this correspond­
ence that all imaginative life begins" (p. 18). He interprets 
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the work of art as an effort to bring the inner desire and 
the outward circumstance into some kind of union, creating a 
vision of the "end of social effort, the innocent world of 
fulfilled desires, the free human society" (p. 19). This 
vision is a community, which constitutes the essence of the 
comic vision. He suggests that comedy and romance are the 
forms of literature that educate the imagination most appro­
priately in the younger or pre-adolescent child and that 
tragedy cannot begin to be understood until into adolescence. 
The four basic structures of literature—comedy, tragedy, 
romance, irony—come from the incorporation of the natural 
cycle in myth, specifically, from the mythic images of how 
the human, animal, vegetable, and mineral worlds correspond 
to the four seasons: 
The absorption of the natural cycle into myth­
ology provides myth with two of these structures; 
the rising movement that we find in myths of spring 
or the dawn, of birth, marriage and resurrection, 
and the falling movement in myths of death, metamor­
phosis or sacrifice. These movements reappear as the 
structural principles of comedy and tragedy in litera­
ture. Again, the dialectic in myth that projects a 
paradise or heaven above our world and a hell or 
place of shades below it reappears in literature as 
the idealized world of pastoral and romance and 
the absurd, suffering, or frustrated world of irony 
and satire. (Frye, 1970, p. 31) 
This concept of the literary structures being derived from 
the natural cycles, as well as having the vertical component 
created by the imagination of a better or worse world (a 
heaven and a hell) is developed in Anatomy of Criticism (1957). 
Following is a brief summary of each genre and its mythic basis. 
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Comedy is the mythos of spring, for its goal is birth 
or rebirth, a new society forming around the hero at the end. 
From the confusion and mistaken identities that are part of 
a society controlled by habit and arbitrary laws, comedy 
moves through illusion toward reality, a reality that has to 
do with what ought to be rather than what is. Thus Frye (1957) 
notes that "civilizations that stress the desirable rather 
than the real, the religious as opposed to the scientific per­
spective, think of drama almost entirely in terms of comedy" 
(p. 208). It is a vision of an "omnipotent personal community 
beyond an indifferent nature, of innocence and 'the unfalien 
world,' the archetype of images of symposium, communion, order, 
friendship and love" (p. 223). 
Romance, the mythos of summer, and also of noon and heaven 
is, like comedy, the quest for the ideal but it focuses more 
on the hero and the conflicts of his journey. It is best 
understood in contrast to its opposite, irony, and over against 
realism. In The Stubborn Structure (1970) , Frye develops the 
poles of romance and irony, represented by heaven and hell, 
noon and night: 
The romantic vision is of the heroic, the pleasura­
ble, the ideal, of that which one feels impelled 
to identify oneself. The ironic vision is the 
vision of the anguished, the nauseated, and the 
absurd. (p. 34) 
The romantic vision does not point toward a Utopian society 
but to the festive occasion, the victory or marriage which 
brings the human community together in an event of rejoicing. 
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Tragedy is the mythos of fall, of decline and dissolu­
tion. The tragic figure is one who has risen to heights (like 
the sun at noon or the year in full growth), whether it be 
a human with almost godlike stature or power or a god who is 
nonetheless vulnerable to fate, and who does not check the 
use of his/her powers, thus upsetting the laws of nature. 
Because this balance must right itself the hero is brought 
to ruin, even if his/her moral intentions were not evil (e.g,, 
Hamlet). This necessity Frye (1957) refers to as "an epiphany of 
law, of that which is and must be" (p. 235) , the law of 
nature. The disintegrations that belong to tragedy are paral­
lel to the unions and reunions of comedy; in place of births 
and marriage and feasts, there are deaths, separations and 
famine. However, the disintegration is not of the same order 
as that found in irony because there is in tragedy a measure 
of hope and a sense of the wrong or excess being purged as 
the laws of nature reestablish themselves at the end. 
Irony and satire are, Frye (1957) suggests, the complet­
ing of the natural cycle, the mythos of winter. It is essen­
tially a parody of romance, "the application of romantic 
mythical forms to a more realistic content" (p. 223). The 
ironic vision, which is dominant in literature today, Frye 
finds, is of the social hell created by the loss of communi­
cation, of commitment, of love and involvement. Through 
irony and satire the artist tries to give form to the ambi­
guities of unidealized life, employing an implicit moral 
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standard but also expressing cynicism about philosophies or 
norms. 
While comedy and romance are the more appropriate forms 
for children and the way they can come to know the struc­
ture of myth, these literary forms are neither childish nor 
insignificant. Indeed, Frye (1964) argues that our society 
has a great need for romance, not in order to escape from our 
problems (as many would suggest) but in order to break out 
of the limitations of realism and its essential conservatism. 
Frye (1976) believes that the Christian and Platonic influence 
on our concept of the function of literature has been to cause 
us to seek, mistakenly, the value of literature in its cor­
respondence with what reason discovers about the world out­
side literature, thus pushing literature in the direction of 
realism. The tradition of romance is, Frye thinks, the pole 
toward which literature should move because it shows a world 
that is better than our everyday world, that the imagination 
can create or discover through the conventions of literature 
and myth. Tolkien and adult fantasy, Frye (1957) cites as 
hopeful signs of our turning away from the preoccupation with 
realism. Myth as a literary design is at an opposite pole 
of realism. In myth is depicted a fictional world, usually 
one where the gods and "the imitation of actions are near 
or at the conceivable limits of desire" (p. 136). Realism, 
in contrast, attempts to focus on content over structure, 
portraying the world as it is. In that realism tends to 
accept society as it is, it has an essential conservatism. 
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However, Frye (1976) contends, romance tends to put the world 
of dreams in the place of everyday experience and thus be­
comes a kind of psychological quest for a better world often 
related to the unconscious, dealing not with the plausible 
but with the archetypes of experience. (pp. 53-57) 
Comedy and romance, then, are for the child a way of 
giving shape to the visions of the imagination, of thinking 
about the world as we want it to be rather than as it is. 
This imagined world, which is basically a mythic world, is 
more real, Frye (1964) argues, than many of the illusions 
of the world we see: "It is the real world, the real form 
of human society hidden behind the one we see" (p. 151). 
Social Function of Myth 
In The Critical Path (1971), Frye discusses the social 
function of myth from a somewhat different perspective, de­
fining two myths that have come to us out of our tradition 
and the place of each in shaping our consciousness: the 
myth of concern and the myth of freedom (or congruence). 
The myth of concern refers to the way all the elements 
that identify a culture—belief, language, history, stories— 
come together through myth to hold society together and to 
express its major concerns. What is true and what is real 
is, from the perspective of the myth of concern, socially 
established. Religious and social conservatism tend to 
characterize the myth of concern and to influence literature 
in a similar way: "the influence of social concern on 
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literature is to make it intensely traditional, repeating the 
legends and learning which have most to do with that concern" 
(p. 37). In oral cultures the myth of concern is dominant 
and its influence in literature is seen in various ways: 
e.g., the poet is seen as a teacher and spokesman passing on 
shared beliefs; the greatest danger is seen as the break­
down of community (self-isolation is seen as abnormal). 
The mental habits that developed with a writing culture 
modified concern, according to Frye. With it came the "lib­
eral" elements: objectivity, tolerance, respect for individ­
uality, philosophy based on logic and dialectic, continuous 
prose, loss of a high level of anxiety about community. With 
these modes of thought, fostered primarily by scientific 
and philosophic activity, there developed a concern for con­
gruence, for belief based on reason, evidence and repeatable 
experiments. This concern for congruence Frye calls the 
"myth of freedom" (p. 130) whose context is the environment 
of physical nature and thus an alienating environment. 
In our culture we experience a tension between these 
two myths, but it is Frye's contention that we must have 
both, not either/or. This tension is felt in the conflict 
over authority, with "concern" pointing to the social estab­
lishment and "freedom" to reason and scientific evidence. 
Positively, what comes from this conflict is "the sense of an 
imaginative world as forming the wider context of belief, a 
total potential of myth from which every specific myth of 
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concern has been crystallized" (p. 131). Thus it is, Frye 
concludes, that the "imaginative world opens up for us a new 
dimension of freedom, in which the individual finds himself 
again, detached but not separated from his community" (p. 131). 
An aspect of freedom is that it releases the language of con­
cern but cannot supplant it, and much of the vision and energy 
that concern generates leaks "away through the openings of 
critical and analytical attitudes" (p. 137). The tension must 
remain, argues Frye, and, indeed, it is for us a productive 
one if freedom is informed toy a vision from culture: 
The only genuine freedom is a freedom of the will 
which is informed by a vision, and this vision can 
only come to us through the intellect and the 
imagination, and through the arts and sciences 
which embody them. (p. 133) 
Myth and Education 
Frye's theories about the role of myth in the curriculum 
range from specific to general, including both structure and 
content. They are not the subject of any one work and exist 
more as sketches of a design. 
In The Stubborn Structure (1970), Frye states that educa­
tional theory has, as its central concern, transforming society, 
moving it toward an ideal order or a just state. Having dis­
cussed theories about the meaning of labor and leisure in the 
social order, he gives a powerful definition of education: 
Education has nothing to do with this vicious 
circle of labour and idleness: it begins in that 
moment of genuine leisure in which Adam is neither 
tilling the ground nor going fishing and leaving the 
real work to Eve, but remembering his lost Paradise.. 
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Even as late as Milton, articulating the dream of 
a lost Paradise is still the definition of educa­
tion. More prosaically, we may say that education 
is the product of a vision of human society that 
is more permanent and coherent than actual society, 
(p. 6, emphasis mine) 
Frye goes on then to expand this definition by saying that edu­
cation is concerned with two worlds: "the world that man lives 
in and the world he wants to live in" (p. 18). While these 
two worlds cannot be clearly separated out as the areas of 
science and of humanities/arts, it is through the latter, 
literature in particular, that education is directed toward 
the concern of the world we want, as well as the world we do 
not want, which concern "forms in every age a huge mythological 
structure" (p. 18). 
Thus Frye establishes his central pedagogical principle, 
that education is not concerned to prepare children to find 
their place in some passing form of the social order (the 
present reality) but to develop their imaginations to be 
able to envision a better social order, a vision that is 
expressed in many ways in that "huge mythological structure" 
embodied in the arts and humanities. A theory of society is, 
in fact, at the heart of a theory of education: 
We cannot discuss educational theory simply in rela­
tion to an existing society, for no educational 
theory is worth anything unless it can be conceived 
as transforming that society and, at least to some 
extent, assimilating it to its own pattern. (Frye, 
1970, p. 7) 
Generally, the education of the child in the schools, as 
well as in the larger world outside, is primarily in the basic 
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social mythology, the American way of life, and its purpose is 
"to create the adjusted, that is, the docile and obedient 
citizen" (Frye, 1970, p. 20). The concern for society is 
strong but it may not be profound or well articulated. The 
education that literature and myth provides should enable 
the child to discover a deeper, more significant level of 
concern and give expression to that vision that is within 
himself, embryonically, and in the tradition, expressed in 
myth, literature and the other arts. It is only by such a 
stronger vision that the child will have the power and free­
dom to conceive of the world in terms other than adjustment 
to what is. The power to fulfill possibilities and transform 
the social order is the basis of true freedom and is derived 
from "the continuing vision of a continuing city" (p. 21). 
Central to Frye's concept of how literature should be 
taught is his theory that "any effective teaching of litera­
ture has to recapitulate its history and begin, in early 
childhood, with myths, folktales and legends" (1963, p. 33). 
In The Educated Imagination, Frye develops an approach to 
teaching myths. He suggests that education begin with the 
most comprehensive and central myth that incorporates the 
central theme of a lost identity that is still sought. That 
myth he finds in the Bible. Thus the Bible is the beginning 
point, the "lowest stratum" for teaching literature: "It 
should be taught so early and thoroughly that it sinks straight 
to the bottom of the mind, where everything that comes along 
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can later settle on it" (p. 110) . It is not for its language, 
religious instruction, or great stories (all of which have 
validity) but its mythic qualities that Frye sees the Bible 
as a foundation: 
The fact that it's a continuous narrative beginning 
with the creation and ending with the Last Judgment, 
and surveying the whole history of mankind, under 
the symbolic name of Adam and Israel, in between. 
(p. Ill) 
The second layer of instruction would be classical mythology 
which is more fragmentary but has the same imaginative frame­
work. Its special contribution is the myth of the hero "whose 
mysterious birth, triumph and marriage, death and betrayal 
and eventual rebirth follow the rhythm of the sun and seasons" 
(p. 112). It is important, he thinks, that such story themes 
as Hercules, Theseus, Perseus get into the child's mind early. 
Following this, instruction should be concerned with an Under­
standing of the basic structure of the main literary forms— 
comedy, tragedy, romance, and irony. The primary two for 
younger children are comedy and romance because of their 
relative simplicity and their idealized conception of human 
delations and the correspondence between nature and man. These 
structures are more important, Frye concludes, than the lit­
erary quality of the works read. Also at this level it is 
important for the child to hear stories, and read or hear 
them purely as stories: 
The art of listening to stories is a basic training 
for the imagination. You don't start arguing with 
the writer: you accept his postulates, even if he 
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tells you that the cow jumped over the moon, and 
you don't react until you've taken in all of what 
he has to say, (pp« 116-117) 
Junior or senior high school is the time to begin a sys­
tematic study of mythology, Frye (1970) concludes, learning 
the archetypes, the cyclical and dialectical structures that 
are the structures of all literature. Myth provides a dia­
gram of what literature is about, "an imaginative survey of 
the human situation from the beginning to the end, from the 
height to the depth, of what is imaginatively conceivable" 
(p. 102). 
Frye (1970) makes a strong argument for literature and 
the mythology that informs it as an essential part of education 
in a democracy because of the role it plays in educating the 
imagination. He contends that "in a modern democracy a citi­
zen participates in society mainly through his imagination" 
(p. 104). The power to fight against adjustment to the pre­
vailing social mythology comes from knowing the "real" society 
that exists beyoung the "phantasmagoria of current events." 
The imagination is even more important than the reason in a 
perverted society, for only the imagination can see "reality 
as a whole" and provide a better vision to correct the present 
order (p. 105). 
Conclusions 
All of these writers contend that man perceives the world 
in terms of mythology, that our psychic and social worlds 
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are deeply embedded in mythic concepts and structures. The 
modern effort to deny the mythic and emphasize the rational 
has been in error in its one-sidedness. Recognizing the power 
and function of myth in shaping consciousness, particularly 
in developing a social vision, is argued, in different ways, 
by each writer. 
Both Jung and Campbell warn that rationalism destroys 
those moral and spiritual traditions that myths embody and 
that we lose those traditions to our peril. Jung, to some 
degree, but Campbell, even more, recognize that we are faced 
with a contradiction to which we have found no solution. The 
dissolution of myths has freed individuals from the tyranny 
of dogma and a closed society, allowing them to discover 
more about the world through scientific inquiry. But those 
very achievments have severed us from the mythic heritage that 
expresses our most fundamental human identity. Campbell 
offers perhaps the best response, which is to accept the dif­
ficulty of this transition and seek ways to revitalize and 
reconstruct our mythic inheritance, recognizing that tem­
porarily, at least, science and myth will represent different 
ways of knowing and different kinds of truths. 
While Jung emphasizes the psychological wholeness that 
can come from integration of the mythic inheritance into 
consciousness, Frye is concerned with the imaginative use 
of the mythic inheritance for creating new social ideals. 
Campbell shares both concerns, although with perhaps more 
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emphasis on the social need for reformulated mythologies. 
But the concept of the archetypes bridges that gap between 
individual and cultural concerns, for it represents the idea 
that the most essential concerns of the individual are also 
the common concerns of the species. Indeed, the universality 
of mythic symbols and patterns is the feature that makes 
mythology a potentially progressive rather than regressive 
force in our time. The archetypes of myth, freed from dogma 
(but not necessarily freed from religious content) may be 
more useful than the structures of reason, these writers 
suggest, in forming concepts by which different cultures 
might begin to conceive of common goals, or common images of 
how to dwell on our planet. Concentration on the personal, 
on the rational, on realism and on scientific inquiry has led 
to an imbalance that needs to be corrected by attention to 
community and imagination. 
In various ways these writers contend that humans are 
profoundly involved in myth and that human society cannot 
maintain itself without what Campbell calls "some arrangement 
of the general inheritance of myth" (1970, p. 19). But at 
the same time they think that it is critical that we get 
beyond our inadequate myths to the deeper ones available to 
us. As Frye suggests, education's goal should be to free 
students from obedience to the prevailing social mythology 
by helping them know the universal dimensions of mythology. 
The educational significance of mythology comes from a 
consideration of how the symbols and archetypes of myth operate 
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in our conception of the world—whether they are artifacts 
from our past that no longer serve our needs and are a re­
tarding element that thwarts the development of rational and 
moral thought; or whether they enlarge and deepen our per­
ception of reality in ways both personally and culturally 
beneficial. I have attempted to establish, through the 
above writers, the significance of the latter option as a 
basis for contending that myth, broadly understood, is an 
important element in curriculum theory and development. 
67 
CHAPTER II 
MYTH AND THE CHILD 
Frye leads us to consider the importance of educating 
the imagination of the child, particularly through attention 
to how myth conveys the basic framework and images with which 
the imagination functions. His suggestion that a curriculum 
for children give a significant place to some of the more 
important and comprehensive mythologies goes against the mod­
ern emphasis on realism and relevance to contemporary life 
in developing materials for children. This issue leads us 
to ask one of the questions in the introduction: do children 
in our age relate to mythic stories and images and do myths 
fit their cognitive and emotional needs? 
Support for the idea that children of our century and 
of our culture relate to myth comes from several sources and 
it is these sources I want to examine. Two recent studies, 
Travers (1978) and Favat (1977) , have noted the correspondence 
between Piaget's (1926, 1928, 1929) early findings about 
the mythic elements in child thought and Bettelheim's (1976) 
theories about the child's close connection with fairy tales. 
Both studies conclude that traditional stories reflect the 
child's conception of reality and the child's emotional needs 
more accurately than do realistic stories. Egan (1979) 
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develops a curriculum theory based on stages of development 
and in it draws heavily on the ideas about child thought 
found in the early Piaget works to define his first stage of 
educational development, the "mythic stage." It is these 
sources—Piaget# Bettelheim, Egan, Travers—that I examine 
now to develop the dimensions of the child's mythic conscious­
ness and the implications of these findings for education. 
A Cognitive Perspective; Piaget 
In three of Piaget's early works—The Language and Thought 
in the Child (1926) , Judgment and Learning in the Child (1928), 
and The Child's Conception of the World (1929)—there are de­
scriptions of characteristics of child thought that seem to 
have important implications for curriculum but that have been 
largely ignored. Flavell notes that in these early works 
Piaget had not yet explicitly developed the "mathematical and 
physical model" that was to dominate his work (1963, p. 269). 
What we have here, rather, are descriptions of the prelogical 
thought of the child and, particularly in The Child's Conception 
of the World, descriptions of the mythic qualities of child 
thought. 
In a critique of Piaget's early writings, Flavell (1963) 
observes that the central concept Piaget was studying in these 
three early works was child egocentrism and its gradual re­
placement by socialized thought. That egocentrism is mani­
fested in forms of thinking very similar to those found among 
"primitive" (Piaget's term) or myth-oriented people, particularly 
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as Piaget understood that perspective from the anthropological 
work of Levy-Bruhl. It is not an egocentricism that comes 
from thinking about the self first or from self-consciousness 
but from a perception of events that does not distinguish 
self from the world, the absence of subject-object distinc­
tion, the absence of self-consciousness. And it is an ego-
centrism that comes from the child's attributing his own 
kind of thought/feelings to animals and inanimate objects. 
Flavell (1963) notes that in the study of causality in Judgment 
and Reasoning in the Child, Piaget found that children do 
not use connectives like "because," "although," "therefore" 
much because they tend to juxtapose things, not connect them 
by the logic of cause and effect, seeing causality rather as 
a psychological event of motive or duty: 
Thus the child's questions about the causes of physi­
cal events reveal expectations of an answer couched, 
not in terms of impersonal, physical-causal forces, 
but in anthropomorphic, quasi-intential terms. 
(p. 274) 
Having examined the form and function of child thought 
in the two previous works, Piaget turned to an analysis of 
the content of child thought in The Child's Conception of the 
World (1929) and there described the kind of egocentristic, 
anthropomorphic ideas, the notions of reality and causality, 
the child has. He asked children questions designed around 
three characteristics of "primitive" thought: realism, animism, 
and artificalism. For realism questions were asked to reveal 
whether distinctions were being made between the internal and 
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external world (e.g., "Where is the name of the clouds?"). 
Animism, that tendency to give life and consciousness to non-
human things, was explored with such questions as : "I.s the 
sun alive? Is the bicycle alive? When is it not?" Artifi-
cialism is the belief that there is a tie between one's own 
actions and natural phenomena and is seen in response to 
questions such as "Where did the sun come from? Why does it 
shine?" In summarizing his findings concerning these charac­
teristics of the content of child thought between the ages 
of five and 12, I will focus on two things: what constitutes 
each concept and how it changes as the child moves from mythic 
to scientific ways of explaining natural phenomena, or as 
greater accommodation is made to physical laws. 
The significance of these early studies for curriculum 
development I will discuss below, but two points regarding 
their value should be made here to help focus our discussion. 
First, I suggest that the findings of these studies have been 
overlooked because educators have had so great a concern 
to foster rational thought and the early acquisition of know­
ledge that accords with scientific explanations of phenomena. 
Were we to shift the focus in our culture more toward the 
value of imagination, creativity, and moral development we 
would view the mythic content of the child's thought quite 
differently. Secondly, I suggest that if we recognize the 
value of making use of the knowledge that the child already 
has (both as a way of assimilating more knowledge and as a 
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basis for learning that leads to accommodation of new ideas) 
then we need to learn to make use of the realism, animism, 
and artificialism that characterize much of child thought. 
The following summary of Piaget's discoveries and conclusions 
about these forms of child thought are from The Child's Con­
ception of the World (1929). 
Realism 
Piaget's approach is to ask children the kinds of questions 
he has determined through previous research that children spon­
taneously ask themselves. The first set of questions seeks 
to reveal the child's notion of reality, whether the child 
sees the external world as external the way adults do and can 
distinguish the self from it and what boundaries the child 
draws between the external and internal world. Asking chil­
dren questions about where thoughts come from, how things get 
their names, the nature and origin of dreams, he found that 
until about age seven or eight they made no distinction be­
tween internal and external, between the sign and the thing; 
that between ages eight and ten they recognized that the 
thought, the name, or the dream is somehow separate from the 
thing in which it manifests itself but is still a material 
thing located somewhere; and that after age ten or 11 they 
begin to see a sign or dream as something immaterial or origi­
nating in the mind, thus eventually making a clear distinc­
tion between internal and external. This characteristic of 
child thought, the absence of a clear distinction between 
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internal and external, is called realism (to be distinguished 
from objectivity) and consists in "ignoring the existence of 
self and thence regarding one's own perspective as immediately 
objective and absolute" (p. 34). 
Thus the egocentricity of the child is not, Piaget con­
cludes, to be understood as consciousness of self but, to 
the contrary, unconsciousness of self as distinct from the 
universe. The child is as conscious of his/her thought as 
the adult is but does not know its source and thus confuses 
the physical and psychical. Consequently, many things that 
come from the mind have a magical appearance to the child 
and what happens to him, he assumes, happens to everyone. 
The early years, what Piaget calls the "primitive stage," are 
when the child thinks his/her own point of view is absolute. 
The child thinks the sun follows him, that the 
clouds follow him. ... He believes himself the 
center of the world, whence follow a whole group 
of finalistic, animistic and quasi-magical con­
ceptions" (p. 127) . 
A sense of selfhood begins when experience brings contradic­
tions and disillusions that start the break-up of the primi­
tive consciousness. 
In addition to lack of consciousness of self, Piaget dis­
cusses realism as the basis of the primitive sense of partici­
pation and magical effects. Participation is the belief that 
two beings or things have a direct influence on each other 
where there is no discernable cause-effect relationship, such 
as the belief by the child that his walking causes the sun to 
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follow him. "Magic" refers to "the use the individual be­
lieves he can make of participation to modify reality" (p. 132). 
Piaget concludes that the child constructs myths and romances 
or uses animistic and artificialist concepts as a way of try­
ing to explain, when asked, that intuitive sense of connection 
between things. The sense of participation begins at the 
point when the child starts to make a differentiation of self 
and the external world, with the self taking on magical powers 
and other beings and things being attributed consciousness 
and life. 
Animism 
Animism is the belief that many or all objects are living 
and have a will; this belief is due to the child's tendency 
not to set limits between the self and the external world: 
"The primitive property of mind which consists in the complete 
lack of differentiation between conscious action and mechani­
cal movement" (p. 231). In studying animism in the child, 
Piaget sought answers to three problem areas: (a) Is con­
sciousness attributed to things and how? (b) What does "life" 
mean to a child? and (c) Does the child see natural laws as 
coming from moral or physical necessity? 
As regards the question of consciousness, he found that 
there is a progression from seeing everything active as having 
consciousness to the limitation of consciousness to animals. 
(Before ages four or five there is implicit animism, i.e., 
everything has purpose and conscious activity.) Having not 
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made a distinction between thought and physical objects, the 
child cannot realize "that there can be actions unaccompanied 
by consciousness" (p. 177). Activity is* by its nature^ to 
the child purposeful and conscious—clouds, sun, moon, rivers, 
fires, bicycles all know and feel, but benches and walls do 
not. However experience begins to teach the child that bi­
cycles do not move on their own, and so the child restricts 
consciousness to those things that can move by themselves. 
Thus wind or the clouds are said to feel things but bicycles 
do not. Even when children begin to doubt that streams and 
clouds are alive, they persist in believing the sun and moon 
to be alive because these bodies have spontaneous and con­
trolled movement. Eventually, usually age 12 or later, the 
child limits consciousness to animals. 
The notion of "life" is closely linked to that of con­
sciousness , having to do with activity and purpose, with the 
expectation of movement being of great importance. As with 
consciousness, there is a progression through stages from 
the notion that all things that move have life to the idea 
that only those things that cause spontaneous movement or 
have force are alive. Thus children ages five through nine 
give these responses: 
Is a bicycle alive?—No, when it doesn't go it 
isn't alive. When it goes it is alive.—Is a 
mountain alive?—No.—Why not?—Because it doesn't 
do anything.—Is a tree alive?—No; when it has 
fruit it's alive. When it hasn't any, it isn't 
alive. . . . Is a lamp alive?—Yes, it shines.— 
Is the moon alive?—Yes, it sometimes hides be­
hind the mountains. . . . Are you alive?—Yes.--
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Why?—I can walk and I go and play. Is the moon 
alive?—Yes.—Why?—It guides us at night.— 
Is the lake alive?—Not always.—Why not?— 
Sometimes there are waves and sometimes there 
aren't any. (pp. 199-200) 
By age 11 or 12 most children understand life as spontaneous 
movement on the part of plants and animals. 
Another expression of animism in child thought Piaget 
finds in the attribution of moral necessity to things or events 
in nature. Asking questions to explore whether children think 
of nature as "a collection of physical laws'! or "a well-
regulated society," Piaget found that children think in moral 
rather than psychological or physical terms and endow "things 
with consciousness principally in order to explain their 
obedience to a hierarchy" (p. 224) . Children to age eight 
generally think that everything acts out a necessity to obey 
a moral law that regulates everything to the greatest good 
of man. After this age they begin to think of physical deter­
minism in some things such as water, clouds, but the idea re­
mains subservient to the moral law until age 11 or 12. Typical 
of this view of nature as acting in accord with moral law to 
serve man is this response: 
Can the clouds do what they like?—No, because all 
they do is to show us the way. . . . Can it (the 
sun) stop?—No.—Why not?—Because it has to shine 
for some time.—Why?—To warm us. (p. 226) 
Artificialism 
The essence of child artificialism, like primitive arti­
ficialism, is "regarding things as the product of human creation, 
rather than in attributing creating activity to the things 
themselves" (p. 258). As with realism and animism, Piaget 
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finds three stages in the child's growth from an artificialist 
perspective to a view of natural events as explained by physi­
cal laws: (a) children ages seven through eight think that 
humans or divine persons made the sun and moon, (b) children ages 
nine through ten think the sun and moon are made partly by 
natural processes and partly by humans or gods, and (c) chil­
dren ages 11-12 drop human agency as a factor. 
Piaget suggests that the artificialist idea comes from 
feelings of participation; the child makes up myths to ex­
plain vague feelings of participation. The young child's 
basic thought is that the moon gets bigger because we do or 
is alive because we are alive. For the child the connection 
is not just an analogy but a matter of causality that is 
related to a universal plan and order: "The universe is a 
society of like beings living according to a well-ordered 
code of rules" (p. 262). The essence of artificialism, as 
differentiated from animism, is "the tendency to believe that 
human beings control the creation and conduct of other beings" 
(p. 263). Piaget suggests that myth comes, for the child, 
from the need, put to him by others, to be precise. 
Piaget notes that some explanations of creation or origin 
may reflect religious or other adult teachings but that the 
child assimilates this instruction in his/her own way. One 
example is the way a child transforms what s/he is taught about 
clouds to fit it to personal experience: clouds are vapors 
and vapors are produced by boiling water, thus clouds come 
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from saucepans. Or on the evaporation of water from the sea 
to make clouds, a child concludes that clouds are "water 
that's been heated in the houses, when the windows are open" 
(p. 302). Children often will repeat the formulas they have 
learned in school about the origin or nature of a substance, 
only to then add their own spontaneous explanations that 
show a more "primitive" or artificial understanding, Piaget 
suggests. 
The essence of artificialism is that of animism, that 
everything exists for a purpose and that purpose centers 
around man: 
The child behaves as if nature were charged with 
purpose, as if chance or mechanical necessity did 
not exists, as if each being tended, by reason of 
an internal and volitional activity, towards a 
fixed goal. . . . But this (purposiveness) in­
volves commands and above all commanders, to serve 
whom is precisely the raison d'etre of things. 
(p. 357) 
This need to serve man is an expression of the blending, or 
lack of distinction between, the physical and moral law, for 
the moral law assumes there are those who give orders and 
those who obey and it is humans (the parents being the proto­
types) who give the orders. 
It is in the second stage of ages seven or eight to 
nine or ten of artificialistic thinking that the child shifts 
from a diffuse sense of everything having the kind of relations 
that exist between himself and parents to a more systematic 
effort to explain origins, a stage of "mythological artifi-
cialsm" (p. 371), Piaget calls it, when the answers children 
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give to questions or origins resemble the myths of origins 
of primitive peoples. After this stage the child begins to 
give technical explanations derived from his/her observations 
and studies of nature and how things work, and thus mythologi­
cal answers cease, Piaget observes. Physical determinism 
begins to explain events rather than moral laws, although 
there remains a sense of iminant artificialism in the idea 
that nature has a purpose and that sun, moon, were made for 
man. If the child has been taught a religion, the artifi­
cialism will be transfered to God and will remain in explana­
tions of creation of the world, while physical phenomena will 
be attributed to natural processes. 
Mythic Qualities of Child Thought 
By way of summary of these findings discussed from 
Piaget's work, I suggest that all of the major characteris­
tics are closely paralled in myths and provide a basis for 
saying that the child is a mythic thinker having the follow­
ing characteristics: 
(a) lack of self-consciousness, unaware of self as 
distinct from the universe and thus not separating external 
from internal events. Thus many things which come from 
within like dreams, visions, appear to be magical and the 
child thinks what happens to him/her happens to everyone; 
(b) an intuitive sense of connection between things, 
the sense of participation, that leads the child to think s/he 
has magical powers to cause things to happen, such as the 
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moon moving when s/he does, and that all things which move 
do so, like himself, out of intentionality; 
(c) a belief that everything that moves has conscious­
ness and feelings and that all activity is purposeful. Those 
things which move do so out of obedience to moral laws and 
in accord with a divine necessity that all should serve the 
good of man; and 
(d) a belief that humans are the creators and controllers 
of those things in nature that move, particularly those things 
that serve man like sun, water, because to serve humans is 
why those things exist. In the second stage this idea shifts 
to a more systematic explanation of creation and purpose, 
attributing divine will and activity to the place and func­
tion of all things, but there continues to be a moral, not 
a physical, necessity that guides all activity. 
Favat (1977) reviewed the research that followed up on 
Piaget's conclusions about the child's animism, artificia-
lism, and realism and found that the general configuration 
of Piaget's hypotheses is confirmed. Some of these studies 
suggest what I would think to be true for many American 
children of this generation, that the ages suggested for the 
different stages may be too old and that children begin to 
take physical laws into account earlier than Piaget suggested. 
The increased exposure to scientific facts and explanations 
and the decreased exposure to folk or mythic ideas and tales 
would, I think, force earlier accommodation to the different 
stages. 
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What is more significant, however, than the fact that 
the few studies done to test Piaget's hypotheses support his 
conclusions, is the fact that this early work of Piaget has 
been largely ignored. Because Piaget himself was primarily 
concerned in his subsequent works with how children develop 
logical thinking, most of his work focused on the structures 
of thought and their place in the schema of development that 
leads to formal operations. Most of what has been written 
about "Piaget in the classroom" has been concerned with how 
logical thought can be fostered at various stages. Those 
taking a Piagetian approach to education view the pre logical 
thought of the child as a problem, a kind of temporary handi­
cap to be overcome and that curricula should be designed to 
build on those tasks the child can do correctly and to ignore 
the areas of confused thought that we cannot do much about 
until the child through accommodation and assimilation moves on 
new tasks. It appears that most educators seeking to apply 
Piaget to curriculum development would say of Piaget's find­
ings concerning the mythic quality of child thought that 
they reveal a bottle half-empty, what is missing and prob­
lematic. I am suggesting that the prelogical thinking de­
scribed shows a bottle half-full of rich and useable concepts 
that indicate a different and interesting approach to shaping 
curriculum materials for the elementary school. 
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A Curriculum Perspective; Egan 
How these findings about the mythic character of child 
thought can be used in developing an approach to curriculum 
has been outlined in Egan's Education Development (1979). 
Even though Egan acknowledges an indebtedness to Piaget and 
Erikson for his stage theory, he does not cite any specific 
works. It seems obvious, however, that he is quite indebted 
to Piaget's early writings in formulating his concept of the 
mythic stage (the first of Egan's four stages). Although 
other writers have suggested guidelines or rationale for the 
study of myths in elementary schools (most notably Frye and 
Steiner), Egan is, to my knowledge, the first to focus on the 
structures of thinking represented by myth as a form for 
writing curriculum materials. In order to understand what 
he means by a "mythic stage" we need to look first at his 
general theory. 
Egan is concerned to develop an educational theory of 
development rather than try to sketch out the educational 
implications of developmental theories from other disciplines. 
He argues that educational research and theory need to move 
beyond the current domination by psychology in order to deal 
with questions about thinking and development to the end of 
attaining information that "yields principles for engaging 
children in learning, for unit and lesson planning, for 
curriculum organizing" (p. 6). 
He contends that educational development follows stages 
and that principles for learning are derived from the 
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characteristic of each stage: 
At each stage we make sense of the world and 
experience in significantly different ways and 
that these differences require that knowledge be 
organized differently to be most accessible and 
educationally effective at each stage. From the 
defining characteristics of the stages are derived 
principles for organizing learning and teaching. 
(p. 7) 
Thus we see that, like Piaget, he is concerned with how the 
child derives meaning from the world, how and what the child 
can learn, or has available to learn with, at different stages. 
It is the structures, the categories that frame a child's 
interest, and not the content, that is the primary concern. 
Taking two basic principles of curriculum building—what 
knowledge the child has access to and what information is 
relevant to a child's needs—Egan suggests that child-centered 
advocates have made some incorrect assumptions. They have 
answered these questions in terms of content and thus assumed 
the child knows best what is closest at hand and that what 
is relevant is what the child sees and does in the external, 
everyday world. Consequently, they build curricula that 
focuses on the familiar (my home, my school, grocery shopping, 
etc.) and then expands outward to lesser known places—the 
"expanding horizons" concept. (pp. 17-18) 
The alternative to this approach is, Egan suggests, to 
see the categories children use at different ages to make 
sense of stories and games, to look at what they are in­
terested in. The kinds of stories young children are interested 
in (fairy tales) suggest that they "know best the most profound 
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human emotions and the bases of morality: love, hate, joy 
fear, good, bad" (p. 10). Through their inner worlds chil­
dren have "direct access to the wildest flights of fantasy 
... to anything in the world that can be connected with 
basic emotions and morality" (p. 11). The inherent struc­
tures that shape a child's interest and ability to learn, 
emotions and morality, are not from the environment but a 
form of heredity, coming either through the common situation 
of being born into a family (Freud) or through the human con­
dition itself (not unlike Jung's collective unconscious). 
The Stages 
These interests just described are central to Egan's 
conception of the first of four stages of education develop­
ment: (a) mythic (ages four/five to nine/ten), (b) romantic 
(eight/nine to 14/15), (c) philosophic (14/15 to 19/20), and 
(d) ironic (19/20 through adulthood). 
The mythic stage. The first stage of educational de­
velopment is termed "mythic" because of the similarity be­
tween the thought of the child and the stories of myth-using 
people."*" There are at least four characteristics of mythic 
thinking as derived from myths found in the child: 
(a) A need for intellectual security through absolutes 
and through significance assigned to all events, 
^Egan, like Piaget, suggests a correspondence between the 
developmental progress of Western civilization and the pattern 
of a child's intellectual growth, the idea that the child 
recapitulates the stages of the culture. 
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(b) a lack of sense of otherness and thus of history 
and change; myth provides "the eternally valid charter for 
things as they are" (p. 12), 
(c) a lack of a sense of the world as autonomous and 
objective, and 
(d) stories based on binary opposites. 
These features manifest themselves in the child's orientation, 
Egan says, as a difficulty in finding meaning in ambiguous 
and complex ideas, as the lack of experience with which to 
understand change and historical causality, as a tendency to 
see and interpret the outer world in terms of personal feel­
ings and imaginative inner life, and as a tendency to under­
stand things in terms of basic oppositions such as "big/little, 
love/hate, security/fear, courage/cowardice, good/bad" (pp. 12-
13). Two of the characteristics listed, (b) and (c), are 
among those Piaget found in the studies discussed above, and 
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(a) is implied in the child's articialism. The fourth, the 
need for binary opposites, is the need for a moral law, a 
hierarchy, that Piaget discussed. 
From these characteristics Egan suggests that we can find 
directions for how to teach children in the mythic stage. 
Thus the teacher or curriculum writer's job is not to take 
materials written from an adult perspective and simplify 
them but to use qualitatively different forms based on the 
child's grasp of emotional and moral polarities and lack of 
distinction between the inner and outer as a basis for build­
ing connections with the outside world. In this way children 
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can learn to use the outside world to think with from their 
own perspectives, with the result, Egan thinks, or modifi­
cation and growth as their own categories are altered by 
this interaction: 
True learning at this stage must involve their 
being able to absorb the world to the categories of 
their own vivid mental life and to dialectically use 
the world to expand the intellectual categories they 
have available. The most effective teaching will be 
that which provides best access to the world, by 
organizing what is to be known in terms that chil­
dren can best absorb and use. (pp. 15-16) 
Stories provide us with the best clues, Egan suggests, 
for organization, and the stories that interest children most 
are fairy tales. The story form itself is essential, he thinks, 
because it fixes meaning and that is a requirement for chil­
dren if they are to absorb, not just repeat, knowledge. Thus 
Egan proposes that most teaching at this stage should make use 
of the story form, casting countries, events, movements as 
characters in a drama with beginning, middle, and end. Even 
science should concentrate on the story of how people make 
discoveries, not on doing isolated experiments unless the 
game form can be used, the game being the other form besides 
story that this age can relate to, according to Egan. 
Egan does not give any evidence or theory for his asser­
tion that children learn best from the story form, but if 
we accept the parallel of child thought with premodern 
thought (as outlined above with Piaget), we can suggest that 
fot the most of human history the story was used as the 
vehicle for teaching most important knowledge. The conception 
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of all life as a part of a purposeful plan to serve man (the 
artificialist concept) leads one to expect that everything 
has its story: the story fixes meaning because it explains 
an event as a segment of life with intentionality, action 
and consequences. Pushing each answer back to its prede­
cessor with a succession of "why's", the child seeks the 
whole story, the link between each thing. For the young child 
it means nothing to say that a rock falls down the hill be­
cause a tree fell on it; s/he-needs to know why the tree 
wanted to fall and make the rock roll down. Often adults 
fail to get the point: the moral necessity that the child 
expects to lie behind all events. It is the story that ex­
plains the moral necessity. 
The first question an educator should ask when organi­
zing material for children at this stage is, according to 
Egan, "What is mythic about this?" (p. 20). The task, then, 
is to find the "two most powerful and conflicting forces in 
our topic" (p. 20) and to personify those forces. Instead 
of being understood as false later on, the student will 
understand such personifications as metaphors. Successful 
- teaching at this level, Egan argues, requires a repertoire 
of story plots and ways to put knowledge into these stories. 
This mode of learning not only gives children access 
to knowledge that might otherwise be out of reach concept­
ually and/or boring, but also develops the imagination 
through enabling children to connect their rich inner life 
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with the outer world and create an appetite for more of such 
wonderful knowledge of the world. Children know about the 
conflict between survival and destruction, Egan points out, 
and thus it is more meaningful for them to understand cul­
ture as a defense against destruction than to have bits and 
pieces of information about shelters, clothing and food. 
Those bits and pieces, which are the subject matter of much 
of the elementary school social studies curriculum, con­
stitute the essence of what Egan calls "the tyranny of pro­
vincial knowledge and experience over so many modern Western 
children's minds" (p. 24). 
The mythic stage is, then, the time for developing con­
fidence that the world can be meaningful, that the outer 
world can be related to one's inner world. The content of 
learning should not, according to this perspective, be in­
formation about the everyday world but the life and death 
struggles that myths and fairy tales represent. These and 
other fictional stories should be central in the curriculum, 
fostering the development of imagination, of language rich 
in contrasts, and of a sense of the drama and mystery of 
existence. The main threat to educational development, in 
Egan's theory, is a curriculum that suppresses "children's 
vivid forms of thinking in local detail and trivia." Life 
is not about "the secure surface of daily routine and local 
custom" but the great struggles. Thus the first task is 
"to destroy the tyranny of this local knowledge over children's 
imaginations by introducing them to knowledge about the world 
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that is, in its dramatic power and human significance, analo­
gous to their own earlier inner struggles" (pp. 121-122). 
I want to describe the next stage in Egan's schema be­
cause it shows how mythic thinking is changed by the child's 
experience and learning, but still retains many mythic themes. 
The pattern fits the development that Piaget found of the 
increasing accommodation of thought to physical laws, but a 
perspective that has not lost all of its mythic features. 
The romantic stage. The primary characteristic of the 
shift from the mythic to the romantic stage, as Egan describes 
it, is seen in the way the child views the world. For now the 
world is viewed as more than an extension of the self; it is 
rather a realm distinct from the inner world, filled with 
strangeness, wonders, and extremes. The opposites within 
which reality exists are still prominent but now they are 
conceived in terms of the limits of reality, thus there is 
a "sudden fascination with the extremes of what exists and 
what is known" (p. 31). It is an age characterized by The 
Guinness Book of Records and Ripley's Believe It or Not. 
At this stage myth is confined to the real world but pushes 
against its boundaries, Egan suggests. 
The student at this stage has two primary tasks: (a) 
finding a new relationship and connectedness to a now autono­
mous world in order to deal with its threatening aliveness, 
and (b) developing a sense of identity. Connection and 
identity with the world are made at this stage, Egan finds, 
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not through learning about the familiar but by making roman­
tic associations with the most powerful and transcendent, and 
often the more remote. Thus it is a time for identifying 
with heroes, through the transcendent human qualities of 
courage, honor, faithfulness, creativity. It is this iden­
tification which glorifies and gives security to the emerging 
ego and provides a means of access to knowledge. 
Egan emphasizes the desire to explore the limits of 
reality at this age. Students have a desire to get a feel 
for different ways of living, to explore the strangeness of 
other worlds, cultures and times, to get a sense of the scope 
of things in the universe. The everyday environment is boring 
and often alienating, Egan thinks, unless the student is 
exploring some facet of knowledge in infinite detail. 
The implications of curriculum development for students 
at the romantic stage are similar in several ways to those 
for the mythic stage. The educator should, Egan suggest, 
avoid the rational, logical, everyday, provencial, "relevant," 
and look instead for story forms, the polarities, and an 
unsophisticated approach. More specifically, s/he should 
look to the unusual or bizarre person in history or litera­
ture whose life expresses some great theme (e.g., creativity 
vs. security) and to whom the student can relate by means 
of identification with the person's courage, nobility, in­
genuity. 
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We find here echoes of what Frye says about the impor­
tance of romance to the development of the imagination, 
especially for children. Romance, as we recall, expresses 
the limits of desire, the world at its extremes of good and 
evil (heaven and hell). From romance the child begins to 
form a sense of the limits of human aspiration and degradation 
and the models who embody it, the heroes and villains. Thus, 
it is significant in forming a moral sense of the world and 
a vision of the ideal, the world we want rather than the 
world we presently live in. 
The romantic view is, I suggest, what the child retains 
of the mythic perspective during a time when experience is 
teaching him/her about the physical laws that supplant the 
magic and animism of nature and events. The imagination 
keeps alive those images of the strange, the extreme, the 
wonderful and the terrifying, the good and evil. It is from 
this accumulation of symbols and archetypes that the student 
will draw ideas as s/he. begins to develop a philosophy, 
a vision of a better world. The philosophic stage, the 
third in Egan's educational schema, will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
A Psychological Perspective: Bettelheim 
What Piaget and Egan reveal about the cognitive needs of 
the child is paralleled by Bettelheim's theories about the 
psychological needs of the child in The Uses of Enchantment 
(1976). In the introduction I discussed the idea that in 
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many respects myth and tale partake of the same characteris­
tics, while maintaining some obvious differences. Given the 
close relationship between these two kinds of ancient tales, 
it is not surprising to find that much of what Bettelheim 
says about children's interest in fairy tales bears a strong 
resemblance to what Egan writes about the interest in mythic 
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materials. In his study, Child and Tale, Favat (1977) refers 
to the reality of the child described in the early works of 
Piaget and that in the fairy tales as being essentially the 
same. Indeed, we can say that although Piaget talks about 
the correspondence between what he discovered about child thought 
and the thought of myth-bound people, we could establish most, 
if not all, the same parallels between child thought and 
folk/fairy tales. I want to show here that Bettelheim's 
description of how fairy tales match and serve the child's 
psychological world complements the picture of the child's 
view of reality established above and thus gives us a more 
complete picture of the child's need for and interest in 
mythic materials, in this case an emotional need that corre­
sponds to and supports a cognitive need. 
In The Uses of Enchantment (1976) , Bettelheim develops 
the thesis that what children need and want most for their 
psychological development that can be gained from books 
^Bettelheim dislikes myths and tries to make a sharp 
distinction; however, his distinction, I suggest, is based 
more on the religious and potentially dogmatic characteris­
tics of myths than on the kind of reality depicted or the 
themes involved. 
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and stories is found in fairy tales. He has found through 
his clinical experiences that their great interest in these 
tales is quite sound. They are seeking, unconsciously, the 
stories that tell them what they most need to know: how to 
deal with inner conflicts created by social relationships, 
mainly the family setting, and how to project hope and mean­
ing into their present struggles. 
Bettelheim is interested in the structure and form stories 
provide for the child's thought, particularly the adequacy 
of the structures to bring unconscious material into conscious­
ness so that the conflicts can be worked through and the imag­
ination expanded and enriched. Contemporary stories, both 
realism and simplified fantasies, are not able, Bettelheim 
thinks, to promote the development of imagination that psy­
chological growth requires because these stories are based 
on false assumptions. They are stories that yield to modern 
parents' beliefs that we ought to be truthful with children, 
that too much fantasy will lead to neglect of reality, that 
the world already has too much that is frightening in it 
without giants and beasts, and that children's ambivalent 
- feelings about parents should not be encouraged. He argues 
that such persons miss the purpose of stories and the nature 
of psychological problems. There is a need to see that 
fairy tales deal with a truth more important than literalism, 
the truth of the imagination, that reality threatens fantasy 
because fantasy is a way of bringing emotions in line with 
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reality, that tales do not add monsters to the child's 
thought but give a way to deal with the fierce stuff there 
anyway, and that it is quite helpful to portray parent-child 
conflict in stories that bring it to a happy conclusion. 
Bettelheim views the child's inner world and development 
in Freudian categories of certain basic, universal struggles 
and suggests that the structure the emerging psyche needs is 
one that allows these conflicts to be expressed and resolved. 
Fairy tales are expressions of these psychological struggles 
and offer not only a vicarious way of expressing them but also 
reassurance that they are okay and can be resolved success­
fully, even that it is an attractive venture to be engaged in. 
The structure of the tales matches the structure of the child's 
mind—a clear polarization of moral and emotional concepts 
(good/evil, happy/sad, etc.). This polarization is necessary, 
he argues, for the comprehension of the concepts; complexi­
ties and subtleties are understood only much later (also 
Egan's argument). The child learns morality through iden­
tification with the hero and thus learns goodness and its 
desirability because of the hero's attractiveness or learns 
to desire success or achievement because of the hero's suc­
cess and great reward. 
Bettelheim contends that the child's thinking is quali­
tatively different from the adult's to a greater degree than 
Piaget does. He contends that while Piaget describes the 
animistic character of child thought, he still often tries 
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to understand a child's thinking from a rational framework 
and thus does not see the child's point (p. 119). The child 
works from the inner world out toward reality; learning to 
bridge the "immense gap between inner experiences and the 
real world" (p. 66) is the developmental task. Reasoning is, 
at this point, still too immature, he thinks, to give form 
and meaning to the "rapidly expanding collection of often ill-
assorted and only partially integrated impressions" (p. 61). 
Attempts to explain phenomena in objective terms and sci­
entific reasoning about the sun, moon, gravity fail to reach 
children even though they may be able to give it back verbally. 
Scientific explanations, Bettelheim thinks, are lonely and 
isolating images to children whose way of imaging the world 
is according to the family setting. Some realism can help 
the emerging rationality, but it is fantasy that gives the 
form by which the child gains order and meaning out of the 
inner needs and the demands of reality. He projects a recapi­
tulation theory for the intellectual and emotional pattern of 
the development of the child's thinking: 
What seems desirable for the individual is to 
repeat in his life span the process involved his­
torically in the genesis of scientific thought. For 
a long time in his history man used emotional pro­
jections—such as gods—born of his immature hopes 
and anxieties to explain man, his society, and the 
universe; these explanations gave him a feeling of 
security. Then slowly, by his own social, scien­
tific, and technological progress, man freed him­
self of the constant fear for his very existence. 
. . . From there man's childish projections dis­
solved and more rational explanations took their 
place. (p. 51) 
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Growth toward maturity is facilitated best, Bettelheim 
thinks, by the development of the imagination. And it is 
through fantasy that the imagination is fostered. He writes 
that "the ability to spin fantasies beyond the present is 
the new achievement which makes all others possible" (p. 125). 
Because fantasy is the way of projecting hope into the future 
beyond the disappointments of the present it makes it possi­
ble for the child to take on new achievements even though each 
step in growth is threatening. Without such projections de­
velopment is arrested. The fairy tales are, Bettelheim 
thinks, the kind of fantasy that best facilitates this de­
velopment of the imagination because they use stock characters 
and "universal symbols that permit the child to choose, select, 
neglect, and interpret the tale in ways congruent with his 
state of intellectual and psychological development" (p. 130). 
The implication of his theory is that the development of an 
imagination rich enough in images and stories to assist with 
conflict and growth throughout life is what is most needed 
in the child's education and that is what fairy tales do best. 
Bettelheim gives a rationale for the child's emotional 
need for mythic images and stories (assuming, as we are here, 
that fairy tales are derived from myths and express many of 
the archetypes) that parallels Piaget's and Egan's findings 
about the child's cognitive needs. The basic assumption is 
that the child's conception of reality is qualitatively dif­
ferent from the adult's and thus the simplifying of adult 
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ideas will not produce the kinds of ideas and materials needed 
by the child. The child relates best to stories in which 
basic concepts like good/evil, happy/sad are polarized and 
where events are portrayed not in naturalistic but in per­
sonalized terms. It is not to deny the importance of ex­
periences and learning that bring to the child an ever clearer 
sense of how the physical world operates to say that the child 
also continues to need expressions of the more "primitive" 
ideas and emotions that are his/her inheritance. In terms 
of emotional development, Bettelheim finds that the fairy 
tales have the great advantage of strengthening the child's 
imagination and hope through the projection of personal vic­
tories over difficult or fearful situations paralleled in the 
stories. 
Patterns in Children's Interests: Travers 
The significance of myth/tale materials for curriculum 
is extended by the theory Robert Travers has developed about 
the link between interests and stage-related intellectual and 
emotional needs. Travers brings together Piaget and Bettelheim 
in his analysis of why fairy tales are of great interest to 
children. 
In the monography, Children's Interests (1978), Travers 
examines the cognitive basis of interests which he has ex­
plored in colaboration with four other educators. He suggests 
that most studies of interests have been based on the theory 
that hedonism is the basis of motivation and have thus missed 
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the major motivation for learning—the need to structure know­
ledge. His thesis is that interests are tied to cognitive 
development and thus are best understood for curriculum in 
terms of developmental theory and the universalities of chil­
dren's interests rather than individual differences. 
Following Piaget's assumption that interests are part 
of the survival need to know about the physical environment, 
he suggests that the curriculum becomes important, interest­
ing to the child when it fosters the assimilation of the 
knowledge the child needs at that point and helps improve 
the organization of knowledge. Essential to this approach is 
a recognition that the child grasps knowledge in a different 
way from the adult and needs a different kind of knowledge, 
thus that interests are stage-related. 
Since in Piaget's findings, cognitive tasks are universal, 
then interests, according to Traver's theory, are universal 
because they are motivated by these tasks and follow the pat­
tern of cognitive growth even though cultural characteristics 
will restrict some more than others. Travers thinks such 
patterns of interest are evident and characterize human be­
havior: "there is a permeating picture of an inherent interest 
pattern that is peculiar to the human species and which becomes 
the very foundation of the humanness of the human" (p. 30). 
It is from such universal patterns of interest that the best 
curriculum can be developed, he thinks, on the assumption 
that the "growing individual seeks structure, and that the 
discovery of structure is highly energizing to behavior" (p. 76). 
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While the emphasis in Piaget is more- on the need to 
understand the physical environment, Travers suggests that 
the deeper need of the child is understanding his/her social 
world and the way the social needs help determine an under­
standing of the physical. For example, the study of flight 
may be an extension of the wish to fly, a desire to find the 
magic. 
Travers focuses his study of social interest in the ele­
mentary school age child on the strong interests in stories. 
Noting what a number of persons have found concerning the 
strong interest in fairy tales between ages five and ten, he 
suggests that the beginning of that interest lies in the need 
to interact with adults and then focuses on these particular 
stories because of the simple structure with which the child 
can identify. However, this does not in itself explain the 
strong appeal of stories that appear to be so different from 
other interests that the child shows, such as environmental 
phenomena, concrete relationships within the family. Follow­
ing Bettelheim, Travers suggests that the fairy tales reflect 
the inner world of the child and the way childish conceptions 
construct reality: 
Yet the child probably sees in the fairy tale a 
deep similarity to the real world because of his 
childish conception of the world. The fairy story 
is told through symbols and refers to a world dif­
ferent from that which he knows through his contact 
with reality; yet it is close enough to his reality 
that he can understand it. For the first time, the 
child becomes interested and preoccupied with an 
ideational world. (pp. 88-89) 
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Thus he is in agreement with Bettelheim about the importance 
of fairy tales for helping the child to understand and give 
form to relationships with others, "a symbolic form of struc­
ture for the child's social world" (p. 93). 
Travers concludes that there is an impressive "overlap" 
between the Bettelheim and Piaget concepts of how children 
gradually evolve an understanding of the physical world and 
how they ascribe meaning to their social relationships, begin­
ning from the egocentric perspective that does not clearly 
distinguish between properties of people and those of objects 
and sees all things as directed to personal needs. For both 
Bettelheim and Piaget the process of assimilation is essential 
for learning and growth, Travers notes, and assimilation is 
dependent on the child's being able to use the intellectual 
structures s/he has: 
The child's intellect places great limitation 
on the interpretation he can give to his social 
world. His intense interest in fairy stories re­
sults from the fact that they suggest ways of view­
ing the social world which he can understand at 
his intellectual level and ways with which he 
feels empathy at the emotional level. (p. 99) 
Not only is the fairy tale an appropriate form for giving 
structure to the social world for the child's intellect, but 
it also introduces the child to metaphorical language which 
will continue to be used as a medium for describing complex 
family, human relationships into adulthood, Travers thinks. 
Thus he suggests that while science is the language for com­
prehending the physical world, metaphor is the language for 
the social world. (p. 100) 
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Travers concludes that the search for an understanding 
of interests that will help in the developing of curriculum 
should be neither in the subject matter areas (for these are 
adult forms that do not relate to the cognitive needs of the 
child) nor in the influence of individual differences which 
is where Americans want to look because they tend to reject 
the idea that humans are very much the same. Rather the key 
to interests can be found in those universal characteristics 
of the developing intellect as it moves through stages. 
Through these we should seek what knowledge the child needs 
and can use to understand the physical and the social world. 
My only argument with Travers is that he gives too much 
attention to the fairy tales as a structure for the social 
world and too little to the way tale and myth provide struc­
ture for relating to the natural world as well. He implies 
a greater distinction between how the child understands the 
social and physical worlds than I think is appropriate in 
the light of what Piaget reveals about the mythic qualities 
of the child's thinking about the physical world. It is, 
I suggest, that strong link between the human and physical 
worlds, that unified picture of a moral universe where all 
events are connected and purposeful, that makes the tale and 
myth so powerful for the child. These natural events always 
mirror the human (or divine) action; fish, tree and wind all 
participate on one side or the other, assisting or threaten­
ing the human venture. As the child learns more about the 
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laws of nature, s/he must give up this magical view, but the 
images and the sense of a lost world remain in the imagina­
tion. Favat (19 77) argues quite plausibly that the reason 
many children around age ten have a brief but intense renewed 
interest in the fairy tales they had about stopped reading is 
that they recognize they are leaving that worldview behind 
and are reluctant to do so. 
Conclusions 
An important feature of myth, then, for the child is that 
is provides an order with which to begin to arrange the many 
bits and pieces of information about the world. P. Parmer 
(1977) suggests that myth is essentially about creating order: 
. . . ordering—ordering experience, both in order 
to make tolerable the immeasurable vastness of the 
universe that the myth-makers encountered all 
about them . . . , and to come to terms with its 
more intolerable events. That way, taking your 
cue from the god, you in your own way recreate 
the world. (p. 181) 
Apparently the child's view of the world is quite similar to 
that in myth and folktale, and thus the child can use these 
materials to understand his/her experiences, to create order. 
The story form is also an important part of the child's 
need to create order, as Egan suggested above. Higgins (1970) 
writes that the world of story is closer to the child than 
the world of science and is important as a means of organizing 
knowledge: 
A story artfully told is perhaps the best model of 
organizing actions that a child can find amidst 
the confines of the visible and apprehensible world. 
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Story offers the child another key to the under­
standing of the universe. (p. 50) 
The importance of the story form for children's learning is 
one of the interesting insights these writers offer. It sug­
gests that for children, knowledge to be assimilated needs 
to be about something, connected to a kind of plot that has 
meaning. While the importance of using existent stories, 
especially traditional ones, is discussed, Egan also suggests 
the value of teachers constructing stories out of the infor­
mation they want to teach, giving it not just drama but also 
significance by using those mythic characteristics of polariz­
ing good-evil, strong-weak, happy-sad. 
The importance of moral categories to the child is seen 
in the tendency to ascribe moral necessity to the way things 
operate in the natural and the human world. Gaining a clear 
sense of good and evil, not moral ambiguities, is important 
to the child, Bettelheim and Egan argue, as well as learning 
that one can prevail if on the side of good. This view runs 
counter to the kind of reasoning that currently influences 
much of the realistic fiction being written for children, the 
idea that children need most those stories and characters 
that show people and events the way they really are—both 
good and bad, strong and weak, sometimes right and often 
wrong, not heroes but real people. 
Educating children in the stories and images of myths 
and tales, we can conclude, gives them access to forms of 
tacit knowledge, as well as to the central ideas and images 
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of the culture. The world of myth is not a strange and alien 
world, but a pattern from the most essential experiences that 
the child intuitively understands. As Frye makes clear, the 
essential structures and images of myths are drawn from the 
cycles of nature and the dialectic of day and night in order 
to establish analogies between the human and natural world. 
Lacking a clear distinction between the subjective and objec­
tive world, children intuitively understand those analogies 
for they project onto the natural world their own feelings 
and motivations. Higgins (1970), in writing about fantasy 
in literature that children read (both traditional and modern), 
observes that fantasy reflects the child's world in which 
"the material and the spiritual are so intricately entwined 
that they are one" (p. 49). This dimension of child thought 
has been neglected, Higgins notes, because of a negative 
attitude toward what has been labeled "superstitiort" and 
"imagination." But now it needs to be recalled, "psycho­
analyzed back into being when its spark is snuffed out" 
(p. 3) . 
Such an education also begins to develop the imagination. 
Myths and tales embody the ideas and images that humans have 
always used to interpret their reality. The child is a 
"natural myth-maker," Anderson and Groff (1972, p. 54) claim, 
and can begin learning, as Framer says above, to "recreate 
the world." The purpose in educating the imagination, Frye 
contends, is to liberate the child from an adjustment 
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mythology by enabling him/her to do that kind of recreation, 
and it begins with knowing the mythic stories in childhood. 
A major contribution of myth-based stories and tales is 
that they provide the child with a great repository of mythic 
images and themes at a time when they can be assimilated 
easily. The child learns to manipulate the symbols and pat­
terns of mythical thought and thus use an important part of 
his/her cognitive and emotional world that is not evoked by 
realistic fiction and rational inquiry. The plots, characters 
and images of mythic stories are the basic "tools" of the 
artistic, literary, and political imagination which the child 
needs as much as the tools of grammar and arithmetic. 
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CHAPTER III 
ADOLESCENCE: FINDING A MYTH TO LIVE BY 
At the philosophic stage, contentious value issues, 
ideologies, metaphysical beliefs are properly not 
just inconvenient incidentals, but rather the 
central focus of education. (Egan, 1979, p. 78) 
In this chapter, I draw again on Egan's curriculum 
theory, as well as on some of Piaget's conclusions, this time 
as regards the cognitive needs and abilities of the adolescent. 
Also I examine Erikson's theories about the psychological 
tasks and needs of youth. Together these viewpoints suggest 
that the main motivation or task for adolescents is find­
ing a philosophy, ideology or myth around which to organize 
learning so that their education serves their primary goal 
of establishing an identity and finding a meaningful place 
in a world that itself has meaning. In the final part of 
the chapter I develop some suggestions for how curriculum 
can be developed that meets the student's need for myth and 
ideology. 
In this analysis I will use several terms that in this 
context refer to the same general idea, even though each 
differs in some significant ways. Thus we need definitions 
for what is meant by each term, particularly as it relates 
to myth. Ideology is a modern concept that refers to an 
ideational or belief system of a culture or a sociopolitical 
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system. An ideology is more abstract than a traditional myth, 
but it does have something of a story line which interprets 
those essentials of a meaning system that are found in a myth. 
An ideology is often called a quasi-myth, performing many 
functions of myth but not being as comprehensive, detailed, 
or bound to a people's everyday life as a myth. Instead it 
is more concerned with economics, historical trends, and 
social theories. The term philosophy is used here in the 
sense of "a philosophy of life," rather than as an academic 
discipline, and thus is similar to myth and ideology in that 
it represents an attempt to deal with the great metaphysical 
questions of meaning and purpose. The term story is used 
for cultural and personal narratives that, like the myth, 
explain the meaning and direction of a society or an individ­
ual, e.g., one's story is one's personal myth. Myth shares 
with these terms the common idea of a schema that orders and 
explains existence, or some aspect of it, in a meaningful 
way. 
From the rites of passage or initiation ceremonies of 
traditional cultures to the recognition of idealism and 
commitment to causes in Western cultures, adolescence is 
known to be a time of fixing beliefs, of commitment to the 
ideals of the community, and of impatience with compromise, 
but many of the values and attitudes of the modern world 
work against such a commitment. The youth of modern Western 
societies are seldom offered a firm, clear myth, a powerful 
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story about what it means to become an adult. What has been 
lost in terms of fixed meaning and a strong community has 
been compensated for, to some degree, by a new freedom to 
find what one chooses to affirm and by liberation from the 
community's fixed roles and expectations. 
The possibility of being free from having to live out of 
a particular myth and from being bound to a community is a 
characteristic of this age celebrated not only in the academic 
world but, increasingly, in the popular culture. But we are 
beginning to see, particularly in the youth of the past de­
cade, that the experience of freedom and liberation may often 
lead not to greater fulfillment but to drift, alienation, 
or hedonism. In the 1960"s there was much said about freeing 
youth from authority and tradition so that they could use 
reason to see what is needed in the world and thus bring 
about social and political change. But we have seen that a 
recognition of social problems, a rational critique of needed 
change, has not been sufficient to bring commitment. 
The rapid changes brought by technology, the loss of 
roots in particular communities, the acceptance of cultural 
pluralism and the ideology of progress are all aspects of 
modern life that have undercut the basis for commitment to 
common goals (although these same changes have made possible 
some new alliances for social and political action and thus 
are not viewed as negative in all their implications). As 
Novak (1971) describes it, the absence of a story or myth to 
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live by is the basis of the alienation of the young: 
In a pluralistic culture, in which many stories 
are simultaneously and powerfully presented to the 
young, a certain confusion, malaise, and loss of 
confidence often result. No one story commands alle­
giance. Action, therefore, lacking a story to give 
it significance, seems pointless. Why bother to 
do anything at all? What is worth trying to become? 
The young often begin to sleep a lot. Not to have 
a story to live out is to experience nothingness. 
(p. 52) 
Freedom "from" community norms and authority has meant a lib­
eration from fixed roles but it has not been sufficient in 
terms of the individual's need for meaning. The synthesis 
that we now need, I suggest, between the poles of individual 
freedom and social solidarity is expressed in the phrase, 
"freedom for," which refers to choosing one's commitment, 
willing one's participation in community. It is in that 
sense that I suggest that the adolescent's need for a myth 
or philosophy for identity and for giving purpose to learn­
ing is not a regressive idea. 
The Adolescent Need for Ideology; Erikson 
In Identity; Youth and Culture (1968) , Erikson defines 
the central task of adolescence as the formation of a per­
sonal identity, and contends that this cannot take place 
without affirming some ideology. It is this study of adoles­
cence that is considered in the following discussion. 
Adolescence begins with the "crisis" of identity, by 
which Erikson means the recognition of the task of establish­
ing an identity as the most essential work of that period of 
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development, and it continues through various events of test­
ing out possibilities until the time of adolescence ends with 
the attainment of a firm sense of identity. How difficult 
this process is will depend, in large measure, on the ideolo­
gies the culture offers for establishing one's relationship 
to the culture. In some periods of history some individuals 
more than others feel alienated from the dominant ideology 
and develop a negative identity, while others prolong the 
resolution through a moratorium, an extended time of search­
ing for an acceptable and meaningful self-image. The failure 
of psychology to take into account the environment, particu­
larly the ideological possibilities the culture has to offer 
at a particular time in history, is one of Erikson's themes 
in describing the task of identity-formation. 
The culture is, Erikson asserts, one of the two central 
dimensions of the identity process, the other being the self. 
Identity is, he writes, "a process 'located' in the core of 
the individual and yet also in the core of his communal 
culture" (p. 22). The culture offers the system of meaning 
that gives purpose, a role, to the individual and thus a 
direction and focus: in adolescence "the ideological struc­
ture of the environment becomes essential for the ego, be­
cause without an ideological simplification of the universe 
the adolescent ego cannot organize experience" (p. 26, emphasis 
mine). In other words, without some form of myth a young per­
son cannot "find himself." 
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While the interaction of youth with the ideology of the 
culture is essential for the individual, it is also important 
for renewal and even change of the cultural myth. Contrary 
to Freud's interpretation of the role of culture as necessary 
but repressive, Erikson suggests an essential, often positive, 
and somewhat flexible relationship between the individual and 
the culture: the cultural ideology is the "guardian of iden­
tity" (p. 26), but the youth of the society also contribute 
to the change of the culture and its ideology by supporting 
those aspects that feel true and rejecting those that do not 
(see pp. 133-134). 
Erikson finds that for the current generation of youth 
the dominant ideology, technology, is more implicit than ex­
plicit but nonetheless a powerful influence on both those youth 
who affirm it and on those who reject or are rejected by it. 
Adolescence is easiest now for those youth who are, Erikson 
writes, "gifted and trained for technological pursuits" (p. 130). 
The machine age has produced an ideology that many youth 
identify with, and for these youth it can be an exciting time 
because the present and the future seem both assured and full 
of opportunity. These are the youth often overlooked by cul­
tural analysts, Erikson observes, the youth who do not rebel 
against their parents or the system: 
If the majority of young people, therefore, can go 
along with their parents in a kind of fraternal 
identification, it is because they jointly leave 
it to technology and science to carry the burden 
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of providing a self-perpetuating and self-accel­
erating way of life. (p. 259) 
Erikson suggests that those who are not willing or able 
to let technology be the primary shaper of life-style and 
values are, on the one hand, the "new humanists" and, on 
the other, those from minority and poorer families where there 
is limited access to the jobs and benefits of the technological 
age. It is characteristic of revolutionary times, Erikson 
notes, that the over-privileged and the under-privileged form 
a bond against the majority (p. 36). The humanistic youth 
respond to those ideas in the culture that are concerned with 
an ethic to guide and check what science and technology can 
do. They identify with those seeking a universal order, a 
world-wide identity, transcending the group-based identity 
that cultures have always offered to each generation. See­
ing technology as a false or evil ideology, they respond 
strongly to anti-technology causes and heroes, identifying 
with "naked heroism anywhere in the world where 'machine' 
threatens to crush man's, will" (p. 37). These youth who do 
not respond to the implicit ideology of technology and who 
are unsatisfied by the complex and uncertain goals of con­
temporary democracy have to search for an explicit ideology, 
Erikson writes, "some inspiring unification of tradition or 
anticipated techniques, ideas, and ideals" (p. 130). They 
need persons and ideas to have faith in, "men and ideas in 
whose service it would seem worthwhile to prove oneself 
trustworthy" (pp. 128-129). 
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While it may be that adults can go beyond ideology, and 
Erikson thinks that our hope lies in doing just that in the 
formation of an ethical view of historical reality, youth 
need to have a belief system, to have "the larger framework 
settled" which accounts for "the acceptance by youth of myth­
ologies and ideologies predicting the course of the universe 
or the historical trend" (p. 247, emphasis mine). Erikson 
thinks that youth do not come to such tasks empty-handed but 
with a history that started in childhood with the good and 
evil prototypes from such sources as fairy tales and parental 
teaching. And they enter upon their first efforts at philo­
sophic thinking in a particular historical context that limits, 
sometimes severely, the possibilities. In particular, Erikson 
observes, the historical era limits the real and fictitious 
people with whom the child can identify. For each generation 
the task is to "find an identity with its own childhood and 
with an ideological promise in the perceptible historical 
process" (p. 258). If what they bring from their own child­
hood or what their culture offers in terms of economic, ethnic, 
and religious foundations is weak or inadequate, a positive 
identity will be more difficult to attain. 
Erikson also points out that some forms of delinquency 
and refusals to "grow up" are a response to the inadequacy 
of the ideology with which they are asked to identify. The 
moratorium on establishing an identity that many humanistic 
youth declare is to be understood largely in these terms: 
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"they will certainly take their time, and take it with a ven­
geance, until they are sure whether or not they want any of 
the identity offered in a conformist world" (p. 26). 
Focusing on adolescent development as a process depen­
dent on the ideological potential of society, Erikson estab­
lishes a rationale for what I want here to term the need for 
myth. He suggests that there are basically two ideological 
responses in our time. One i-s the acceptance of the "myth 
of the machine," the belief that civilization will now be 
carried forward toward a better society for all through the 
production of more and better goods, the increase of harvests 
through use of scientific methods, the eventual eradication 
of disease and finally the end of wars through the elimina­
tion of economic ills. The other is the belief in the re-
establishment of human primacy over machines, the limitation 
of technological development so that individual freedom and 
cultural values can be maintained. The latter being more 
explicitly ideological, the more mythical, and with ties to 
our past that technology does not have, it avails itself more 
of the stories and images of the hero defying the anti-human 
or evil forces. These two dominant ideologies or myths that 
Erikson identifies, technology and humanism, may not adequately 
cover the possibilites but they provide one good starting 
point for helping students think about the ideologies with 
which they can identify. 
The psychological need in adolescence to embrace an 
ideology, in our terms here, to find a myth to live by, 
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corresponds with the developing cognitive skills during this 
time. Building theoretical systems and developing a life plan 
are the appropriate intellectual tasks of the youth as for­
mal operations are attained, Piaget contends, and Egan ex­
tends that theory to argue that developing a philosophic sys­
tem is the main educational task of the adolescent. 
The Importance of Philosophic Thinking: 
Piaget and Inhelder 
In the concluding chapter of The Growth of Logical Think­
ing: From Childhood to Adolescent (1958) Piaget and Inhelder 
write about "Adolescent Thinking," citing the change in role 
and thinking as the distinctive events marking adolescence 
rather than the onset of puberty. Adolescence, they contend, 
is when the young person begins to take up adult roles, seeing 
himself as an equal and able to judge adults. The ability to 
see oneself in an adult role is a sign of a change in mode of 
thinking, i.e., the shift into formal operations. Formal 
operations is characterized by the ability to handle abstract 
concepts, to think of possibilities, to think beyond the pre­
sent, and to fit these projections into larger designs or 
systems: "the adolescent is the individual who begins to 
build 'systems' or 'theories,' in the largest sense of the 
term" (p. 339). The adult role requires that such a life-
plan be developed, even though crude and subject to change. 
It is the adolescent thinking as a philosopher or theo­
retician that Piaget and Inhelder describe. They have observed 
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that somewhere between the ages of 14 and 19 most youth de­
velop political and social theories, seeking explanations and 
reforms for world problems, engaging in philosophic specula­
tion, re-examining religious beliefs and seeking a universal 
system: "adolescence is the metaphysical age par excellence" 
(p. 340) . Even though the concepts or philosophies formed 
may be oversimplified and unoriginal, their effort enables 
youth to see and to integrate social values and to assert 
themselves over against adults in a creative way. 
This new ability to form concepts of the possible is the 
basis of the idealism that is characteristic of adolescence, 
the writers suggest. At first the power to create a new world 
seems unlimited and the egocentricity of thought prevents youth 
from distinguishing their own point of view from that of the 
people they would like to reform. If the idealism that forms 
the adolescent's philosophy is naive as a plan for social 
action, it does serve the individual in beginning to have a 
life plan, course of action, a set of values to which s/he 
submits his/her ego. They note that adolescent systems/theories 
are most often plans for personal action in which the indi­
vidual sees him/herself as having a significant role in ef­
fecting change and achieving goals. Thus by setting a life 
plan the young person brings emotions into harmony with in­
tellectual framework, consolidating personality and preparing 
to assume a role in society, not in a passive sense, but as 
someone new, doing something better or different (p. 350). 
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The Philosophic as an Educational Stage; Egan 
Drawing on Piaget and Erikson, Egan in Educational Develop­
ment (1979) describes adolescence as a time when the central 
educational task is to construct, utilize, and test out a 
philosophical position. It is a time when the guiding in­
terest is in finding general truths, forming schemas into 
which particular knowledge will fit, developing hierarchies 
for the organization of information. 
At about age 14 or 15 most students enter a new stage in 
their learning, Egan finds, when they begin to realize that 
the bits and pieces of the world that have fascinated them— 
heroes, great events, true but strange facts (of the Ripley's 
and Guiness Records variety), collectable items—are no longer 
what is most important to know because now they are beginning 
to see that there are laws of nature and human nature, sys­
tems operating that influence and to some degree determine 
their own lives. Thus romantic connections dissolve in light 
of the "growing realization that their proper connection 
to the world is by means of enormously complicated causal 
chains and networks" (p. 51). As students begin searching 
for their place in the scheme of things they seek both know­
ledge about human psychology, the laws of history, and social 
forms as well as a context to fit this information into, an 
ideology like Marxism or liberal progressivism. Learning 
particulars, a concern and often an obsession at the romantic 
stage, now seems trivial compared to the search for great 
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truths, which search, Egan thinks, becomes the motivation 
for developing abstract intellectual tools. 
Egan concludes that it is learning itself, not just phys­
ical maturation, that is responsible for the shift in per­
spective at this new stage and for keeping philosophical in­
quiry going. Through the accumulation of a sheer amount and 
variety of information the student becomes aware of the world 
as a much more complicated place, which recognition, coupled 
with a new subjective sense of oneself that begins with ado­
lescence, creates the feeling that there needs to be some 
philosophy to explain the world and give one a purposeful 
place in it. Whether the student's philosophy is adequately 
developed depends a lot on the wealth of knowledge the stu­
dent brings to it, Egan contends. 
The learning process at this stage is, Egan argues, a 
dialectic between the philosophical position and the particu­
lar knowledge that continually must be assimilated to it or 
alter it: 
The more knowledge the student acquires, the 
more likely it is to generate anomalies, and so 
require revisions in the general scheme, which in 
turn will require further inquiry, the accumulation 
of yet more knowledge, which in turn will contain 
further anomalies, which will lead to increasingly 
sophisticated general schemes. (p. 39) 
The teacher1s need is, on the one hand, to help students find 
knowledge that aids in the development of their schema and, 
on the other hand, to expose them to more information and 
ideas that do not fit, i.e., anomalies, so that they must 
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expand and alter their views and not close themselves within 
a crude and inadequate ideology. 
Students are not motivated to organize knowledge just in 
order to know about the world but rather they are motivated 
by the need to find their own place, to know what will influ­
ence them, to find meaning for their lives. The educational 
task at this stage is to recognize and assist the emerging 
capacity and need for ideologies and metaphysical schemes in 
order that students may use these to organize their learning. 
Egan argues the need to recognize this source of interest: 
The students are interested in psychology, 
sociology, literature, religion, women's studies, 
ethnic studies because they are looking, not for 
the particulars that interest scholars, but the 
essences, the regularities, the general order that 
tells them about the world and their place in it. 
(p. 63). 
The teacher needs, on the one hand, to help students find know 
ledge that aids development of their schemas, and on the other 
hand, to help them see anomalies that then require further 
revisions of their ideas. 
On the whole, teachers and curriculum developers will 
not be comfortable with this approach, Egan thinks, because 
the notion of encouraging ideological commitment runs counter 
to most thinking in education today. Humanistic thinking 
about education has encouraged teachers to think that they 
should not interfere in any way with students1 development 
of values and beliefs, but, Egan says, such a notion misses 
the essence of education: "To believe that it is possible to 
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educate in a value-free way is like believing it is possible 
to be in love unemotionally" (p. 78). Educators need, Egan 
thinks, to recognize that intellectual growth for adolescents 
is directly linked to their need to deal with ideas, values, 
and beliefs, and to deal with these in the simplistic way 
that thinking at this stage often requires. The teacher's task 
is not to show students where their ideas are false but to 
help them discover the additional knowledge that will keep 
the dialectic described above going. Egan suggests also that 
curriculum and teaching need to be prepared to make use of 
the story form which coninues to be important for learning, 
although in a less recognizable form. What is important for 
students at this stage is that their philosophical schemes 
have both a beginning and a projected end, history being a 
single process toward some goal or resolution. In this sense 
the story form fixes meaning. In the terms I am using in 
this study, the student needs a philosophy in the form of an 
ideology or a myth that imposes order on human events and 
thus interprets them in a meaningful way. 
In Erickson, Piaget and Egan we see the common emphasis 
on the adolescent's need to find an organizing principle, 
a system that gives meaning to the larger world of which 
s/he is now becoming aware. The psychological need for 
identity and the new intellectual ability to think abstractly 
and form systems converge at this time on the task of finding 
a philosophy, a myth to shape one's sense of self and organize 
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one's learning. But the value of acquiring a myth or ideology 
beyond meeting certain psychological and intellectual needs 
of a particular stage of development is less certain. Some­
what cynically, Egan (1979) suggests that it does not matter 
what schemas students use because if they continue to grow 
intellectually they will learn that there is no universal 
pattern, no truth, only little truths that come from careful 
observations of the external world. The educator, Egan main­
tains, makes use of the student's drive to find meaning in 
order to further the student's education. Erikson (1968), 
on the other hand, sees the need for ideology as something 
that binds human communities and that is not outgrown, except 
in the belief that there is some universal truth or way of 
living in the world that supercedes the limited ideologies of 
the various cultures. 
Frye's argument that education in the great myths is a 
way of educating the imagination to envision a different and 
better social order than the present social mythology that 
calls itself reality suggests that adolescence myth-making 
can be a way of breaking out of an adjustment mythology. 
Myth for the adolescent is different fr:om the myth for the 
child. The primitive kinship of thought has receded and 
the supernatural events are now understood as metaphors 
(unless they are part of religious belief). Fairy tales are 
put aside, although their influence continues at a subcon­
scious level because they are not just about children's 
problems but the essential human dilemma. 
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Educational Strategies 
A curriculum that focuses on the student's need for myth 
needs to provide both for the interpretation of myth and the 
construction of the student's personal myth. There are dif­
ferent ways of learning from the different kinds of myths: 
the traditional/religious and the modern/ideological. I 
will discuss ways that each can be approached to meet the 
kinds of educational, personal needs outlined above, and then 
look at what it might mean to construct a personal myth or 
story. 
Ancient/Religious Myths 
The most common rationale for studying mythology in high 
schools is that it gives the students a foundation for the 
study of literature. The emphasis is mostly on Greek and 
Roman mythology, particularly on those stories and themes that 
have been most influential in our literary tradition. Some­
times Hebraic mythology is studied indirectly in a course on 
the Bible as literature. While these studies have their 
validity, I think that the significance of these myths, along 
with the Indian, African, Asian which are seldom considered, 
lies in their philosophic and psychological perspectives, in 
how they help students envision the possibilities of ways of 
being in the world. Thus I suggest three other approaches to 
the study of the ancient/religious myths. 
The approach of studying myths and religions suggested 
by Barbour in Myths, Models, and Paradigms (19 74) is to find 
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the model within the myth, those basic components that make 
of the myth a systematic organization of ideas. A model is, 
he points out, a symbolic representation, "an imaginative 
tool for ordering experience, rather than a description of 
the world" (p. 6). The model is the systematic, structural 
component of the myth, the abstract form derived from reflec­
tion on a myth, and thus the means by which the myth can be 
critically analyzed and evaluated. Barbour seems to suggest 
that while the appeal of the myth may depend a lot on the 
affective qualities of the story, the value of the myth in 
cognitive and moral terms can be judged by examining the mo­
del it provides for ordering reality. Discerning the model 
also helps one transcend the particularity of the myth and 
find the commonality of several myths. A single model can 
be derived from a number of myths, Barbour finds: "models 
summarize the structural elements of a set of myths" (p. 27). 
While models lack the richness and appeal of the myths 
themselves, they give us a way to talk about the truth and 
value of myths without having to deal with the issues of 
whether particular events in the story actually did or could 
happen (a level beyond which discussion of a myth often never 
goes). In addition the models give us a way of comparing 
myths. Seeking the model within the myth allows us to deal 
with living religious myths as well as ancient or secular 
myths because it does not require that we deny the unscien­
tific elements of the myth the way demytholgizing does, thus 
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raising questions of literal truth. It leaves the myth in­
tact but gives a means for critiquing and understanding its 
implications. 
Thus by asking what kind of worldview or cosmic frame­
work is embodied in a myth, what kind of identity and per­
sonal involvement it offers, what ideal state it envisions 
and how that can be attained, what ethical patterns and 
moral norms are defined (Barbour, 1974, pp. 21-21), the value 
of the myth as a model for human existence can be examined 
and compared with other models. While these elements of 
the mythic model are drawn from traditional religious myths, 
most of them are present also in modern secular philosophies 
like Marxism and evolutionary naturalism, Barbour observes. 
What can be learned through a study of the models em­
bodied in myths are some different ways of being in the 
world, as well as developing some critical perspective on 
the kinds of social visions human cultures have created. The 
effort of man as myth-maker to order and explain the universe, 
to answer the important questions of meaning and destiny, 
speaks to the young person's interest in such philosophic 
issues. 
A second approach is to study myths as representations 
of universal characteristics of the human psyche. As was 
discussed in Chapter I, the renewed interest in myth in our 
time has focused largely on the way the ancient stories use 
the same themes and symbols, which is interpreted to mean 
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that they depict not the outward world so much as inward 
reality. Thus the student of myth who looks at the stories 
comparatively can begin to see not so much a strange concep­
tion of the world but a more familiar landscape of the mind. 
While some aspects of such a study will be beyond the ability 
of many junior and senior high school students, some initial 
exploration of the recurring archetypes and symbols could 
prove both valuable and interesting, particularly as these 
may be related to their own dreams. The importance of com­
ing to understand and give some expression to one's subjec­
tivity is something that a curriculum for adolescence needs 
to consider; the study of myth from a Jungian perspective 
would be one possible approach. Such an approach is based 
on the idea that, as Campbell suggests, there is, in the 
whole body of mythology, a philosophia perennis of the human 
race. Learning to identify and relate one's own experience 
to some of those universals is what I am talking about here 
as a way the curriculum can foster self-knowledge and identity. 
A third approach is one suggested by Frye in The Educated 
Imagination (1964) and involves both a study of ancient/ 
religious myths, particularly the Old and New Testaments and 
Greek and Roman mythology, and our literature, which has 
evolved out of the myths. What we learn from the myths and 
literature is a vision of the ideal, Frye contends, a reality 
created by the imagination. Once we recognize that the 
society we live in is not some unchanging reality but a 
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particular social mythology (middle-class, 20th century) that 
will change, we may also realize that there is another world, 
one we want to live in, "a vision inside our minds, born and 
fostered by the imagination, yet real enough for us to try 
to make the world we see conform to its shape" (p. 151). What 
Frye is suggesting is that from our myths and our cultural 
expressions we can begin to construct a vision of the world 
as it might be and thus have a perspective on the inadequacies 
of the social mythology we live in—this constitutes the 
education of the imagination. Such a perspective could come 
only from a curriculum that placed a strong emphasis on 
mythology, literature, and cultural history through a number 
of grades, but it could have interesting political, as well 
as intellectual, consequences. Those who decry the idealism 
of envisioning the world as it might be are often those who 
have most to defend in the status quo, those who want educa­
tion to be concerned with the real world, i.e., the current 
social mythology. 
Modern/Ideological Myths 
The older myths, unless they are part of a living reli­
gious tradition that has continually modified them, even 
when interpreted symbolically, do not reflect the knowledge 
and experience of recent centuries and thus cannot provide 
an adequate philosophy for us now. In particular, they leave 
us without a way to understand economic forces, historical 
trends, scientific discoveries. Societies, and individuals, 
126 
have continued to construct all-encompassing stories and 
schemas to interpret our new knowledge and experience. These 
quasi-myths or ideologies serve some mythological functions 
well, particularly defining the purpose of history, man's 
role vis-a-vis nature, social patterns and organization, but 
they often ignore the inner (or spiritual) self and the im­
portance of rituals. Thus a modern ideology may be linked 
by the individual or the society to a religious myth (e.g., 
Christian or Buddhist Marxists). There was a time when the 
central myth of the Old Testament, God's leading His people 
out of slavery and into the Promised Land, was the basis for 
the American Dream. Theologian Michael Allen tells of how 
his grandmother used to intermingle the stories of the Old 
Testament and the stories of their ancestors settling this 
country in such a way that he never quite knew where the 
Bible left off and the American story of his relatives took 
up. 
Developing specific ways to learn about modern myths and 
how they influence our lives both personally and collectively 
is not within the scope of this study, but I suggest that 
any approach needs to recognize that these secular ideologies 
are another form of man's myth-making and that they are sig­
nificant to students both as myth and as ties to the communi­
ties to which they belong or with which they wish to be 
identified. While the relative merits and various dimensions 
of an ideology can be examined intellectually, it is at the 
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point of a search for identity and for meaning that students 
are concerned to understand and accept or reject them. Bal­
ancing one's approach between the objectivity of scholarship 
and consideration for the commitment that goes with deeply 
held beliefs is one of the educator's tasks. Also an approach 
should consider that for some students who feel alienated from 
family or lack ties to political/social goals, any system or 
philosophy will be dismissed as nothing more than propaganda; 
such alienation and skepticism seems to be manifested in an 
ever younger population. 
There is a concern in our society that the schools teach 
something about the major ideologies in the world. From the 
right side of the political spectrum schools are expected to 
teach young people about communism and its propaganda in order 
that they may learn to hate it and to teach them the values 
of capitalism or "the American way" so that they will promote 
and defend it. From the left or liberal constituency schools 
are urged to teach young people the major ideologies in order 
to understand and learn to be critical of the nationalistic 
ideologies; the implied goal is to get beyond all ideologies 
and myths to a place where only reason prevails. Thus to 
develop a curriculum that includes a study of modern ideolo­
gies is to become involved in political issues. I do not 
think that the teacher can or should encourage the student to 
develop a philosophical position without much regard to its 
implications for the student in the context of the larger 
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community, as Egan seems to suggest. A student's philosophy 
or mythical perspective is an expression of his/her ties to 
real or potential communities, and it is to this dimension 
of myth as an activity of constructing a personal myth that 
I now turn. 
Personal Myths or Stories 
The term "personal myth" can only be understood from a 
modern perspective and it still is a questionable label be­
cause a myth in a true sense of the word belongs to a people, 
to a community; it is the expression of a collective vision 
and of the values of a people. Perhaps a better term to use 
is Novak's "personal story." 
Novak (1971) writes about a person's "story" as that 
which "ties a person's actions together in a sequence . . . 
(and) unites past and future" (p. 60). One does not invent 
but discovers his/her story out of his/her personal unique­
ness, on the one hand, and, on the other, out of the cultural 
stories inherited. While one's story ought to allow for 
realizing one's own potential, it also ought to be "appropriate 
to the stories of those to whom I am bound by family, friend­
ship, community" (p. 61). These stories are larger than any 
set of principles and more than any particular situation— 
they give perspective on both one's past and one's future. 
As Novak describes it, the story is both one's philosophy 
and one's ethical system; it is how the person defines his/ 
her own life in relationship to those myths and communities 
of which s/he is a part. 
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The modern person, being influenced by more than one myth 
and, theoretically, having the freedom to accept or reject all 
or parts of any of these, can rarely immerse him/herself in 
a single myth. Thus the act of developing one's own narra­
tive, making a story out of those various perspectives that 
have meaning in one's life becomes crucial. The student today 
finds it necessary to construct a personal rayth, in the sense 
of a story that pulls together fragments of older myths and 
the modern ideologies that have personal meaning, although 
one main myth (often a religious one) will most likely give 
one's story its basic shape. While that act of construction 
is difficult and charts an uncertain course through the Scylla 
of totalitarian ideologies and the Charybdis of meaninglessness, 
it is a way of making meaningful one's education and of stay­
ing in touch with one's roots, as well of taking a stance that 
is open to new experience and new knowledge. I am, obviously, 
talking about a story that is continuously in the making, that 
is, for all its indebtedness to other stories, an act of cre­
ation. 
What goes into the personal story and how education facil­
itates this activity are difficult questions. Some students 
will have some rich resources while others have very few; 
some will find that their various myths reinforce a common 
story while others will find conflicting ones. For one stu­
dent his Jewish faith's myth of suffering and deliverance is 
reinforced by the family's commitment to political activities 
and groups that work on behalf of politically oppressed people. 
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For another student her Southern heritage has created a myth 
that justifies slavery and unequal racial status that con­
flicts with her Christian myth of all persons being the same 
in Christ. A black student is caught between the myth that 
his grandparents and great-grandparents lived by, that of taking 
risks for the deliverance of their people and his parents' 
belief in the American success story where each gets what s/he 
can. 
The myths of religion, family, region or country, racial 
or ethnic group all contribute to the student's story but not 
always in a mutually supportive way. Finding a common theme, 
or choosing one theme out of several, is necessary for a 
clear sense of identity. Moral education will help the stu­
dent weigh the relative merits of a particular viewpoint. 
Thus if the student from the South attains a fairly mature 
sense of justice, s/he will reject the Southern racial myth 
in favor of the religious one. Another way to approach this 
aspect of constructing one's story is to help the student find 
other mythic themes that are presently hidden in those tra­
ditions and communities to which s/he belongs. For example, 
there is a pacifist tradition in both Judaism and Christianity, 
even though it is ignored by the dominant theologies of those 
religions. By coming to know this tradition the student who 
rejects war need not be alienated from the whole religious 
tradition. Another example would be the student from the 
South who, in an inquiry into the past, finds ancestors who 
rejected slavery while living in the midst of it. Such a 
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discovery makes it more possible to maintain both family and 
regional ties while being a critic of the region's history. 
Such a discovery also enriches the student's potential story 
as one who can act on a principle that is rejected by the 
peer culture. 
I am suggesting that helping students find ties to par­
ticular myths while also learning to make judgments about 
the validity and morality of their inherited myths is a more 
positive way to help them toward identity and a personal 
philosophy than through attempting to create a critical dis­
tance between them and their parochial views. This position 
is based on the premise of this study that myth, and the com­
munities to which myths link us, are valuable and something 
we destroy to our peril. Myths need not be static nor 
accepted authoritatively. They can be an act of creation 
that we are involved in collectively, and to some degree, in­
dividually. It is toward re-mythologizing instead of demyth-
ologizing that we can direct the inquiry of students as they 
are engaged in that central task of finding an identity. 
Strickland (1978) , writing about developing social stud­
ies curricula, discusses the shift in young people's interest 
in history away from analytic studies of large movements and 
toward the more personal and immediate concerns. Students 
are responding much more to the new attention in history to 
ways of establishing personal ties to the past, finding the 
stories that link anonymous or ordinary people to their 
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"roots." This approach to history, writes Strickland, re­
flects the human need for "the personal, the private, the 
concrete and, ultimately, the mythic dimensions of the past" 
(p. 28, emphasis mine). This "Roots phenomenon" is basically 
a healthy reaction, he thinks, to the abstract, analytical, 
and anti-parochial character of much history, a reaction that 
expresses the need for personal meaning and continuity with 
the past. 
This kind of shift from treating the "mythic dimensions 
of the past" as errors to be corrected by education to a 
recognition of their potential as a source for education 
that is personally meaningful is one of the curriculum changes 
that I would suggest. 
Bruner's essay on "Myth and Identity" (19 62) underscores 
my main argument in this chapter about the role of myth in 
adolescent development and points to the link between myth 
and community that is the concern of the last chapter. He 
points out that myth provides a pattern and a set of possi­
bilities that direct the growth and identity of the young 
person: 
One may speak of the corpus of myth as providing 
a set of possible identities for the individual 
personality. It would perhaps be more appro­
priate to say that the mythologically instructed 
community provides its members with a library of 
scripts upon which the individual may judge the 
play of his multiple identities. (p. 36) 
However, at this point in history, Bruner observes, our 
"mythologically instructed community" (Campbell's phrase) 
is itself fractured and the search for identity often becomes 
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a lonely, internal affair. He suggests that in the transi­
tion from old myths to new ones the inward journey, the 
"Culte de moi" may be inevitable. The importance of myth for 
establishing identity is underscored by Bruner. He also 
points to the importance of the community for providing and 
validating mythic themes. Identity, he suggests, needs both 
myth and community, and where these are not available in the 
society the search goes inward, fostering subjectivity and 
individualism. 
Once again we encounter Frye's theme of the importance 
of educating the imagination in such a way that it is em­
powered to think more adequately of a potential world, 
to create new myths in order to create better ideas about the 
social order, the human community. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MYTH AND COMMUNITY 
I have discussed the importance of myth in a develop­
mental perspective of the education of the young child and 
the adolescent. One can, at this point, draw different con­
clusions about what part myth might play in the perspective 
of the adult. One view would be that the child, like the 
species, has a need for myth until s/he becomes a mature per­
son able to view the world rationally and empirically. Mythic 
polarities, animism, stories that explain creation and history, 
identification with a metaphysical plan—these all serve 
their developmental purposes and then are shed, like an old 
skin, to allow the growing mind to attain the mature know­
ledge that the only truths are those that are empirical and 
material. This is the conclusion of Egan (1979), for the fi­
nal stage of development in his schema (the adult perspective) 
is the ironic stage. 
The other conclusion is that the importance of myth con­
tinues into adulthood, once again changed in form, but still 
carrying some of the childhood and adolescent insights, e.g., 
a sense of good and evil, a connection with the natural world, 
a vision of an ideal world, a sense of order and destiny, 
heroic images and metaphysical or archetypal symbols. As 
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suggested in the first chapter, the mature learner is not nec­
essarily the one who has outgrown the need for myth but may 
be the one who understands its functions and cognitive value 
in a deeper way. Mythic thinking, I have tried to show, has 
not gone away nor does it remain only in the immature or in 
enclaves that civilization and education have not touched, 
but is present to us often in hidden or disguised form. In­
deed, we often do not see the child's mythic ideas because 
we tend to look for the emergence of reason, and we do not 
see the significance of the adolescent's need for myth because 
we see it as immature idealism. 
I want to suggest in this chapter that there is a mythic 
perspective, a way of viewing reality that is informed by the 
great human myths as well as by those mythic themes that are 
part of the psychic contents of people, that needs to inform 
our curriculum theory. One of the main contributions of this 
perspective is to direct us toward a reconsideration of the 
importance of community. As both Jung and Campbell argue, 
myth always points us away from the individual and back to­
ward the community. What the hero does in the myth defines 
who the people are; his/her actions are never singular in 
significance. Myths are the collective consciousness of a 
people, and when the myths are destroyed the whole fabric of 
the society is altered, sometimes destroyed. Modern societies 
that have ceased to place much significance in their reli­
gious myths have, nonetheless, ideologies, mythic themes 
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that provide some of that function of defining the collective 
character of the people, or of groups within the larger so­
ciety. Without exploring further what is a complex relation­
ship, the nature of which is much debated (especially in 
anthropology), we can say that myth and community exist sym-
biotically and that a curriculum concerned to give attention 
to the mythic dimension of human thought and development will 
also need to concern itself with how education relates to 
community. 
Myth and community are terms that refer to a conception 
of human existence different from the kind of social relations 
most evident in the Western industrialized societies. Under 
the influence of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment 
we have created modes of inquiry and forms of living together 
that have sought to replace our older dependence on myths 
and the close bonds of traditional communities. These new forms 
have addressed well our material needs, our need to find 
liberation from fixed roles and political control, and our 
need to discover, invent and know. But as rational inquiry 
has come to dominate our intellectual life and the needs of 
an industrial system to shape our social forms we are begin­
ning to discover that by ignoring forms of knowing and of 
social organization that evolved over the centuries of human 
history we have created an imbalance in the human psyche and 
inadequate forms of community. We are in danger of destroy­
ing the ecology of social relations that, like the great 
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swamps and deserts of the world, has proven to be more intri­
cate and essential than we thought. We are discovering that 
humans need rituals, neighborliness, intimate connection with 
the sources of their material goods and their work, stories 
and metaphors of common significance, and a place to call 
home just as much as they need to read, to express their own 
ideas, material comforts, the hope of being successful, the 
experience of liberation, scholarly inquiry, freedom of 
association, and the chance to go somewhere new and begin 
again. 
In order to understand a "mythic" perspective on commun­
ity as it relates to education, I want to clarify what "mythic" 
means by contrasting it with two other perspectives, those 
derived from rationalism and from technology. 
Mythos, Logos, and Technicism 
I am using the terms mythos, logos, and technicism as a 
way of distinguishing what I suggest are the main philoso­
phical perspectives operating in our culture. I am taking 
the terms logos and mythos from an essay by Underwood, "Myth, 
Dream, and Contemporary Philosophy" (1970), in which the author 
develops a helpful perspective on the renewed interest in 
myth and dream and the role of philosophy in our age. He 
suggests that the role of myth in relationship to contemporary 
philosophy is to restore a balance in modern consciousness 
by bringing to attention aspects of existence and conscious­
ness which have been neglected by a prolonged attention to 
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reason and logic. Philosophy itself, Underwood claims, was 
a birth of a new kind of consciousness, the emergence from 
unconscious participation in the natural and political order 
as defined by myths to conscious reflection about how we think 
and exist in the world. This he calls the movement from mythos 
to logos. While this was a development that contributed posi­
tively and significantly to human development for many cen­
turies , it now contributes to an imbalance and narrowness in 
our philosophy. In the way the ancient world was in the grip 
of mythos, we are now in the grip of logos, or in Husseral's 
terms, a "mistaken rationalism," Underwood contends (p. 244). 
He concludes that the task of philosophy today is to help give 
birth to a new consciousness that once again puts us in touch 
with what is common and lifegiving, with the depth and full­
ness of being: 
If the vocation of Greek philosophy can be under­
stood as a movement from mythos to logos, then per­
haps we can understand the vocation of contemporary 
philosophy as a movement from logos to mythos. 
(pp. 244-45) 
Thus myths, dreams, and symbols become for us important signs 
for the direction of a new philosophy or persepctive and for 
helping us understand better who we are. 
Logos, then, represents the position of the rationalists 
that emphasizes the value of logic over the senses and the 
emotions, the control humans can have over themselves and 
their environment through increased knowledge about human 
nature and physical laws, the priority of the individual over 
139 
the collective, a belief in human perfectability. Technicism 
is both an extension of rationalism and a turning away from 
it. The great discoveries made through reason and science 
developed technology and the freedom from the taboos of myth 
allowed us to use that technology to change radically the 
forms of our social existence. 
The meteoric rise of technology and the organizational 
forms developed for industry that are now applied throughout 
the society, e.g./ the corporate organization model and the 
systems approach, threaten to leave not only mythos but also 
logos behind as archaic perspectives. The philosophical im­
pact of technicism was noted earlier in Erikson's observation 
that an increasing number of youths are bypassing the need for 
explicit ideologies because they find in technology a way of 
being at home in the world that offers both an identity and 
a new universalism. The argument is made that technology it­
self is neutral and that it is only human decisions that make 
of the use of it something helpful or destructive (i.e. , that 
is only an extension of rationalism). But this view tends to 
disguise the fact that technology not only has a way of cre­
ating its own demands but also of fostering ways of thinking 
about values and goals that perpetuate a need for and depen­
dence on modern technology. The way we relate to nature, to 
work, and to each other has been profoundly changed by tech­
nology; it is, increasingly, creating its own reality and 
placing not thinkers or priests but technicians in control. 
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If logos represents that development of Greek philosophy 
that introduced reason and freedom (or individual autonomy) 
as concepts and that had its major cultural impact beginning 
with the European Renaissance, then we can contrast it with 
technicism, that way of thinking initiated by the Industrial 
Revolution that focuses on the application of scientific dis­
coveries and industrial organizational patterns to achieve 
greater material benefits and more control over society and 
that is achieving its greatest influence in this century in 
the West. One sign of technicism supplanting logos or ra­
tionalism is when a society is driven by its capabilities to 
create those things which reason knows are not needed or in 
the best interest of human existence, things such as nuclear 
weapons, baby formula for marketing in impoverished countries, 
as well as endless gadgets and luxuries. Obviously, it is 
not just because we know how to make such things that we do 
it but because they serve the economic or political interests 
of those with power. But our society accepts these uses of 
technology in part, at least, because we have come to pride 
ourselves in our technology more than in our use of reason. 
Thus as logos replaced mythos, technicism is now replacing 
logos. I am suggesting this pattern of ascendency at dif­
ferent historical times, but it is important to note that all 
three continue to exist in our time and to provide alternative 
ways of viewing what is important and good. Most of us op­
erate, to some extent, out of all three perspectives. Although 
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we least recognize the mythic, it continues to be a powerful 
shaping force, both through the unconscious in the Jungian 
sense and through the unrecognized impact it has had on how 
we think about the world, particularly in the images and 
symbols carried in our language. 
Education and Community; An Overview 
Writings about and discussions of community reflect our 
ambivalence about a social form that seems to be rapidly de­
clining. We seem to be unable to restore community or to 
live full lives without it; thus we seek cautiously for ideas 
because we are uncertain about what would constitute meaning­
ful community or for what we can realistically hope. Part of 
the dilemma is the conflict between developing a sense of 
community with other positive goals. Keyes (19 75) points out 
that we cherish mobility, privacy and convenience--all of 
which undermine community. In order to have community, he 
points out, we must sacrifice some individuality. Those things 
that foster individual freedom in the sense of pursuing one's 
own interests, cultural diversity, equality of the sexes, 
racial integration are often destructive of community because 
they involve such things as severing ties with a particular 
place, changing lifestyle, supplanting local with centralized 
control or guidelines. For example, in regard to schools, 
the black community has probably lost more in terms of com­
munity from integration and busing than most white neighbor­
hoods or towns—a point that is not often discussed. Even so, 
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South Boston has become the most poignant example of the strug­
gle between the value of community and the value of racial 
integration. In this instance as with others, like the 
Kanawha County/ West Virginia, controversy over the language 
in books, most liberal commentaries have failed to recognize 
the dilemma because they have looked for the values of free­
dom of speech and integration but failed to see the issue of 
community. 
We need, I suggest, to get beyond the fear of labels like 
"conservative" and "liberal" in order to examine the impact 
of social change and to recognize the losses that accompany 
many of our important gains. The dismantling of traditional 
social forms may, on the one hand, provide opportunities for 
liberation but, on the other, it also may leave people more 
vulnerable to the values and control of a more diffuse but 
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powerful ethic, such as the individualism and consumerism of 
the American success ideal. To work out of the tension be­
tween progressive and traditional values is to work in an un­
certain and difficult, but creative, area. To seek images 
and models of community that can exist without denying cul­
tural diversity, equality for women, racial justice is one 
of those tasks. 
There are several different educational approaches to 
the relationship between curriculum and community, the main 
difference being in how "community" is interpreted. In order 
to distinguish the different concepts I suggest three categories: 
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community as a geographic unit, community as a created event, 
and community as a traditional social form. The following 
brief discussion of each approach is to help clarify the con­
cept of education and community developed below. 
What "education and community" means from the geographic 
perspective is how the school relates to the local political 
structure, to other institutions, to the adults who live in 
the city, town, neighborhood, and how the school can extend 
its services to adults in the area. Education as a life-long 
event (adult classes) and use of school facilities for shop 
work, recreation, child-care and public meetings are some 
major examples. The other side of this approach is finding 
ways to include more community people in the school instruc­
tional program. Artists, business persons, skilled laborers 
and professionals are invited to teach mini-courses, talk 
with students about careers, etc. Some plans combine both 
aspects to gain maximum interaction between the school as 
place or as institution and people of the area, but the 
school itself is the place where the events take place. A 
different approach within this same perspective is to find 
ways for students to learn from institutions and persons in 
the community, leaving the school building for a small or 
large part of their school day (e.g., Philadelphia's "Schools 
Without Walls"). In all of these plans the concern is to 
make education more a part of the total life of an area, in­
tegrating life and learning, child and adult, school and 
community. 
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A very different concept of community, what I will call 
the "created" community, often referred to as "a sense of com­
munity," refers to that feeling of belonging that can be de­
veloped among any group of people who share something meaning­
ful or that develops within a person because of a network of 
significant relationships. The school itself can become such 
a place of community, some suggest, by the way it plans the 
curriculum, establishes policies and sets goals. Activities 
to bring students close to each other and to teachers, shared 
decision-making about rules and courses of study activities 
beyond the school building and inclusion of parents and other 
adults in the life of the school are all a part of making a 
school a community. Kohlberg's work to create a "just com­
munity" in a high school by a plan to develop shared decision­
making in policies and their enforcement is one example of 
an effort to make the school an experience of community. 
Historically, communities have been both specific geo­
graphic areas and groups to which the members felt a strong 
sense of belonging. It is a measure of the degree of social 
change in our times that so many people seek community, ask­
ing if where I live is also where I belong or how I can be 
connected to the people with whom I live and work. The third 
approach to education and community is what I call the 
traditional concept. It focuses on ways that students can 
learn from adults the way children did when the town was a 
community. 
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Tyler (1975) points out that young people used to learn 
adult roles, jobs, character development, moral principles 
and the economic and political structure of society just by 
the regular activities of life in a community. Now that they 
are cut off from so many of these immediate contacts and 
experiences the school needs to find ways to re-institute these 
kinds of educative activities by planning student participation 
in adult work and activities outside the school. While this 
idea is similar in several respects to those programs men­
tioned above of letting students learn from places of work 
in the town or city, it differs in that its primary concern is 
that students learn values and a way of relating in ways that 
community has traditionally performed that function. 
I share with all the varied efforts to link education 
with community a concern over how much schools have become 
isolated and isolating institutions, segregating school age 
children from adults, from the work place, and from the life 
of the town. And I think that all of these efforts in some 
way have the potential to help restore a child's belonging 
to meaningful groups. But the efforts to increase contact 
between students and the people who live in their area will 
not establish the kind of ties and sense of belonging that 
are needed because that "community" out there is rapidly 
ceasing to be community and has less to offer once the inter­
action is established than we would hope. The creation of 
communities within schools is very difficult both logistically 
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and philosophically, but where it can be done it will be an 
important experience that will, temporarily at least, over­
come much of the isolation and alienation that students and 
teachers and parents experience with regard to school. There 
is, however, a serious limitation to the school's potential 
to be a place of community, as Oliver (1976) points out be­
low, and that is its lack of a diversity of ages that is 
one of the essentials of a community, in the traditional sense. 
Community in its traditional form is most significant, I sug­
gest, for meeting human needs. I want to discuss one approach 
to education and community that develops this concept of com­
munity. 
Education and Community: The Theory of D. Oliver 
I have focused on Oliver's Education and Community (1976) 
because his analysis is related to the function of myth in 
education, although this link is more implicit than explicit 
in this work. However he does comment on the importance of 
myth in another work that will be considered later. What is 
important i-s that his theory of education and community gives 
us insight into curriculum questions from the perspective of 
myth and community. 
Oliver locates his analysis of community and education 
in the context of a choice between two conflicting theories 
of society: the corporate organization theory and the com­
munity theory. These ideologies correspond to two of the 
perspectives described above, corporate organization being a 
technic model and community a mythic model. Although Oliver 
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does not often use the term "myth" in Education and Community/ 
he describes community as a form that has evolved out of and 
is still expressive of primitive or premodern social forms, 
as a people bound together not only by place and economics 
but by belief and ritual as well. Thus, from Oliver's anal­
ysis, when we consider community as a value to be concerned 
with in education we are not talking about how to change the 
patterns within school walls or how to spend more time in 
the town or city, but how to educate children to see society 
differently and to seek certain values or activities by re­
lating to places of genuine (or traditional) community beyond 
the school. 
His educational recommendations, like his theory of so­
cial forms, expresses a fundamental argument with our present 
social order and with much of the thinking about how educa­
tion should help students relate to their communities. While 
those who point to the great social changes as evidence of 
how much catch-up work the school has to do in order to adapt 
itself and help students adapt to the new order, Oliver argues 
that the new social structures are the problem and that the 
task of educators is to help students gain a different per­
spective both in their studies and in their experiences. 
The corporate organization theory, an expression of utili­
tarian perfectionism, now dominates the thinking of social 
planners in Western countries, Oliver argues, primarily be­
cause the technical order has replaced the moral order in our 
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culture. Even though the social planning that is based on 
this ideal has a concern to see that the material needs of 
all persons are met, this is an inadequate and finally de­
structive system, Oliver believes, because it replaces the 
rituals that express meaning from a moral order with material 
gains and thus strips away those patterns of living that in 
the past gave life significance. He interprets this ideology 
as resting on several beliefs: material well-being is society's 
prime goal; man is not only at the center of things but also 
can, through technology, separate himself from many of his 
dependencies on the natural world; through reason and sci­
ence man is perfecting not only the environment but also his 
own nature (progress); personal freedom includes liberation 
from previous cultural patterns that bound individuals to 
groups. Indeed, utilitarian perfectionism has linked its 
view of man to a belief in the "necessity of rapid techno­
logical growth" (p. 33) with the consequence that technology 
and the corporate model now provide the patterns that man 
must fit into. This is a social theory, Oliver concludes, 
that fails to understand human nature and thus cannot sustain 
the quality of life that humans are capable of, even though 
it can, through meeting physical needs and providing tem­
porary solutions, keep a society going. 
Some of the consequences of the dominance of the corporate-
technological model in our society are, Oliver argues, a great 
deal of social stress, alienation, loss of such tendencies 
as cooperation, play, generosity, feeling of purpose, as well 
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as the institutionalization of the young, old, and abnormal. 
To meet these new conditions our society has created the 
"helping professions" which operate on the assumption that 
by rational planning, research, and better systems these 
human needs can be met by institutions or professional ser­
vices. 
Oliver's argument is that Western culture has developed 
a social form and a symbol of man that are expressions of 
social, economic and symbolic development of the past few 
centuries but that ignore the more significant social pat­
terns that were developed over a much longer period of time. 
The idea that we could make radical changes in forms of work and 
patterns of living together and make human changes to fit 
the new social forms has been an erroneous one. No amount 
of refinement, he contends, can correct the weaknesses of 
the corporate organization model. 
His choice of the community model over the corporate 
organization model is an ideological one based on the follow­
ing assumptions: humans are not perfectible and thus their 
differences are not a basis for segregation from the group 
to which they belong; human society is intricately bound to 
the natural environment and thus exploiting nature destroys 
a vital relationship; humans have a complex set of social 
and biological needs that can best be met by belonging to a 
"band" or group with a common set of practices and beliefs. 
For their development children need a range of people and 
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experiences that the current primary social groups—nuclear 
family, school, and corporation—do not provide. 
The two key factors in Oliver's concept of community 
seem to be diversity and parochialism. A community must be, 
to some degree, an in group that shares, in addition to a com­
mon space, a history, experience, set of beliefs and myths. 
But it must also have diversity in ages, types of personalities, 
education, and income. He finds the nuclear family too lim­
ited in range of persons (as compared with the extended fami­
ly) , the school too limited in age range, and the corporate 
organization having neither the common beliefs and rituals 
nor the age/personality diversity to be places of community. 
For characteristics of community he looks to our evolutionary 
past where living in bands was understood as a basic, primi­
tive social need and from these he derives the following 
characteristics of community: 
—commitment to care for all humans born into the 
group, the aged, sick, and poor 
—absence of control by a centralized elite 
—attachments, work, celebrations, decisions woven 
together by symbol, ritual, and religion 
—nuclear family less critical; extended family 
gives greater range of adults to relate to 
early in life 
—sense of home, place one will always be shel­
tered and accepted 
—variety of human differences accepted or tol­
erated. (pp. 23-24) 
The community is unified not just by shared beliefs in 
the sense of ideas, myths, or religion but also by the ties 
of a common experience that reaches back into time, the 
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connections of kinship, territory, and history. It is that 
connectedness to a number of elements in life that once were 
taken for granted that civilization now threatens. The evo­
lutionist's concern, Oliver says, is not to return to primi­
tive life or abandon civilization but to try to restore a 
balance between our older and our present social form. 
Oliver does not believe that public schools can be them­
selves communities because they are required to minimize dif­
ference and be accepting of pluralism (which tends to reinforce 
relativism rather than belief), and because of the dominant 
utilitarian philosophy that requires preparing children for 
life in a business-oriented society. This kind of emphasis 
tends to draw children away from parochial beliefs and the 
specialness of their families, religions, and ethnic identi­
ties. Because the corporation does not need or value diver­
sity of skills and originality and uses a singular, linear 
measure for competency, the schools are expected either to 
prepare people to take a place in the organization or to be 
a member of a helping profession to work in or through insti­
tutions to care for those who, because of age or being dif­
ferent, do not fit into the system. Traditionally, the main 
reason for schooling was to transmit a common culture, but 
in the absence of such a common life, Oliver contends that 
the goal has been reduced to promoting instrumental self-
interest or obedience to authority. As schools have lost 
touch with the "common life of communities" there has been 
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a decrease in the variety of kinds of schools. Even alterna­
tive schools which have sought a different model have often 
failed, Oliver suggests, in large part because they have 
lacked myths to give common meaning to life. 
Within existing school settings there are, however, at 
least two approaches that Oliver outlines that educators can 
take toward shifting the emphasis from utilitarian philosophy 
and the dominance of corporate life structures in the direc­
tion of an evolutionary perspective and recovering community. 
One is to seek out and teach from a different ideological 
perspective, particularly the evolutionary perspective, so 
that in history, biology, and other areas, a different em­
phasis and different questions are dealt with. This would 
mean not attempting the almost impossible job of changing 
the institution but revising the curriculum one is respon­
sible for: "Revising curricular content so as to stop glori­
fying the utilitarian perfectionist view of nature, man and 
sdciety; and creating a new view of how man might inhabit this 
planet" (p. 49). The other approach is to find different 
kinds of learning activities and to help make administrative/ 
bureaucratic changes that stand in the way of doing them. 
Oliver envisions such activities as working with neighborly 
places that have the potential for community: parent-run 
day care centers, food co-ops, church-sponsored community 
programs. 
What Oliver suggests for education at first seems mini­
mal. However, his first option is, I think, more powerful 
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than it may appear. Decisions about the way we design and 
teach social studies, the goals and materials we choose for 
reading, the way we teach and use science vis-a-vis nature 
and the environment are curricular choices of real signifi­
cance. Extending this analysis we see other ways that the 
practices in schools could be altered to support the value 
of community: not minimizing but supporting the diversity in 
the student's interests and beliefs; not attempting to sep­
arate the students from their community ties and traditions 
by creating intellectual disdain for regional, ethnic, or 
religious values unless there are moral issues involved; 
career counseling that does not focus narrowly on the stu­
dent's interests but includes the community's needs; class­
room practices that foster cooperation, and school policies 
that allow parents and relatives to have a more significant 
relationship to the school. These suggestions by themselves 
are not adequate as moral guidelines. Considerations of com­
munity always need to be made along with attention to meaning 
and moral vision. 
In summary, Oliver contends that in replacing the moral 
order with the technical order in our society, schools have 
increasingly shifted from education in a common culture that 
is tied to our past, to a concern to educate children for a 
business-oriented life. Concern for instrumental self-interest 
and obedience, values compatible with the corporate organi­
zation, now dominates. To restore a balance in our culture 
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between the need for parochialism, shared beliefs, the ties 
of symbol and ritual, shared histories, on the one hand, and 
the demands and benefits of technology on the other, is what 
Oliver is advocating. His argument that human consciousness 
and social forms are evolutionary products that we cannot 
alter quickly without great peril" is quite similar to Jung's 
contention that modern consciousness is but the tip of an 
iceberg that reaches deep into a common past that we must not 
ignore. Community, like myth, is an ancient form that tells 
us much about our humanity that we tend to ignore in an age 
of reason and technology. 
Oliver speaks of the importance of myth to education 
more directly in an article with Bane (1976) about the prob­
lems they experienced in efforts to do moral education through 
the rational inquiry approach. Their conclusion is that 
structured discussions or rational responses to moral dilemmas 
become "another schoolroom game" that students do not relate 
to personally. It is, they suggest, the "nonrational moral 
sensitivities" (p. 349) of the students that the curriculum 
needs to be dealing with, including the dark and tragic side 
of human nature: 
(P3 erhaps a sensitivity to paradox and tragedy in 
human nature is a far more powerful force in the 
expression of man's inherent humanity than the use 
of reasoning strategies in the development of 
flexible moral principles. (p. 349) 
Those virtues of principled reasoning and impartiality 
in judgment are not what are needed most for creating a moral 
community, Oliver and Bane conclude. Rather the curriculum 
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of moral education needs to be directed toward, on the one 
hand, a better understanding of and greater sensitivity to 
the tragic dimension of human weakness, and, on the other 
hand, to seeking a way to create or recover myth: 
We somehow need to create myths and celebra­
tions by which we can project the common joys, 
sorrows, and compassions that we share simply by 
the fact that we are human. (p. 360) 
For this task they suggest that educators work with 
theologians and others to find "a kind of powerful metaphor 
with which our Christian heritage once provided us" (p. 360). 
They suggest that one of the ways such a curriculum can be 
developed is through finding new ways to teach the humanities, 
getting away from the organization imposed by academic dis­
ciplines and including movies and television, along with art 
and literature, to try to understand a deeper and broader range 
of human experiences. Young people need not so much to dis­
cuss decisions about events in the world, they argue, as the 
"opportunity to project themselves in rich hypothetical worlds 
created by their own imaginations or those of dramatists" 
(p. 368, emphasis mine). 
This analysis suggests that to educate by relying on rea­
son to the exclusion of the mythic is often to fail to engage 
students personally and imaginatively at a level where sig­
nificant understanding can take place. It also points to the 
significance of myth, along with ritual, as the way we have 
of focusing on our common life, of drawing us into community. 
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Community; The Need for a New Myth 
Oliver and Bane's proposal that educators join with 
theologians to find a powerful metaphor by which we can re-
conceptualize our way of being together in the world is one 
that has much promise. Gibson Winter, a theologian/ has pro­
vided us with just such a critique of our dominant metaphor 
and its destructive impact on community. However, because 
I find that Winter's suggested new metaphor, the work of 
art, to be problematic, I want to discuss here only his 
analysis of the problem. 
In a paper presented to educators, Winter (1979) focuses 
on the centrality of symbols in human society and the impact 
of the mechanistic model on the West, particularly the degree 
to which it has fostered individualism over community. It 
is Winter's view that people always live according to a sym­
bol system that is interpreted through myth, story, forms 
of work, etc. and that our efforts to make needed social 
changes should involve re-interpretation of our symbols and 
finding new metaphors to represent our life together. Our 
need in Western culture is to shift away from the mechanical 
metaphors that emerged with the Enlightenment because they 
have led us to an individualism and privatism that do not 
serve us well. However, at the time the mechanistic metaphor 
was introduced it offered, Winter observes, a way to liberate 
thought from the authority of state and church and from the 
idea that decay always followed growth according to the 
organic metaphor. 
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Winter (1979) points out that the mechanistic conception 
derived from the idea of a rational order based on universal 
laws and became the basis for two important concepts: indi­
vidual autonomy and freedom from traditional authority. We 
have gained, he concludes, some important values from the 
mechanistic age: "freedom of inquiry, economic development, 
political motivation, moral relativity, and religious liberty" 
(p. 7). But the rationality and freedom which laid the basis 
for an industrial society have been in turn stiffled by eco­
nomic production because the control of production has been 
concentrated in the hands of a few. Thus, Winter observes, 
"the flight from family and community into the liberated 
world of industrial work has proved to be a chimera for some 
and a bad dream for others" (p. 9). With the individual as 
the only entity, communities become merely aggregates of in­
dividuals and negotiation replaces belonging. At a time when 
culture is pushing individuals to optimize their interests, 
the family is viable only so long as it meets one's interests. 
Winter argues that freedom in this context means autonomy, 
"doing as I wish with my own powers, pursuing my own trajec­
tory" (p. 10). Thus the mechanistic symbolization has ceased 
to be life-giving and is destructive in that it now fails to 
"open horizons of creativity in dealing with environmental, 
economic, international and spiritual tensions" (p. 14). 
Education in the mechanistic age has been primarily 
through schooling that is aimed toward liberation from family 
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and tradition and preparation for the discipline and skills 
needed for the industrial work place, "conformity to the 
imperious system of production" (p. 10), Winter (1979) writes. 
Alienation and loss of community have been the effect of 
mechanization and the economic system on school and society: 
Schooling and work became a path to alienation and 
subordination. Meanwhile, the fabric of human 
communities was being torn by the mobility and 
fragmentation which the productive system generated. 
The techno-economic drive to rational control sun­
dered personal bonds in local communities and with­
in the economic order. This degenerative process 
eroded the fabric of urban life, reducing every 
bond to a cash nexus. (p. 10) 
Winter (1979) observes that many individuals have turned 
to a private world of consumerism and "life-style" because they 
have lost a sense of freedom, as well as community. The 
economic system benefits from this privatism by creating goods 
that foster the life-style. Other persons have sought belonging 
and meaning through communal living, some expressions of which 
are healthy attempts to rediscover community> Winter thinks, 
while other communities are a dangerous regression to authori­
ty (such as Jonestown). Our need is to recover from our 
heritage symbols that give meaning to our common life, meta­
phors that can reinterpret and renew our heritage and allow 
us to find community in positive, life-giving ways. The con­
cept of community that we need is not the idea of solidarity 
that sacrifices freedom nor peer group support for personal 
goals, but that "shared work of disclosure of decency, moral 
responsibility, personal contribution in which each person is 
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called to contribute to an enrichment of the quality of life 
in which we are dwelling" (p. 15). Winter suggests that each 
tradition has within it archetypal symbols of our common hu­
manity on which we can draw for resymbolization. 
Winter, like Oliver, understands our need for community 
as a need to reestablish our links with our mythologically 
based past in order to recover and renew images of wholeness 
and connectedness that have been shattered by the mechanistic 
age. Neither thinks that efforts in this direction need to 
sacrifice individuality. Rather the pursuit of individual 
interests needs to be balanced by a concern for the common 
good, for our wholeness is not just a matter of self-realiza­
tion but also of belonging. 
Political Implications for Education for Community 
In order to understand why it is difficult to establish 
community as an educational theory we need to recognize some 
of the ways that the present economic system works against it. 
Communities and the myths that informed them have not vanished 
just because they have been expressions of primitive social 
relations, I suggest, but at least in part because they do not 
encourage individualism or conformity to the values of the 
corporate order such as intra-group competition and social 
mobility. As Winter (19 79) points out, it is in the best 
interest of business to foster the idea of freedom as the 
expression of personal interests and life-style dependent 
on consumerism. It is commonly recognized that the mobility 
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of our society has been accelerated by corporate practices 
such as moving employees and closing plants in one place only 
to rebuild in another in order to save costs. Much has been 
written about how schools have adopted the administrative and 
organizational practices of business with the result that 
stratification, competition, measures of productivity (grades, 
standardized tests), obedience to authority, class and school 
size based on economic efficiency have all become accepted 
practices in American education. The value conflict between 
individualism and community is deeply rooted in our political 
and economic structures. 
A socialist critique of American education helps us to 
see why community is such a hard value to try to promote in 
our schools and curriculum. Even though one may not share 
fully the socialists1 vision of the good society or all of 
their educational goals, their analysis of the conflict be­
tween the value of individualism and of community in our 
culture is most helpful. In the area of educating for 
community, socialist schools in some countries are helpful 
models, particularly in encouraging cooperation and in doing 
tasks that are needed by the village or city. But I would 
also contend that the Marxist perspective is, in itself, too 
materialistic and too narrow, eclipsing the significance of 
imagination and spiritual depth that characterize human achieve­
ments and goals at their best. Myth directs us to aspects of 
human consciousness and to values that a socialist pedagogy 
does not include. 
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In the article, Individualism, Collectivism, and Radical 
Educational Reform, Cagen (1978) gives a socialist analysis 
of how the individualism in American culture is a barrier to 
achieving the goals of self-realization, community, and im­
proving society, an analysis that identifies some of the 
political implications of placing a high priority on community. 
The most distinctive characteristic of American culture 
is individualism, Cagen claims. Personal liberty, individual 
initiative and the private search for happiness are deeply 
rooted values. While these are in themselves positive values, 
they have become the legitimation for selfishness and for 
placing individual concerns over group needs. In the place 
of moral commitment, we increasingly appeal to a personality 
ethic that evalutes actions by how they meet personal needs 
and desires, a "morality of individual whim" in Becker's 
terms (p. 230). The growing concern with "healing psychic 
wounds and liberating persons from oppressive guilt" has led 
to a more negative perspective on family and community life 
and a down-playing of such values as responsibility, loyalty 
and caring (p. 230). While individualism in America has 
always been strong, Cagen suggests, religion restrained it 
in earlier times and helped maintain those values that pro­
mote the common good. But with the decline of religion, in­
dividualism in its more destructive forms has flourished. 
Responsible for this growing self-centeredness and iso­
lation is our economic and political order, Cagen argues. 
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Individualism is not incompatible with conformity, and indeed, 
our mass institutions often promote both, particularly through 
a materialistic, consumer orientation that a free enterprise 
system promotes. Reacting against the conformity and dehu­
manizing settings of our institutions, many persons withdraw 
and declare their own independence. But such a stance is 
neither a way to self-realization nor to social change and 
solidarity, Cagen points out. Indeed, it is the economically 
privileged who can withdraw and seek their own way to self-
realization. What is needed, she argues, is a commitment to 
economic and social changes that will liberate all classes, 
one that is based on a sense of solidarity and a moral com­
mitment to a better society for all. Cagen criticizes radi­
cal, free school educational reforms for having ignored how 
selective, class-based, and individualistic their concepts 
of liberation are and for omitting concerns for cooperation, 
ways to work for social change, and altruistic attitudes. 
Cagen advocates a pedagogy that goes beyond the idea that 
personal liberation and social responsibility are antithetical, 
proposing one that is founded on the idea that it is human na­
ture to live in a social context, that self-realization takes 
place in community. With a concept that human development 
is concerned both with individuality and community, an edu­
cational theory can maintain a dialectic between authority 
and personal values. She notes that while free schools are 
one-sided in the direction of personal values, collectivist 
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education tends to be one-sided in direction of authority. 
Cagen is particularly concerned that we develop educational 
models that give an important place to cultivating behavior 
and attitudes reflecting concern and respect for human beings 
and commitment to social action: 
The goal of collectivist education ... is 
to make moral ideas into moving forces, to educate 
and raise children whose sympathies for other hu­
man beings become as important in determining 
their actions as their ability to use reason and 
intellect. (p. 248) 
While Cagen seems to be too sanguine about the heavy hand 
of authority in socialist schools and, for me, too dogmatic 
in Marxist rhetoric, she nonetheless articulates well the con­
cern that individualism has overpowered community in our society 
and in our schools and that most concepts of educational re­
form give too little attention to the need for altruism, com­
munity, and commitment to work for the common good. Cagen, 
Giroux (1980), Bowles and Gintis (1976) and others from this 
perspective make clear that we cannot talk effectively about 
a concern for alternative values and structures in education 
without becoming aware ourselves and helping students develop 
a critical consciousness about how the social, political, and 
economic forces influence those structures and have a vested 
interest in maintaining them. 
Recognition that the loss of community and its values 
is closely linked to our economic system is essential, I 
suggest, for any significant understanding of why community 
is a difficult value for Americans in this century to achieve. 
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However, we do not have to turn to some ideology outside our 
tradition, like Marxism, because there are significant com­
munity themes (such as "We the people" of the Declaration of 
Independence and truly democratic political models), other 
versions of the American myth, as well as religious traditions, 
that offer an alternative to the dominance of our social and 
economic life by the concerns of the capitalist system. In­
deed, I find that the social vision of Marxism is not adequate, 
even though it offers a profound critique of the weaknesses 
of our society. Human solidarity based on class struggle 
and common economic concerns is not sufficient for a lasting 
or comprehensive community. Based on the idea that social 
existence creates consciousness, Marxism tends to reduce the 
human spirit and imagination to materialistic concerns. A 
more complete vision of human community is the kind seen in 
the Polish workers' strike where men and women joined in 
solidarity to gain both their economic and political rights 
and their right to maintain their mythic heritage, i.e., their 
Christianity. 
Without seeing the mythic dimension of human conscious­
ness and community, an education that seeks to develop in 
students a critical awareness of the economic and political 
powers that shape and control their institutions runs the 
risk of alienating youth from their families, traditions and 
places of community. While some degree of alienation is 
probably necessary and inevitable, the mythic perspective 
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suggests that to be fully human is to be deeply rooted in the 
common life of a people and to share visions of common goals 
that are broader than economic and political concerns, but 
that include these concerns in a significant way. The task 
is to educate the imagination for such visions, to discover 
through art, literature and even the metaphors of science the 
potential world as well as the real world. 
In Conclusion 
The problem of alienation is the most serious social and 
educational problem which community addresses. Attention to 
the value of community requires that we re-examine some of 
the fundamental liberal principles, suggesting that they may 
not be wrong so much as incomplete or one-sided. While much 
of the alienation in our society is due to the impact of the 
corporate organization on our institutions and social forms, 
some of it is also due to our movements toward liberation. 
The "liberated" woman is very often alienated from her family, 
the liberated black person is frequently alienated from the 
black community, and the liberated student is quite often 
alienated from the ideas and values of his/her parochial 
world. The dilemma of liberation vs. commitment suggests that 
we need to direct more attention to ideas and models that 
represent a synthesis, ways to overcome alienation without 
simply abandoning the idea of self-realization contained 
in the movement toward liberation. 
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Maxine Greene (1978) addresses the concern for overcoming 
the alienation that often accompanies learning through help­
ing students recover their own "primordial landscape." Draw­
ing from the writings of Merlou Ponty, Greene explores the 
importance of finding one's own ground, a lived reality, the 
space out of which the self emerges. An example of this kind 
of process she finds in Wordsworth's Prelude, in which the 
poet returns to his homeplace to begin to shape a meaningful 
world. In this process of regaining "the primordial land­
scape," Greene writes, "he feels present to himself, in touch 
with himself as never before." His learning, his self-
knowledge, takes place "against an awareness that rooted him 
in a landscape and provided an enduring ground" (p. 15). 
This perspective could not be gained from a disembodied, 
abstract exploration, she concludes. The goal of such a 
process is to locate one's being in a context and then to 
transcend through reflection and analysis to the creation of 
the self, not abstracting oneself from the background but 
finding a range of perspectives that help one create a net­
work of relationships that make being in the world not an 
isolated and random event but a direction of possibility and 
responsibility. 
Becoming reconnected with one's background, with the 
primordial landscape is very similar, I think, to the concern 
expressed above for education that helps students to find 
and, if necessary, to reinterpret ties with their own 
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mythological inheritance and communities. While this is an 
individual task, it is also a communal task, for it will be 
through the discovery or creation of common symbols that stu­
dents will begin to be able to talk with each other about 
common tasks and meanings. This seeking of the deep connec­
tions is what myth is concerned with, both in a psychological 
sense and in the social realm of shared history and rituals. 
The image of being rooted and grounded in a given landscape 
exists in tension with the image of transcendence; together 
they suggest the poles between which the student searches 
for an education that is personally meaningful. A curriculum 
that is designed for liberation alone risks alienation, while 
one designed for accommodation to tradition and authority 
sacrifices self-realization and moral criticism. 
Education and community sounds like a good, safe issue, 
and it is if we accept the superficial interpretation often 
given to community. However, when we understand that com­
munity is a social form that is not compatible with the values 
encouraged by our economic system we realize we are talking 
about the need for political confrontation. When we find 
that what supports community conflicts with some of our other 
personally held values, we realize that we are dealing with 
a classic human dilemma—there is not a right answer. 
Besides seeking some changes in curriculum material, 
changes in attitudes toward what we are educating students 
for, and changes in how we view the school's relationship to 
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the community, there is another kind of task we can be in­
volved in at a theoretical level that is the major sort of 
shift for which we would hope. That task is the search for 
a new metaphor or a new story that will symbolize for us a 
way of dwelling together that represents the human dimensions 
of community and myth and overcomes the isolation of our 
mechanistic metaphors. Approaches to community that do not 
include the mythic dimension, that search for common metanhors 
or stories, are without the depth that a meaningful concept of 
community requires. What Jung, Campbell, Frye and other 
writers about myth tell us is that we have a rich common 
stratum of images from which to draw. 
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EPILOGUE 
This investigation into the various dimensions of myth 
and education has stopped short of making many specific sug­
gestions for curricula in specific areas. How some of the 
ideas developed here could be applied to decisions about what 
is to be taught in schools is an area for further inquiry. I 
want to suggest several directions such investigations might 
take. In doing this I want to make clear that these sugges­
tions do not represent the main goal or primary concern of 
this study. Indeed, I hope that the main ideas about how 
myth is related to learning at different developmental stages 
and how it helps us to focus on the significance of imagina­
tion, meaning, and community in curriculum development have 
already been established. 
The recognition of the importance of myth and fairy tale 
to the child's cognitive and emotional development can pro­
vide a new perspective on what literature we select and en­
courage for children. Not only does it suggest that the 
traditional stories are important, but it also indicates that 
fantasy is as "relevant" to the child's needs as realism. 
In recent decades there has been a great flowering of chil­
dren's literature, including a large outpouring of both con­
temporary realistic fiction and modern fantasy. While most 
approaches to children's literature suggest that children need 
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both kinds of fiction, too little attention has been given 
to how these different forms help shape or are matched with 
the child's conceptions of the world and how to strengthen 
the developing imagination and ego. 
Advocates of realistic fiction argue that children will 
deal with their own problems better and be more sensitive to 
others' needs if they can read about people like themselves 
going through similar difficulties. This idea seems to be 
based more on adult logic than on what we know about how 
children think and how they deal with emotional conflict. 
Also, I find that realistic fiction runs the danger of being 
didactic, showing children how they should adjust to modern 
life, as well as carrying strong messages about personal and 
social values that are current but, I think, often superficial 
and at times destructive of the confidence and hope children 
need in order to want to grow up. 
Fantasy, on the other hand, because it offers experiences 
and images more universal and related to needs at a level of­
ten below consciousness, strengthens the child's ability to 
use the imagination to organize knowledge and to deal with 
problems in a way more flexible and meaningful. Because of 
the flux and relativity of their everyday world, children 
need, as much as ever, experiences of an ideational world 
where ideals, absolutes, and firm values exist and where trage­
dy is not senseless but takes place in a context of meaning. 
The strong appeal of myth-based fantasies, starting with 
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Tolkien and C. S. Lewis and continued by other good writers, 
is indicative of the significance of this kind of fiction 
for children. 
The importance of fantasy to adolescents is a phenomenon 
that has been more difficult to understand. Why do teen-agers 
read Tolkien, play Dungeons and Dragons, read and create 
comic books based on ancient legends and myths? Because 
these interests are strongest in youth who identify with what 
is left of the "counter-culture," it indicates that they are 
part of the rejection of one myth the culture offers and the 
seeking of another. 
I am suggesting that more study is needed to explore how 
the literature children read relates to the development of 
the ego and the imagination and how it corresponds to the 
knowledge children can use. Also, more investigation is 
needed into Travers' theory that it is not from individual 
interests but from those patterns of interest that indicate 
universal characteristics of children's needs and the conceptual 
framework at particular ages. Such investigation can help us 
understand the role of fiction in child development at a 
deeper level than it is usually treated. 
Approaches to teaching science need to be examined from 
this perspective. The way younger children relate to natural 
phenomena is, as we see from the Piaget study, not detached 
or scientific. Instead of teaching younger children to use 
the scientific method, it may be more appropriate and 
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meaningful to allow them to explore the natural world and 
express their discoveries and questions in terms of the ani­
mism and artificialistic modes with which they think. The 
child's sense of connectedness with natural phenomena is 
the basis of metaphor and the sense of belonging in the world 
that could be reinforced rather than weakened by what is taught 
in a science curriculum. Questions to be asked might be: 
What basic metaphors about the natural world do we want our 
children to think with, Earth as Mother or Home, or Earth as 
a gold mine or a factory producing goods? What might be 
the long-range consequences of establishing mythic and or­
ganic metaphors rather than mechanistic metaphors? 
For adolescents the approach to science will shift. 
Children, having gradually replaced their mythic sense of 
participation in nature and events, have learned many of the 
facts of the physical world. During adolescence more than 
the facts become important, for now students seek to know 
the laws and systems that govern the natural world. However, 
the approach developed here suggests that it is also a time 
when raising philosophical and ethical questions is important. 
- This suggests that learning about the moral and ideological 
choices made in regard to science and its applications in 
technology should be an important concern of a science curricu­
lum at this level. 
In the area of moral education there is the need for more 
investigation of ways to address the problems Oliver and 
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Bane (19 76) found with the approach that focused on the ra­
tional discussion of principles. Their suggestion that atten­
tion shift from seeking principles to understanding human 
dilemmas and seeking common myths is a concern addressed also 
by Novak (1970): 
Contemporary studies in ethics, in Anglo-
American circles, concentrate upon logic and lan­
guage; I wish, instead, to concentrate upon the 
drive to understand and upon myths and symbols. 
My reason for doing so is that men seldom, if 
ever, act according to principles and rules stated 
in words and logically arranged. They act, rather, 
according to models, metaphors, stories, and myths. 
Their action is imitative rather than rule-abiding. 
Prior to their attention to obey sets of rules, 
they are trying to become a certain type of person. 
Rules are to myths what single words are to 
sentences. The same word may have different mean­
ings in different sentences; the same rule may be 
obeyed differently by men living out different 
myths. (p. 23) 
Greene (1978) also contends that moral education needs to 
direct more attention to the identity students are trying to 
work out and the kind of communities they want to be linked 
with and less to the consideration of principles: 
Moral education, it would seem, must be as 
specifically concerned with self-identification 
in a community as it is with judgments persons 
are equipped to make at different ages. It has 
as much to do with interest and action in concrete 
situations as it does with the course of moral 
reasonina. It has as much to do with conscious­
ness and imagination as it does with principles. 
(pp. 47-48) 
This task of "self-identification in a community" is, as I 
attempted to show above, a part of the function of myth. 
Finding modes of moral education that focus on the myths 
and stories, as well as the communities with which students 
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want to identify, and seeking ways to make moral choices as 
regards those myths, is an important area for study. 
Beyond specific curriculum areas, attention needs to 
be directed toward what the school symbolizes by the kinds of 
studies and kinds of space for learning that are provided. 
For example, Charity James (1980) recommends that schools 
think about other kinds of centers than just skills centers, 
such as a "myth center" where students can reflect on and be 
in touch with that level of consciousness where myths reside. 
Time and space for art and dance are also ways that the 
school says to the students that mythos as well as logos is 
important. 
It is my general conclusion from having done this study 
that myth refers not to just some rather vague feelings about 
a deeper level of consciousness, or to a retreat from the 
modern world into "primitive" ways of thinking and living, 
or to any narrow conception of the religious experience. 
Rather I see it as itself a kind of metaphor for ways of 
knowing and organizing knowledge, as well as for kinds of 
knowledge inherent in different forms at certain stages of 
development. At times the mythic way of knowing stands in 
opposition to the rational way of knowing, but this conflict 
is one that can often be resolved or understood differently 
when we recognize the ideological conflicts that usually 
underlie commitment to the rational versus the mythic, or 
individualism versus community. What knowledge is important 
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is, we know, as much a political as an objective decision. 
Attention to myth will, I hope, help us to reexamine some 
of our social and political assumptions about education, as 
well as allow us to look in a new way at the world of the 
child and the dilemma of the adolescent in our society. 
Bruner and Campbell both suggest that while we seek 
myths as external and communal images of our identity, we 
may be forced in our time to turn inward in our search in 
an effort that is lonely and not complete because the com­
mon myths and communities are present only in fragmented ways. 
But neither suggests that we abandon the effort to know and 
explore the mythic, and Campbell is optimistic that beyond 
this period of fragmentation we can achieve more adequate 
myths than those we are being forced to leave behind. That 
kind of hope gives the study of myth in our time integrity. 
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